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Abstract
Traditional views of negative, self-referent emotions such as shame and
guilt never questioned the utility or necessity of these painful feelings. In fact,
both shame and guilt were seen as crucial to maintaining appropriate modes of
conduct, propriety, and keeping in check selfish strivings or self-aggrandizement.
Modern psychology has long treated both shame and guilt as pathological and,
given its emancipatory, individualistic focus, has sought to rid persons of both of
these self-conscious emotions without considering the possible negative
consequences of such a project. A key component of the pathologization of
negative emotions is the increasing emphasis placed on the individual, as both the
primary psychological and political unit in American society. Mainstream
psychology has placed the self in the center, both reflecting and reifying the
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dominant social ethic and political philosophy, liberal individualism. Psychology,
with its emphasis on the individual, has had the effect of inculcating an often
hypertrophied self-awareness, as well as expanding individual freedoms and
potentials. This self-awareness, with its inevitable self-comparison,
vulnerabilities, and clamor for validation, is the fountainhead of shame (and
shamelessness) for modern persons. The relationships between shame and guilt,
depression, individualism and communitarianism, empty narcissism and
Meaningful Connectedness, and responses to anger provoking scenarios were
investigated in a sample of 150 upper division undergraduates using measures of
the dimensions of interest. In general, shame-proneness was significantly related
to externalization, depression, and malevolent anger. Guilt-proneness was
significantly related to constructive anger and Meaningful Connectedness. When
grouped according to level of individualistic ethical beliefs, highly individualistic
participants were significantly more shame-prone and more likely to endorse an
empty, selfish and disconnected approach to life.  The highly individualistic group
was significantly less likely than either the moderate or low groups to experience
a sense of meaningful connection to others or a community, which may
exacerbate feelings of alienation and shame. A communitarian ethical orientation
was significantly related to a sense of Meaningful Connectedness. There were no
significant relationships between individualism and malevolent, destructive anger.
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1Chapter One
Overview
Traditional views of shame, guilt, and the other so-called “self-conscious”
emotions regarded these experiences as the natural personal consequences of an
individual’s or group’s thoughts and actions in the social, personal, and spiritual
realms. In the traditional sense, shame was the consequence of an immoral act
attributable to character logical weakness, or of a socially proscribed manner of
living. In more archaic definitions, shame is simultaneously an emotion, a
personal quality, and a status. In this manner, a "sense of shame," an
understanding and respect for the boundaries of acceptable deportment, was once
seen as essential to dwelling in community with others.  Guilt, less global in its
implications, attended the outright violation of codes of interpersonal conduct and
was resolved by amendment or reparation. These emotions were normally
regarded as helpful, guiding people back onto a path of right belief, thought, and
action; or as a well deserved form of emotional autocorrection. In fact, failure to
experience shame or guilt in appropriate contexts has traditionally been treated as
either a moral failure or as a character defect, i.e. "moral insanity" or sociopathy.
To lack a "sense of shame,” or to behave shamelessly are character judgments
usually reserved for unsocialized children, outlaws, or renegades of selfishness.
2This once was true of American and Western cultures in general, and continues to
be the case in many cultures characterized by more relational notions of self and
identity.
Current views of negative emotions, grossly influenced by over a century of
psychological theory and changes in the self and interpersonal connectedness,
generally problematize and seek to overcome or dispense with them. The
proliferation of self-help books, programs, workshops, not to mention psychiatric
medications all address a fundamental dissatisfaction with our emotional lives.
Why have guilt, shame, pride, and other self-referent emotions come to be treated
differently in American mass culture? Guilt and shame, and getting rid of them,
have become a big business for a diverse group of experts, from self-anointed,
self-help speakers, to "aesthetic surgeons," to empirical psychology researchers. It
is difficult to see why these negative self-reflexive emotions traditionally regarded
as painful but natural and vital, have come to be experienced in such a
problematic, and often debilitating manner by modern persons.
A central premise of this dissertation is that changes in what Charles
Taylor (1989, 1991) refers to as frameworks of meaning, and concomitant
mutations in the entity we refer to as "the self," are the most salient factors in the
increasingly noxious power and attendant pathologization of negative emotional
experiences. Frameworks of meaning, derived from lived experience, pre-existing
the individual, and within which facts become meaningful to persons, are
3"intricate webs of belief by which individuals shape their lives and against which
these lives make some sense." (Taylor, 1991) Similarly, the political philosopher
Alasdair McIntyre (1988) identifies these frameworks, or tradition as not so much
a system of beliefs, and as such open to substantiation or delegitimation by
argument. Instead, "the language in which we must frame questions and answers
for ourselves," (Lovin, pg. 2 1991) and that we do not so much assert them as we
are shaped by them.
Among the changes in frameworks of meaning, the emphasis on the
individual self as the base unit of life has had dramatic effects across the lived
world and studies of it. Taylor (1989) argues that selves were once more
connected or embedded in a web of relationships, roles, and invariable
continuities of experience. While he does not contend that in the past, recent or
archaic, that there was no such thing as the self. He does make a powerful
argument that beginning with the Enlightenment and the expansion of scientific
inquiry and increasing skepticism towards cosmological understandings of life
and the world, people once experienced themselves in a radically different manner
(Taylor, 1989, 1991b). This supposition is given credence by encounters with
persons from less individuated and industrialized contemporary cultures such as
Japan, China, or India (Ho, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1996; Taylor, 1992).
We can hardly imagine our selves as being any other than as they are.
Yet, a key component of the pathologization of negative emotions is the
4increasing emphasis placed on the individual, as both the primary psychological
and political unit in American society. Scientific psychology has placed the self in
the center, both reflecting and reifying the dominant social ethic and political
philosophy, liberal individualism. Psychology, and to be fair, the majority of the
other academic disciplines have promoted the “turn inward” (Cushman, 1990;
Sass, 1994) and this emphasis on the individual has had the effect of inculcating
an often hypertrophied self-awareness, as well as expanding individual freedoms
and potentials. An argument will be made in the course of this project that these
changes in the self initiated and imposed by modern frameworks of meaning have
allowed current persons of both genders and many ethnic groups the greatest
degree of individual freedom and personal fulfillment in recorded history, while
concomitantly alienating from self and community and increasing the debilitating
qualities of negative self-conscious emotions, especially shame.
Quite a few theorists have proposed that shame and guilt are affective
concomitants or even affective signals to threat perceptions to social bonds (H.
Block Lewis, 1971, 1976, 1980; Manaster & Corsini, 1993; Morrison, 1989;
Scheff, 1990, 2000; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991). In a recent retrospective study,
Thomas Scheff (2001) identified the primary contributors to depression in a group
of elderly men as lack of secure bonds. Insecure bonds he typified as relationships
with a history lacking moments of mutual understanding (both cognitive and
emotional) and devoid of even a vague level of equality. In Scheff's analysis, the
5depressive disorders of the elderly men in his sample were attributable to "another
primary emotion, shame," (2001) rather than grief. During interviews, the men
"positively radiated shame," identified in their "overly soft speech, lack of eye
contact, slowness, fluster, and self-blame," all of which (Block Lewis, 1976,
1981; Kaufman, 1989; M. Lewis, 1991, 1996, 2000; Retzinger 1991, 1995) are
regularly identified as behavioral shame indicators.  The late empirical researcher
and clinician Helen Block Lewis (1976, 1981) proposed a type of depression that
is attributable, primarily to unacknowledged shame.
Block Lewis (1976) defined the term shame in a special sense, referring to
a concept much broader than implied in everyday usage or current empirical
psychology. She considered shame to describe a family of emotions that includes
embarrassment, modesty, and shyness, as well as more problematic
manifestations like humiliation. The common element to this range of emotions,
Block Lewis believed, was that they are all reactions to threats to social bonds. In
this light, Block Lewis acknowledged the positive, as well as the negative aspects
of shame. In her usage, shame also referred to a variety of colloquial terms
indicating a lack of self-respect, low self-esteem, lack of self-confidence,
heightened self-consciousness, and unfavorable social self-comparison. Similarly,
she also implicated shame in resentment and envy, which in turn, are ineluctably
relational phenomena concerned with the state of social bonds.
6Block Lewis spent well over two decades researching and writing about
shame and guilt, but still managed to regard both of these emotions as natural and
necessary. She addressed shame, in particular as having healthy, relationship-
affirming qualities as well as pathological, alienating manifestations. Subsequent
psychological theorists seem to have taken only the pathological aspects to define
the entirety of shame (Kaufman, 1989; M. Lewis, 1991, 2000; Morrison, 1989;
Nathanson, 1991; Tangney, et.al 1991, 1992, 1996). Theoretical and empirical
relationships between shame and many forms of deviant and pathological
behavior have been examined. Significant empirical correlations were
demonstrated between a pathological degree of shame and narcissistic personality
disturbance (Gramzow & Tangney, 1996; Hibbard, 1993), somatization and
depression (Tangney, et. al, 1991, 1992), destructive responses to anger (Tangney,
1996), Dissociative Identity Disorder (Alessandri & Lewis, 1996; Lewis, 1992,
2000) and domestic violence (Scheff & Retzinger, 1995). Clinician-theorists have
written at length on the relationship of shame to Narcissism (Broucek, 1991;
Capps, 1992; Fowler, 1996; Goldberg, 1995; Kohut, 1971, 1976; Morrison, 1989,
1991), Histrionic personality (Broucek, 1991; Kernberg, 1975), and alienation
(Kaufman, 1989; Schneider, 1992).
7Mainstream psychological researchers basically ignore the idea of
shamelessness, perhaps because of its reference to moral judgment1.
Shamelessness can be defined as a denial of modesty, self-promotion,
instrumental use or display of one’s body or self, self-objectification, and
imagined transcendence of the shared meanings and values of one’s world of life
(Broucek, 1991; Fowler, 1996).  Shamelessness is also characterized by a lack of
empathy, or an initial empathic sentiment that regresses into an inward focus on
the injustices done to, and the sufferings of the self, or “egoistic drift” (Hoffman,
1984).
Shamelessness is a form of self-objectification, or “embracing
objecthood” (Broucek 1988, 1991).  He suggests that turning oneself into an
object for the visual appropriation of others is a common symptom of narcissistic
and histrionic personalities. In this case, aesthetic considerations predominate
over moral considerations. According to Broucek (1991), the aestheticism of
hysteria is concerned with many variations on two basic themes: “Am I pretty, or
manly?” and “Am I bright?” Combined, these two themes produce the questions
“Am I interesting?” and “Do you like me?”
Shame in its many manifestations is intimately connected with connection,
that is, it seems to signal danger to or detachment from social bonds. In its more
                                                 
1 Much has been written as to the allegedly "value-free" or objective nature of psychology that
reveals, in fact, the discipline operates under several disguised or unacknowledged moral
8pathological manifestations, shame makes re-affiliation difficult or extremely
problematic due to its stimuli to the shamed to hide, cover, or disappear. Given
the modern, Western framework of individualism, with its attendant amplified
sense of separation, boundedness, and self-generation, it is not surprising that
shame has become so debilitating. Nowhere is this more apparent than in some
modern theories of psychological development, with the emphasis on "separation-
individuation" (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). On the advice of experts,
parents have, for at least a generation, practiced pushing their children away
(Michael Lewis, 1991, 2000) allegedly fostering "self-sufficiency." It is possible
that this has had the effect of weakening social bonds and increasing the
pathological, alienating experience of shame.
An individuated self is after all a self on display, separate from the
protective figure-ground of family, group, or community. Through the media, we
are constantly bombarded with images of impossible beauty, strength, wealth, and
achievement. Thus the new ideals of acceptability, of worth, of having any value
as a being, are disseminated and demanded. How could we fail to experience the
emotions of self-deficit, including shame when compared to images of eternally
youthful, perpetually pumped, and immaculately dressed models? Especially
when the same images encode commands for self-comparison and resultant
shortfall. An image is infinitely manipulable while a person is not. It would seem
                                                                                                                                      
assumptive bases or ideologies.
9that many of the well-documented psychological disorders of modernity are
adaptational or defensive formations in the face of exposure, separation, and
commercially mandated self-deficit.
There are many admirable qualities and values embedded within the
frameworks of segments of American society that are outside of the dominant
discourse. Many of these same qualities and values were once a part of Western
frameworks of meaning, but have weakened or been lost in the spiraling of
individualism-consumerism-imagism that has contributed to the breakup the
modern self, families, and communities. In particular, social identity derived from
webs of relationships and interdependencies combined with valuation and respect,
rather than slavish obeisance, to tradition and of those with greater experience, i.e.
the elders in our lives, holds more promise than threat.
This brings the line of inquiry to a point that would not be possible
without considerable diminution of the formerly "imperious frameworks of
meaning" (Taylor, 1989). Namely that we, as (post) modern persons are able, at
least in part, to discern and describe these very frameworks. By so doing, we
possibly choose from among the best of the freedoms, responsibilities, values, and
qualities of both relational and individualist ethical orientations without violating
the foundational beliefs that constitute who we are, as individuals or members of
various groups. If this is indeed possible, what drives or undergirds our notions of
the good, the true, and the beautiful? What makes our choices worth choosing?
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Although thinkers such as Taylor, Lasch, and others recognize the frameworks
wherein lives are navigated and lived out, these "horizons"2 are never totally
perceptible or knowable. Fortunately, many thinkers have addressed these very
issues and some have offered a "third way," or at least an alternative to alienated,
self-interested individualism or oppressive, self-negating collectivism.
Communitarianism differs from both individualism and collectivism not
only on basic ethics of identity and on the world of life, but it is not received, or a
culturally inculcated position; people are not born into communitarian cultures
(Glendon, 1991). Rather, Communitarianism requires a conscious and intentional
engagement with the various frameworks such as individualism and collectivism,
their benefits, and dangers. This often requires a struggle within the self and in
communities to think, feel, and interact from a stance that acknowledges the
inherently dialogical nature of the self. This being an identity and a commitment
to the common good, to responsibilities, as well as preserving individual liberties
within the limits of the potential deleterious effects their exercise may hold for
others.
From communitarian perspectives, liberal individualism misrepresents
life. Humans cannot be self-contained, strangers to one another when each is born
with parents, and when these parents have friends, relatives, neighbors, work
associates, co-religionists, and fellow citizens (Walzer, 1988). The language of
                                                 
2 Heidegger's (1964) use of this term is similar to Taylor's sense of frameworks of meaning
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liberal individualism takes away the sense of connectedness, and leads to an over-
dependence on the rights of the individual, as protected by the courts and the state
rather than by close connections. In this way of thinking, the self is not a pre-
social configuration, but is capable of "reflecting critically on the values that have
governed its constitution" (S. Dolan-Henderson, 1994).
In this sense, communitarian thought is a dialogue between two broad
positions, one that gives primacy to liberty--individual rights and freedom, and
the other that gives highest priority to order--the good of the collectivity. Amatai
Etzioni (1996) characterizes his particular take on communitarianism as having
the goal of a "good society that nourishes both social virtues and individual
rights… and requires a carefully maintained equilibrium of order and autonomy,
rather than a maximization of either." A good society requires an order that is
aligned with the core moral commitments of its members. If the philosophy(s) of
Communitarianism does neglect individual, group, or community in any way, its
bases in life as a dialogue, an ongoing conversation among voices within and
without makes likely that these shortcomings will be addressed in interlocution.
12
Chapter Two
Literature Review
The Study of Self-conscious Emotions
There seems to be no universally accepted definition of what an emotion is
or what characteristics a phenomenon must have to qualify as one. The affect
psychologist Robert Plutchik summarizes:
Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective
factors, mediated by neural/hormonal systems, which can (a) give rise to
affective experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b)
generate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual
effects, appraisals, labeling processes; (c) activate widespread
physiological adjustments to the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to
behavior that is often, but not always, expressive, goal-directed, and
adaptive. (Plutchik, p.32 1994)
Philosopher Robert Solomon emphasized the cognitive, evaluative aspect
of emotion and de-emphasizes the physiological processes, “emotions are
judgments, not blind or irrational forces that victimize us. Emotions are the life
force of the soul, the source of most of our values, and the basis of most other
13
passions.” (Solomon, p. 21 1993) For many philosophers, emotions are part and
parcel of human beings as ethical, aesthetic, and relational creatures. Emotions, as
distinct from feelings or mood, are about, at, or for something. They involve
evaluation, whether conscious or otherwise. In practical terms, emotions may be
seen as involving affect or feelings concomitant with physiological events.  As
such, involving cognition, however ephemeral, in the form of evaluation and
memory; emotions express “inner” feelings; emotions can be a form of intra- and
interpersonal communication; and emotions can be extremely powerful, at times
to the point of overwhelming one (Pattison, 2000). Moods can be said to be more
general, in the sense that Heidegger believed as “being tuned into” or “turned off
to” the world (Solomon, 1993). Feelings, emotions, and moods, as categories, are
difficult to separate, one from the other, and are obviously profoundly interrelated
and interactive.
Social constructionists such as Kenneth Gergen (1994) argue that
emotions are not biologically based, physiological phenomenon resident in
individual agents. In this way of thinking, emotions have no objective existence,
they are not, in other words, “natural,” but rather are “performances within
relationships that conform to a socially intelligible script.” (Gergen, 1991)
Without aligning to either a radically scientistic or relativistic position, it is salient
that emotions, like human existence itself, involve both physiology and
psychological, social, and cultural factors.
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The emotions, as a subject of inquiry have an extensive history. However,
the term “self-conscious affects” was not coined until 1988, when Michael Lewis
employed it in reference to guilt, shame, pride, hubris pridefulness, and their
many possible permutations. As the term indicates, these emotions require a
reflexive awareness of one's location in a performative space, the referencing of
oneself in regards to some rule, condition, goal, or relationship. Thus, as M.
Lewis (1989) makes clear, self-conscious emotions involve evaluation of oneself,
and by extension, one's actions, choices, and decisions in regard to some
contextual or global standards or requirements.
Many theorists have made the distinction between primary and secondary
emotions (Lewis, H.B., 1971; Nathanson, 1994; Tomkins, 1963). The quantity of
emotions, which humans experience and with which they make sense of their
lives, is extensive. The idea of a basic set of emotions, pre-wired or genetically
endowed, is logically restricted to a small set from which others, through
combination or elaboration, are formed. There are multitudes of decision, rules,
and ideas that various theorists have insisted must be passed in order for an
emotion to be considered basic (Tomkins, 1963; Plutchik, 1962; Izard, 1977;
Lewis, 1998). One decision rule common to most schemas insists that primary
emotions are not dependent on introspection (Plutchik, 1962 in Lewis, 1992). This
is borne out in studies of the development of emotions in infants and children. If
we accept the supposition that infants are not born with a fully developed capacity
15
for self-awareness, then logically the emotions present when neonates are thrown
into the world, as well as those that emerge early on in life, might be described as
primary, or as comprising a more basic set of human emotions (Lewis, 1999).
If, for the primary set of emotions, self-consciousness is not required
(Lewis, 2000, 1992), then evocation of disgust, sadness, anger, surprise, joy,
interest or fear does not require introspection or reference to the self. A second set
of emotions including jealousy; empathy, envy, embarrassment, shame, pride, and
guilt seem to require the faculty of self-reference and involve the application of
the self to a thought, situation, or evaluation. The first set is in evidence before the
development of self-awareness and the second form with the capacity for self-
reference, or as the self emerges. M. Lewis (1990) uses the category “self-
conscious affects” to describe these changes in the emotional repertoire.
Lewis (1990) subdivides the secondary, self-conscious affects into one set
that involves self-evaluation and another that does not. The non-evaluative set
consists of emotional states that involve social exposure and include empathy and
envy. The evaluative set involves reflexive evaluation of the self according to
standards, rules, and goals that a person has tacitly interiorized and synthesized
through socialization and relationships to others. This evaluative set includes
guilt, shame, hubris, and pride.
Lewis (1990) conceptualizes emotions as "emotional states, emotional
expressions, and emotional experiences.”  In this way of thinking, emotional
16
states are non-cognitive, that is they do not require a set of thoughts, perceptions
or interpretations to precede them. Bodily sensations such as hunger, thirst, pain,
and fatigue are such states. Lewis refers to these as affects. Certain affects,
however embodied they may be, are more than physiological cues for survival.
These are referred to as emotions and they consist of states that many people
undergo on a daily basis that occur within and serve to constitute and color both
social and internal experiences. The list of primary emotion-states includes simple
conditions such as joy, sadness, fear, disgust, interest, and anger. For Lewis, the
secondary emotions include more complex states, including empathy, sympathy,
envy, guilt, shame, pride, and regret. These latter emotions require self-reference
and are distinguished from the primary emotions on this basis.
Lewis (1992) describes feeling in two senses. The first sense of the term
implies a felt physiological internal state, supposedly independent of cognition,
which has a unique connection in a one-to-one manner with some discrete
emotions such as fear or anger. A great deal of research and experimentation has
attempted precisely to observe, measure, and quantify these “biological emotions”
(Ax, 1953; Bowlby, 1969; Campos & Barnett, 1984; Damasio, 1994; Eckman,
1992; Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1991; LeDoux, 1995, 2001), with generally equivocal
results.
The second meaning of the word feeling has more to do with the self
(Lewis, 1998). In this sense, feeling falls under the heading of emotional
17
experience. It is an awareness of being in a particular emotional state. For
example, “I am aware of feeling angry,” is a knowing about feeling. This requires
an objective self-awareness of one’s feeling state not necessary for the
physiological state itself to happen. Emotional experience relates to introspection
and the self and Lewis defines as “a person’s evaluation and interpretation of her
own perceived emotional state, through observation of physiological changes,
such as increased heart and breathing rate, facial flushing or blushing, sweating,
etc., or through evaluation of facial neuromuscular activity like smiling.” (1992).
Emotional experience is influenced by contextual factors that aid in the labeling
of physiological states as discrete emotions.  Emotional experience requires
simultaneous attention to the emotional state or subjective level of awareness, and
a social/contextual factors requiring objective self-awareness. Subjective
experience is “the body attending to itself” (Lewis, 1997). This includes
homeostatic mechanisms and adjustments, as well as unattended to cognitions and
emotional states.
The second level of experience or objective experience is based on the
notion that people, as selves and social interlocutors, consciously reflect on
themselves. This may take the form of evaluating how one is meeting, or failing
to meet, operative standards, rules, or goals, or whether these criteria make sense
in a given situation. People are not always experiencing at the objective level.
Often other things draw attention away from the self. An example of this is the
18
loss of self-awareness that professional athletes describe during optimal levels of
performance, “in a zone.” The player, in such a situation, becomes a part of the
game and does not attend to her internal state. The player may not attend to her
feelings until a break in the action or after the game. At such a time, the player
may use contextual factors, such as winning or losing, to shape their emotional
experience.
Emotional experience requires people to attend to a restricted set of
stimuli (Lewis, 1997; Roberts & Pennebaker, 1995). Even though an individual
may be in a certain emotional state, without attention to contextual factors or
impressions, objective emotional experience may not occur. Emotional states and
expressions may occur outside of conscious awareness; they may influence
perception, interpretation, thoughts, and interactions with others and incite an
actor to a certain course of action (Tangney, 1996). For example, a person is
criticized by a supervisor at work, but then runs in to an old friend on the way
home and is distracted by the encounter. Nevertheless, after arriving home, his
partner comments that he seems touchy and short-tempered. This draws the
person’s attention to his emotional state, for which he has difficulty accounting.
Emotional experience ensues subsequent to the interpretation and
evaluation of states and expressions and is thus reliant upon cognitive processes
requiring perception, memory, and elaboration (Lewis, 1992; Roseman, 1984).
Changes in physiological activity must be monitored, perceived, and compared
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with previous experience before being labeled as a certain emotion. Socialization,
enculturation, and individual experience provide persons with contexts and a
vocabulary for deciding which emotion one is experiencing (Abu-Lughod & Lutz,
1988; Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995).  For a person to be aware that they are
feeling a certain feeling requires the imposition of learning and enculturation that
a certain feeling state is a certain feeling and thus has certain meanings specific to
that individual, their family, local groups and culture. Lewis’s second sense of the
word feeling may account for situational, individual, local and cultural differences
in emotions. In this sense, feeling falls under the heading of emotional experience.
Emotional expressions rarely have a direct correspondence to internal
states (Damasio, 1996; Lewis, 1992, 2000). As many researchers have found, the
physiological activities observed during divergent emotional states are quite
similar. For example, similar autonomic signs are measured for both anger and
happy excitement. There have been investigations linking local brain activity and
neurotransmitter proliferation with emotional states (LeDoux, 1991, 1995), but
these are beyond the scope of this project.
There are three modes for the expression of emotions, the face, the voice
and the body. Again, there is no straight association between internal states and
facial, vocal, and bodily expressions other than primary emotions in infants and
children (Lewis, 1990, 1992). Researchers have totaled at least 33,000 different
facial expressions available to most people given the musculature of the human
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face (Ekman & Freisen, 1977; Izard, 1988). Facial expression is certainly
amenable to conscious control. Given the many social situations that require
concealing one’s real feelings from others, it is safe to say that there is no direct
relationship between emotional state and expression and in fact persons who
cannot control or inhibit their emotional expressions generally have great
difficulties socially.
 Since there seems to be only a partial association between emotional
states and expressions, any account of shame by way of observing behavior is
bound to have limitations. Many theorists including Darwin (Bowlby, 1990;
Cornelius, 1996), Sylvan Tomkins (1963), Carroll Izard (1986), and Carolyn
Zahn-Waxler (1987) have attempted to identify shame and guilt experimentally
by observing research participants’ behaviors. Shame has characterized
behaviorally by gaze avert (breaking eye contact), down-oriented facial
positioning, collapse of the upper body into itself, blushing, and a cessation in the
flow of behavior. Given human ability and the social necessity of controlling
displays of emotions, experimental evocation and observation does not seem to be
a valid method for identifying self-conscious emotions. Another crucial confound
to accepting behavioral signs as shame or guilt manifestations is that many
researchers have not distinguished between shame, guilt, shyness, or
embarrassment (Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1992).
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Charles Darwin (Bowlby, 1990; Cornelius, 1996; Lewis, 1992) focused on
the function of emotions and their social expression in the context of evolution by
natural selection. Emotional expression, for Darwin, did not serve the purpose of
communicating emotions, but rather were the result of underlying action patterns
that promoted the survival of the individual and the species in general. For
example, the patterns of muscular activation of a male who perceives competition
(erect posture, chest thrown out, arms held tensely at sides, in effect making the
male appear larger), in Darwin’s way of thinking, are the result of the male
preparing to defend or attack. Given the close genetic relationship of humans and
other primates, their emotions and their expression should be similar and have
comparable functions.
Darwin observed that one of the basic distinctions between humans and
other primates is that human’s blush, while other primates do not (Bowlby, 1990).
He attributed this difference to “mind” or consciousness.  He associated shame
with a strong desire for concealment resulting from exposure to the gaze of
another plus the commission of a negative action.  He characterized
embarrassment as exposure plus a positive action. This is the only distinction
Darwin makes between shame and embarrassment. He also did not distinguish
shame from guilt, shyness or modesty.
Sylvan Tomkins (1963), psychoanalytically trained, adopted a Darwinian
perspective in his study of emotions. He, like Darwin, did not differentiate
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between shame, guilt or shyness and believed these emotions to be of the same
class (Nathanson, 1994). For Tomkins, all of the self-conscious emotions are in
reality a single class of emotional status that has the purpose of inhibiting or
increasing interest and enjoyment (Nathanson, 1994; Tomkins, 1963). In Tomkins
view, emotions are differentiated at the level of conscious awareness. Shame is
activated by an “incomplete reduction of interest and joy,” presumably in the
service of survival (1963). Tomkins identified shame behaviorally by a dropping
away of the head and upper body, closing and fluttering of the eyelids, turning
away, and blushing, which are all intended to reduce facial communication. For
Carroll Izard, another neo-Darwinian (1977, 1986), emotional expressions are
universal and do not vary much cross-culturally.  In the course of his work on
emotional expressions, Izard has developed a coding system for facial expressions
as a tool in the study of emotional development.  This facial coding system has
failed to differentiate any of these affects consistently (Nathanson, 1994; Lewis,
1992).
Carolyn Zahn-Waxler (1987, 1990) also developed a coding system for
measuring the self-conscious emotions, relying on all three modes of emotional
expression. By observing children’s responses to playing with toys that were
designed to fall apart, Zahn-Waxler and her colleagues have claimed to
differentiate shame from guilt. If a child responds to her/his toy breaking by
averting their gaze, “freezing,” acting confused or befuddled, they are identified
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as exhibiting a shame response. If, however, they respond to the toy breaking by
showing a tense facial expression and momentary gaze avert, and attempt to fix
their toy, this is suggestive of guilt. The “guilty” children do not attempt to
disappear and their attempts at reparation indicate that the focus is not on them,
but on the toy, the external object. In Zahn-Waxler’s thinking, the focus
subsequent to some failure is perhaps the most helpful behavioral difference
between shame and guilt. With shame, the focus is on the self, however with guilt
the focus appears to be external and subsequently on remediating the failure.
Zahn-Waxler’s studies do not differentiate between embarrassment and shame,
nor do they discriminate between guilt and coping or problem-solving behaviors.
Despite over a century of research, there is no single behavioral measure that
bears a strong relationship with the experience of shame (Lewis, 2000).
Self-Conscious Emotions: Phenomenology, The Self And Culture
Taking a position that emotional experiences require objective self-
awareness (Broucek, 1991; Lewis, 1990, 1992, 2000), it is possible to be in an
emotional state and not experience that state, whether it is a primary or a self-
conscious one. Self-conscious emotional states differ from primary emotional
ones in that they require self-construal. All emotional states require an organism
to produce the emotion, but self-conscious states require a self both to produce
and to experience it. To be in a state of shame, an individual must compare their
24
self, their actions or thoughts against some standard, rule, or goal and evaluate
failure. In order to experience the emotion people must focus their attention on the
state. This requires objective self-awareness. Shame may become a propensity for
some individuals and be evoked in an almost automatic manner.
Some psychoanalytic theorists have suggested that all shame is produced
unconsciously, out of objective awareness. For example, classical psychoanalytic
theories have advocated that there are prototypical shame-inducing situations such
as toileting accidents in potty-trained children. In this way of thinking, there is a
direct correspondence between bowel movements and shame. However, this
might also be explained by a child’s thoughts about their failure concerning the
standards of what big kids do not do and what little kids in fact do. Rather than
automatic processes incited by specific events, the logic of prototypicality should
rest on the assumption that certain stimuli lead to shame states because they are
more likely than others to lead to negative self-evaluation and shame producing
thoughts. However, many theorists from Darwin to the present continue to insist
on a causal link between prototypical shame-eliciting events and the production of
shame states (H.B. Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1995). In Tomkins’ mechanistic view
of affective life, most shame is induced automatically, out of conscious awareness
by prototypical events that stimulate the organism to reduce interest/enjoyment
(Nathanson, 1994). From this perspective, shame is the result of incomplete
reduction of interest/enjoyment. Michael Lewis (1992) counters Tomkins by
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suggesting a transposition of the elements in this formula. In Lewis’s formulation,
shame interrupts interest/enjoyment.
Carroll Izard (1992) includes both automatic elicitors and a more
phenomenological view. In this way of thinking, shame can be elicited by an
unconscious reduction in interest/enjoyment, ala` Tomkins, but also is a form of
self-perception, a keen consciousness of the self. Izard believes that prototypical
events can be internal, in the manner of beliefs or thoughts about the self, as well
as external. He defines shame as “a heightened degree of self-consciousness or
self-attention: our consciousness is filled with self and we are aware of some
aspect of the self we consider innocuous or inadequate.” (Izard, 1977) The trigger
is a quality of the self that a person considered innocuous or inadequate. From this
perspective, shame can be an affective regulatory mechanism, a series of thoughts
and feelings about the self, and a painful emotional experience.
Helen Block Lewis’s (1971, 1977) beliefs about the prototypicality of
shame center on the notion that it is a state of self-devaluation that can be
externally provoked, but an external event is not necessary or sufficient. In her
view, shame involves self-consciousness and self-imagery. Self-imagery is
present in the form of mental pictures or images of the self as disgusting, weak, or
damaged, dread fantasies of another’s judgmental perceptions and feelings in
regards to the self. Block Lewis distinguishes shame from guilt in terms of the
object of the emotion. With shame, the object of the feeling is the self. Guilt takes
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as its object a wronged other or a transgressive action by the self. HB Lewis
believed, like Adler, that shame and guilt had the same function that of correcting
lost relational bonds (Helen Block Lewis, 1971). Perhaps her major contribution
to the study of self-conscious emotions may be the emphasis she placed on the
mind as the elicitor of shame and guilt (M Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1992; 1995).
The disapproval of a significant other may provoke thoughts about self-
degradation, which then lead to the experience of shame. In this manner shame is
not the automatic product of a specific action. Rather shame-elicitors reside in the
self's legitimation of the negative evaluation of the self by others, and it would
seem, can be anticipatory or elicited in response to a projection or imagination of
the self in a situation that provokes shaming thoughts. The specific causes of
negative evaluations are varied. It may be failure to adhere to standards, the
violation of rules, and the failure to meet goals, or threat to, or loss of a
relationship. In all cases, it is the self’s focus on the self’s failure, and an
evaluation of the failure that evokes a shame experience.
Guilt may be somewhat easier to reconcile with the notion of prototypical
elicitors, although its manifestations vary as widely as do shame’s. Given the
current emphasis on guilt as a protector of relationships, the prototypical guilt
situation may be characterized as any event that is interpreted by an actor or
actors as in some way threatening to de-stabilize relational bonds (HB Lewis,
1971; 1977; Tangney, et al., 1992). Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1995)
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have proposed several interpersonal functions for guilt: (1) guilt contributes
directly to good relationships by promoting behaviors that benefit relationships
and by serving as an affective affirmation of the importance of relationships; (2)
guilt functions as an influence technique. Persons in relationships often will
employ guilt as a leverage mechanism, particularly if there is a power differential
in the relationship. As such, guilt can serve to equalize the balance of power; (3)
guilt acts to re-distribute emotional distress. Behaviors by a party in a relationship
that compromise the bond in favor of self-gratification may initially feel good to
the transgressor and bad to the injured party. Guilt acts as an emotional equalizer
when evoked in the transgressor, dampening their selfish enjoyment and possibly
heartening the wounded person through their partner’s show of remorse
(Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1995).
Until recently, guilt has received a majority of the attention of both
clinicians and affect researchers. The psychoanalytic position(s) on guilt are well
known. In the case of Freud, the superego, the mechanism by which the standards
of parents are incorporated into the self, (specifically through the child’s fear that
the parents will respond to transgression by withdrawal of love or punishment) is
the initial source of guilt. Guilt, in relation to the superego, is similar to its
relationship with instinctual drives and their expressions. Anxiety or fear is
directly transmutable into guilt. From Freud, two stages in the development of
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superego-guilt are notable: (1) the fear of authority, and (2) the fear of the
superego itself (Lewis, 2000).
In a well-developed superego guilt is always operative, not only when an
actual transgression has occurred. Freud’s notion of guilt did not involve the
global self, as in the case of existential guilt, but rather was related to one’s
action, including thoughts and instinctual urges. In the Freudian sense, guilt is a
specific and focused response to a transgression that can be repaired through
abstinence and penance. Pathological guilt arises from the combination of a
hypertrophied sense of guilt resulting from an overdeveloped ego. Normally, the
superego constantly condemns the ego; this in turn gives rise to normal guilt
(Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).
Phenomenology of Shame and Guilt
While it may be difficult to enumerate specific behaviors or prototypical
eliciting events for shame, a combination of behaviors and situations can be
helpful in the definition, observation, and study of shame and guilt (Lewis, 2000).
People’s responses to events can vary widely as a function of individual
differences in life experiences, expectations, desires and needs. However much
the content of thoughts about the self may vary individually, the phenomenology
of these two self-referent emotions does not change much across descriptions and
cultures.
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Lewis (1998) describes four useful ideas about shame phenomenology.
First, writers from the Old Testament to the contemporary describe an
overwhelming desire to hide or disappear. A second feature of shame is acute,
painful self-consciousness. This intense pain, discomfort, and anger distinguish
shame from embarrassment and shyness. A third feature of shame is the feeling
that one is worthless, inadequate, broken or contemptible. These thoughts
represent a global judgment of the self by the self. A fourth feature is the fusion of
subject and object. When experiencing shame, an individual is the subject, the
experiencer, as well as the object of evaluation. Shame disrupts ongoing activity
as the self focuses intently on itself (Helen Block Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992;
Tangney, 1995). The results are confusion, the inability to think clearly, to talk or
to act. A self is ensnared in a predicament in which the capacity to act becomes
compromised. The fusion of subject and object distinguishes shame from guilt. In
guilt, the self is the subject but not the object of the emotion. The object is
external to the self and may include a focus on harm done to another, to a
relationship, or to some other perceived collapse according to a set of standards or
rules.
Many theorists in the analytical tradition insist that shame is triggered by
the prototypical incontinence scenario and an assortment of other, primarily
intrapsychic sources. These include unacceptable aggressive and libidinal
impulses and specific developmental challenges such as muscle and motor
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control. HB Lewis (1971), herself analytically oriented, links shame with “soft
self-boundaries.” This consists in part as a preoccupation with what others are
thinking about the self, and in particular, the imagery that accompanies this
ideation. In shame, there is a literal feeling of looking and being seen. Francis
Broucek (1991), a proponent of a more relational form of self-psychology,
believes that shame signals a disruption in intentionality and shared consciousness
(an empathic mutualism) and thus in the sense of self. In this logic, there is no
need for a distinct structure of conscience or superego. Relational and moral
responsibilities to others and they to the self are a part of a constitutional
conversation and form the lifelong core of the self. Shame might result from the
failure of the self to abide by its obligations and responsibilities in regards to
others, as well as from consistent failure, rejection, or objectification by important
others.
Self-referent Thoughts and Self-conscious Emotions
A common thread that runs through the various theories under
consideration in this project supports the notion that whether an individual
experiences shame or guilt in certain situations seems dependent on how they
identify the self in that event (Broucek, 1991; Kohut, 1977; Lewis, 1992; 1998;
2000). What is common with both emotions is a self-evaluation and attribution in
regards to failure to act according to standards, rules, and goals. The self-
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attribution one makes determines the nature of the resultant emotion. M Lewis’s
cognitive-attributional model of shame and guilt (1992) does not specify what
constitutes success, failure, or the idiosyncratic processes that one employs in a
self-evaluation. This model does not specify any particular standards, rules or
goals that evoke shame or guilt across a population; these specific attributions are
a social product.
Michael Lewis’s Cognitive-Attributional theory of Self-conscious
Emotions (1992, 2000) is represented in Figure 1:
Figure 1: Lewis’s Attributional Model of Self-Conscious Affects
A. Standards, Rules, and Goals
B. Evaluation
C. Attribution of Self
The first feature of the model concerns standards, rules, and goals that
form and structure human behavior. All people have an ethical orientation
Success Failure
Focus
HUBRIS SHAME Global
PRIDE GUILT Specific
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consisting of beliefs, interiorized from their culture, education, family, and
individual life experiences, which may include reason. Standards differ across
different cultures, across groups within a culture, across individuals within
groups, across eras, and between persons of different genders and ages within the
same groups (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). To become a member of a group
requires that a person learn, emote and act according to its standards. These
standards are associated with human behavior, including thinking, feeling and
acting. Merely thinking about certain things may constitute a violation of some
groups’ standards. For example, a person who has sexual thoughts about a
friend’s partner may be violating the standards not only of the friendship, but also
of his family, faith, and culture. Lewis (1995) proposes that how people think,
what they think, and how they feel are modulated by standards. For the
philosopher Charles Taylor (1991), how people think about their standards and
their position in regards to them constitutes strong evaluation, or evaluation of
one’s position in regards to the good, the true, and the just.
Certain feeling states are appropriate and inappropriate, generally and
contextually. Sexual feelings about one’s mother are inappropriate in most all
cultures, while sexual feelings towards one’s partner are generally acceptable,
although varyingly private. In the inappropriate case, these feelings may produce
guilt or shame or may be defended against and surface as anxiety or a vague sense
of shame or guilt. Prescribed actions, standards, and the meanings associated with
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culture, gender, and ethnicity partially constitute the self from an early age
through a caregiver’s interactions, expectations, and relationship to a child. By the
age of one, children are beginning to learn the appropriate action patterns
reflecting the standards of their culture (Lewis, 2000). Standards are distributed
differentially to members of cultures and groups over time, gender, ethnicity, and
status, but the transmission to children begins at a very early age (Abu-Lughod &
Lutz, 1988).
The evaluation of actions, thoughts, and feelings in terms of standards is
the second feature of the attributional model of self-conscious emotions. There are
two major aspects of the process. The first concerns the internal and external
aspects of evaluation. People violate standards but do not often attribute their
failures to themselves. Frequently failure is attributed to the situation or other
person. Internal and external attributions are both situationally influenced and
may be characteristic of certain individuals. Some people are likely to blame or
credit themselves no matter what happens. Dweck and Leggett (1988) found that
many children blamed their success or failure on external factors, although a
significant number attributed their performance to their own actions or selves. In
this and other studies, strong gender differences are noted. In academic
achievement, boys generally attribute success to their actions and failure to
external factors (Beneffectance), while girls did just the opposite (Dweck &
Leggett, 1988).
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The second aspect has to do with how individuals determine success or
failure in regards to any specific standard. Interpretation and evaluation of
actions, thoughts and feelings in terms of standards is an important feature of
human behavior. All systems have some evaluative component, from biological
feedback mechanisms to whole societies. Children as young as three years old can
be described as having their own sets of standards, rules, and goals and show
distress when they violate them (Lewis, 1992; Stipek, 1983). Some standards are
more valuable than others, although what constitutes importance varies between
different groups. An example is found in Carol Gilligan’s (1982) critique of
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. In her work on the moral development
of children, she found that there are differences between girls and boys as to what
receives priority. For boys, notions of fairness and procedural justice prevail,
while with girls, priority is accorded to relationships. Subsequent thinkers (Dolan-
Henderson, 1994) have criticized Gilligan’s position as itself essentialist, although
it is possible to observe differential notions of what constitutes value between
these groups. Other writers within psychology have cited the lack of empirical
support and faulty methodology of Gilligan’s findings.
Criteria for and evaluation of success or failure are not the same for
everyone. Individual, familial, relational and contextual factors all can influence
the outcome of a self-evaluation. Obviously many factors influence the
production of unique or inaccurate evaluations of success or failure. These include
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early failures in the self-development leading to characterological problems
(Broucek, 1991; Kohut, 1971; Morrison, 1991), harsh socialization experiences,
and high levels of reward for success or punishment for failure (Lewis, 1992;
2000).
Another feature of attribution has to do with global or specific self-
attribution. Global attribution refers to the propensity to focus on the total self.
Some individuals, at least some of the time, and in some situations, tend to focus
responsibility for success or failure on the total self. The propensity for global
self-evaluation may be transitory (behavioral self-blame), or it may be a habit
(characterological self-blame). On the occasions of some failure in regards to
standards, rules, and goals, the focus is on the self, as both subject (actor) and
object (evaluated). This happens because the evaluation of the self by the self is
complete. The focus of the self is not only on his/her behavior, but upon their
worth, or lack of, as a human being. The result may be shame or a paradoxical
narcissistic defensiveness (Broucek, 1991; Kohut, 1971; Morrison, 1989; 1991).
Specific self-attribution refers to the propensity for some persons, some of
the time, and in some situations to focus on the specific actions of the self in
regards to standards, rules, and goals. The total self is not implicated, but specific
behaviors or effects on others may be. For example, if there is a failure to
remember a friend’s birthday, the focus is on the individual’s forgetting, the
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possibility that the friend’s feelings may have been hurt, and on repairing the
injury by calling, apologizing, or sending a belated card.   The self’s focus is on
its behavior in interaction with objects or persons (Tangney, 1992; 1995).
Global versus specific self-focus may be a personality style or habit (HB
Lewis, 1977; M Lewis, 1992; Weiner, 1988). When positive or negative events
are taken into consideration, relatively consistent attributional patterns can be
detected in individuals. This is referred to as an “attributional style.” Some
persons are likely to exhibit stability in their global and specific evaluations as a
matter of course. In addition to dispositional issues relating to global or specific
attributions, there are likely to be contextual factors. It seems likely that specific
types or situations, especially those involving gender or status role, may be more
likely than others to elicit a particular attributional focus, but these prototypic
elicitors remain largely unexplored (Lewis, 1992).
Given the view that persons, through shared consciousness, experience, or
socialization, establish standards, rules and goals; evaluate success or failure.
Based on these standards, rules and goals; and that people self-evaluate in terms
of internal/external, global/specific, and stabile/transitory; the relationship
between these processes and self-conscious emotions becomes clearer. This
model focuses on four emotions (and more subtle variants). Shame is a
consequence of a failure appraisal relative to standards, rules, and goals when the
person makes a global evaluation. Guilt, too, is the consequence of an assessment
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of failure, however, the focus is the self’s specific action. There are parallel
processes when an appraisal of success is made. When success is evaluated and an
internal, global, stable attribution is made, hubris or pridefulness is the result.
When success is assessed and a person makes a specific attribution, pride is the
resulting emotion (Lewis, 2000).
Shame
The term shame has been used to describe a broad range of related
feelings and social positions. One can feel shame when failure occurs in both the
public and private sphere, one can be “the shame” of one’s family, the term can
be used to express a loss, as in “it’s a shame you didn’t ----,” or to describe a
deplorable act or situation, “America’s shame is the death penalty.”  Although
generally unexplored in the psychological research, modesty, humility, reticence
and other desirable qualities are also closely related to shame (Augsburger, 19--;
Block Lewis, 1976, 1981; Schneider, 199- ).
Michael Lewis (1990; 1992; 2000) proposes that shame is the product of a
complex series of cognitive activities: individual’s evaluations of their actions in
regard to standards, rules, and goals and their global evaluation of the self. While
the mechanisms and precipitants of shame differ considerably between theoretical
positions, its phenomenology is generally accepted by most. The experience is
described as the wish to hide, disappear, or die (Kaufman, 1989; HB Lewis, 1971;
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M Lewis, 1992; Lindisfarne, 1998). It is extremely distressing and painful and
many writers propose it results in the disruption of ongoing behavior, confusion,
and inarticulateness (Broucek, 1991; Lynd, 1958; Morrison, 1989; Wurmser,
1981 :). The behavioral manifestations of shame are a drawing in and shrinking of
the body, as though to withdraw from interaction, covering the face and gaze
avert (Izard, 1989). Because of the intensity of shame and the global implication
of the self, the only immediate escape seems to be ridding oneself of it. Since it is
a global attack on the self (by the self), it may be extremely difficult to dissipate
(Kaufman, 1989). Paradoxically, shame is described as resulting in both being
dumbstruck and in empty verbosity (Scheff & Retzinger, 199-). There are many
actions people utilize when shamed in order to undo the state. These actions range
from the rational to the pathological, from reinterpretation, acceptance, and
confession to grandiosity, rage, dissociation and repression.
Contrary to earlier formulations, shame is not related to whether an event
is public or private3. Shame can result from a public failure or transgression, but
exposure is not necessary or sufficient for its evocation (HB Lewis, 1971;
Tangney, 1992, 1995). Failure, attributed globally to the self, can be either public
or private. It can be provoked just as easily by unacceptable thoughts or negative
self-comparisons as it is by some public failure. Ruminating on perceived failures,
                                                 
3 As proposed by writers from Charles Darwin to the contemporary psychiatrist Nathanson and
many others have insisted.
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social faux pas, and the like probably evokes a lot of shame. Shame can center on
moral action as well. From a philosophical perspective, standards, rules, and goals
are moral, they guide, shape and monitor the lives of humans, as beings for who
things matter (Taylor, 1991).
Block Lewis (1971; 1977)) and Tangney (1992) have proposed that some
individuals are shame-prone, or likely to experience shame in situations where
there are several affective possibilities. This is understood as a trait-like
interpretive bias that results in the implication of the global self in situations of
perceived failure or moral transgression (M. Lewis, 1992).  Shame proneness is a
negative evaluative belief about the global self that is stable over time and
situations (A global, internal, and stable attribution). Shame is a painful affect that
stimulates intense self-focused personal distress, emotional substitution, and
subsequent efforts to reduce this distress often by projection and externalization
(Tangney, 1992). Where guilt is regret for what one has done; shame is a regret
for who one is. Guilt has been defined as re-integrative, while shame is generally
treated as alienating and stigmatizing. Shame, with its attendant intense self-focus
is proposed by many to pre-empt the capacity for empathy and shared
consciousness, or intersubjectivity (Broucek, 1991; Tangney, et al., 1992).
Shame prone individuals were experimentally observed to resort to
destructive responses when angered. Tangney and colleagues (1996) found strong
positive correlations between shame-proneness and more intense anger arousal,
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destructive responses, distorted cognitions, and pessimism as measured by the
Anger Response Inventory (Tangney, et al., 1996). These responses include such
interpersonally maladaptive behaviors as withdrawal and avoidance, irritability,
self-aggression, direct and indirect hostility and aggression. Shame-proneness,
with its attendant self focus on the defective global self and disabled empathic
potential, can be an affective disposition to alienation and disconnectedness
(Capps, 1993; HB Lewis, 1977; Tangney, 1993). If the personal ambience of
social interaction is an exquisite sensitivity, and the responsibility for pain is the
defective self, then shame-prone individuals may self protectively be disposed
towards individualistic value positions. Thus, shame-proneness may be related to
an individualistic ethical orientation.
Shame, Guilt, and Psychopathology
Helen Block Lewis believed that shame and guilt were related to unique
symptom clusters (1971). A 1992 study by JP Tangney, Patricia Wagner, and
Richard Gramzow failed to support this particular idea. Several studies (Tangney,
et al., 1992, 1996; Keltner & Buswell, 1996) have found empirical support for
distinctions between these two self-conscious emotions. Drawing on Helen Block
Lewis’s notion that certain individuals are prone to shame, while others are more
prone to experience guilt, Tangney and her colleagues found significant
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correlations between shame-proneness and general psychosocial maladjustment
and several specific dimensions of psychopathology (1992). Significant
correlations from this study establish relationships between shame and
somatization, obsessive-compulsive traits, paranoid and idiosyncratic ideational
styles, proneness to hostility and anger, interpersonal sensitivity, both trait and
state anxiety, and depression. Guilt-proneness was inversely related to hostility
and anger, phobic anxiety, and depression.
 Block Lewis (1971) referred to shame as both a product and a catalyst of
alienation. 4 Tangney and her associates have also demonstrated associations
between shame-proneness and: anger arousal and self reported aggression (1992);
lack of empathy (1991); proneness to narcissistic personality disturbance (1992);
and destructive responses to anger (1996). Other theorists and researchers have
either demonstrated or proposed correlations between shame and various forms of
psychopathology including Narcissistic and Borderline personality disorders
(Broucek, 1991; Hibbard, 1993 HB Lewis, 1977; Morrison, 1989; Wurmser,
                                                 
4 Shame has been compared a form of intrapsychic communication, relating the
simultaneous fear of interpersonal failure combined with an overwhelming desire for acceptance
and belonging (Retzinger & Scheff, 1991). Individual psychologists such as Alfred Adler and
Ansbacher and Ansbacher (1959) have inferred that shame is an affective cry for belonging. Given
that many standards, rules, and goals have to do with relationships, this does not seem unlikely.
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1981), and Posttraumatic Stress and Multiple Personality Disorders (Lewis,
1992). Another study established significant associations between early trauma,
including sexual, emotional, and physical abuse and shame (Alessandri & Lewis,
1996). Because all humans must make sense of the events in their lives in some
manner, it is reasonable to assume that grossly mistreated individuals would
establish a causal link between their selves and the abuse to which they are, or
have been subjected. Even if the abuse stops, one who has been subjected to
sustained mistreatment is likely to believe that in some way they brought it on
their self (Lewis, 2000). In this sense, a “ruined” self is part of the evaluation and
attribution process resulting in shame.
One particularly noticeable confound for most empirical studies of shame
and guilt is that the shame considered in the majority of these studies is of an
extreme, debilitating form. Many of these recent articles on shame focus only on
its psychopathological manifestations and neglect possible positive or affiliative
instances. Many of these researchers, including Tangney make the error of
equating all shame as pathological and propose that it must be gotten rid of
altogether. Tangney actually valorizes “shame-free guilt” as an optimal human
emotional experience.
Problems in living originating from disturbances in the self have become
more prominent in the preceding twenty-five years (Broucek, 1991; Kohut, 1971;
Lasch, 1979; Lewis, 1992; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). Many writers
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and theorists have implicated cultural and economic changes in the transformation
from a society predominated by neuroses and anxiety, to one where
characterological problems seem to be flourishing. Narcissistic disorders, in
particular seem to have received a great deal of attention since the 1970’s. There
are significant differences between narcissism as a behavioral descriptor and as a
disorder of character. Christopher Lasch (1979) suggested that the concept of
narcissism has been “watered down” to refer to any thought or action that seems
remotely selfish; however, he applied the term as a descriptor of the general
development of American society over the past forty or more years. As American
culture as become increasingly psychologized terms, which were once used in
clinical and theoretical literature have become a sort of Lingua Franca,
particularly among the educated. The common usage of clinical terminology in
reference to non-clinical situations or phenomena is another facet of the
medicalization of the world of life.
Freud distinguished between two forms of narcissism: primary narcissism
involved an infant’s focus of her libidinal energies on her as yet undifferentiated
ego, while secondary narcissism referred to a withdrawal of psychic energies from
objects (people or pursuits) back to the ego, generally as a defense against
instinctual impulses. Freud regarded primary narcissism as more or less normal.
Heinz Kohut (1971, 1977) elaborated on the concept and argued that all
narcissism is not necessarily pathological, but rather, may lead to love for others
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early in life. In Kohut’s way of thinking, narcissism in its mature form is
responsible for creativity, empathy, and humor (Lewis, 1992). In this sense, this
form of narcissism is not pathological, but may be thought of as the will to power,
assertiveness, and self-esteem.
Diagnostically, pathological narcissism is described by DSM-IV (1994) as
a affected show of self-importance, an obsession with fantasies of endless
success, power, beauty, or ideal love; indifference or rage, subservience, shame,
and emptiness; exhibitionism; entitlement; manipulation in interpersonal
relationships, overidealization or devaluation; and a lack of compassion. Many
theorists (Broucek, 1991; Morrison, 1989; Lewis, 1992) argue that an inability to
cope with shame and humiliation underlies pathological narcissism.
The pastoral theologian Donald Capps (1993) refers to several types of
narcissistic personality in which shame is prominent, either by its proliferation or
absence. He delineates these types as, the "craving self," which is “emotionally
undernourished” and characterized by chronic emptiness, demands for attention,
and pouting and whining. When their demands are not met (and they never really
are); the paranoid self, characterized by hypersensitivity, rigidity, unwarranted
suspicions, jealousy, self-importance; and tendencies towards externalization and
attribution of evil motives to others. The manipulative self is characterized by
lying, lack of guilt, transient and superficial relationships, and extreme contempt
for others; the phallic self is characterized by exhibitionism, recklessness, and
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manipulative tendencies. The phallic type is generally thought of when the term
narcissism is employed. Capps refers to all of these types as empty and deficient
in empathy and the ability to connect with others in meaningful ways.
HB Lewis’s (1971) notion of shame-proneness, as elaborated by June
Price Tangney (1992) is helpful in thinking about narcissism and shame.
Narcissistic people are readily shame-prone and actively try to avoid experiencing
shame. This is attempted either by utilizing a set of cognitions designed to avoid
shame, or when this fails, by engaging in emotional behavior that masks shame
(Broucek, 1991; Morrison, 1989; Schneider, 1992; Wurmser, 1981). Using the
cognitive attributional model for this analysis, some people are disposed to
making global self-attributions, particularly in regards to negative events. The
propensity underlying narcissism is the consistent focus on the global self when
evaluating success or failure. Because of this focus, failure is likely to produce
shame and success is likely to result in hubris. The tendency to make global
evaluations affects both their standards and the evaluative process of failure in
regards to these standards. A person can avoid shame by never experiencing
failure; she can avoid failure by setting her standards low so as never to risk the
possibility of failure to meet them. Low standards, because they're easily met,
create a feeling of hubris. Persons who are prone to making global attributions
also set unrealistically high standards, which are difficult if not impossible to
meet, and thus create more shame for their selves.
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People employ many ideational defenses related to evaluation.  Some
claim success unrealistically; others with higher standards and the same behaviors
would be likely to rate their behavior as a failure. This unrealistic evaluation of
success is characteristic of grandiosity. Unrealistic evaluation of this sort is
designed to increase hubris and to avoid shame. A narcissist evaluates a behavior
that others would interpret as failure as a success. Unrealistic evaluation is
characteristic of the self-aggrandizement of narcissism.
Kohut (1971, 1977) described several characteristics of narcissism: the
prevalence of intense self-consciousness and particularly shame or hubristic
affect; an inability to empathize or consider the interests of others beyond their
usefulness to the self; and obsessive impression management (Goffman, 1963).
These related to intense awareness of themselves as a social object, as well as
unconscious fears of fragmentation. Kohut also believed that persons with
narcissistic personalities are deeply conscious of themselves as defective in some
elemental way.  Narcissists must defend their fragile selves by seeking affirmation
for their grandiosity.
Kohut’s conceptualization of narcissism is closer to Rathvon and
Holmstrom’s (1996) “depleted narcissism” and Wink's (1991) "covert
narcissism." The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Narcissism
subscale, when subjected to a principal components analysis, yielded two
independent factors, one suggesting Vulnerability-Sensitivity and the other
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Grandiosity-Exhibitionism (Wink, 1991). Wink found that there were common
associations between the two factors in the dimensions of conceit, self-
indulgence, and disregard of others (lack of empathy). Vulnerability-Sensitivity is
characterized by introversion, defensiveness, anxiety, and low stress tolerance.
Grandiosity-Exhibitionism was related to extraversion, self-assurance,
exhibitionism, and aggression.5 Many theorists, primarily psychodynamically
oriented, have echoed this bipolar distinction. Kohut (1971), Broucek (1991), and
Kernberg (1975) have suggested differences between “a more phallic, aggressive,
and externalized form; and a more hypersensitive, dependent, and internalized
form” (Hibbard, 1993). There are many popular scales purporting to tap
narcissism, however they often measure seemingly antipodal aspects.
For obvious reasons, most research and clinical literature seems to refer to
the covert or depleted type of narcissism and it is with this type that most
psychopathological signs are positively associated. The more externalized form is
more often related to shamelessness, a topic not often addressed, but covered at
length in texts from other disciplines. Aside from studies by JPT and Richard
Gramzow (1992), other researchers have found support for associations between
                                                 
5 Freud distinguished between two forms of narcissism: primary narcissism involved an infant’s
focus of her libidinal energies on her as yet undifferentiated ego, while secondary narcissism
referred to a withdrawal of psychic energies from objects (people or pursuits) back to the ego,
generally as a defense against instinctual impulses. Freud regarded primary narcissism as more or
less normal. Heinz Kohut (1971, 1977) elaborated on the concept and argued that all narcissism is
not necessarily pathological, but rather, may lead to love for others early in life.
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shame and the depleted form of narcissism. Stephen Hibbard, studying the
relationship between parental alcoholism and both forms of narcissistic
presentation, found significant positive correlations between participants’
endorsements on a shame measure and two measures of the covert, hypersensitive
form of narcissism (1993). He also found significant relationships between a lack
of shame affect and the exhibitionistic, aggressive form of narcissism, suggesting
an additional link of this form with psychopathy (Gacono & Bannatyne 2002).
Both Helen Block Lewis and Michael Lewis explore several different
shame experiences including the felt experience of shame and a bypassed or
generally unacknowledged type. Much of the effect of shame on human life
occurs because of bypassed shame (HB Lewis, 1977; M Lewis, 1992). Felt and
bypassed shame affect an individual in different ways.
Unacknowledged shame remains out of awareness because of defensive
inattention, repression, denial, or engagement of objective self-awareness onto
some more acceptable stimuli (Lewis, 1992). It exerts a detrimental force,
intrapsychically, in two ways: (1) unacknowledged shame can influence behavior
and make it difficult to account for. It may contribute to actions that have
troublesome effects, which, due to bypassed shame’s unacknowledged character,
an individual, may have trouble making sense of; (2) bypassed or repressed shame
may lead to the formation of psychopathology, as many psychodynamic theorists
believe.
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Individuals who are unwilling to experience shame may deny it through
the mechanism of focusing on their action rather than on the global self, although
at an unattended level of awareness they may be truly focused on their sense of
worthlessness (HB Lewis, 1971). People also employ other forms of ideation,
which allow them to shift into the position of a detached observer and thus
distance from the self as the experiencer of shame. HB Lewis also saw the loss of
self as a possible consequence of bypassed shame, not in the sense of psychosis,
but as a loss of memory. M Lewis writes of how shame can contribute to loss of
memory. Loss of memory, particularly memories so crucial to self-experience,
may be thought of a loss of self.
Most studies of consciousness accept that much thought and affect
(emotional states) are not always active in conscious awareness. The earlier
review of awareness in the work of Michael Lewis establishes an acceptable
foundation for this concept. Bypassed shame may also be attributable to other
processes such as that offered by Thomas Scheff and Suzanne Retzinger (1995).
They suggest that unfelt shame involves excessive thought, but with very little
feeling. Conversely, they characterize felt shame as excessive feeling, but with
very little thought. In these writers’ opinion, bypassed shame is experienced as “a
moment of painful feeling, followed by a lengthy episode of obsessive thought or
speech” (Scheff & Retzinger, 1995).
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Michael Lewis (1992) explains what becomes of the initial painful wince
or jolt by proposing a “focus of attention hypothesis” which entails a de-focusing
on the jolt of shame and attending elsewhere to avoid experiencing the painful
emotion. One may be in a state of shame, but choose not to attend further to the
state. The self is removed from attention to the state, but the state itself remains.
Felt shame indicates that one has not removed their attention from the shame
state, and may in fact be employing other methods to deal with the shame such as
distancing oneself from it. Attention may also be withdrawn from focus more
gradually by forgetting (M Lewis, 1992).
The problems that have become associated with unacknowledged shame
have to do with the difficulties produced when people are in a state but do not pay
attention to it. There are three areas of difficulty when shame is bypassed: (1)
physical actions (2) defensive substitution of other emotions and (3) disrupted
interpersonal exchanges (M Lewis, 2000). Unacknowledged shame has some
physical consequences. People in a state of shame may blush, change body
posture by collapsing inwards and averting their gaze, they have difficulty
thinking, and feel uncomfortable and distressed. These physical actions can occur
without acknowledgement of the shame state.
If a shame state remains unacknowledged, a person may focus on another
emotional state. Emotional substitution is common with other emotions as well as
shame. One may focus on feeling washed out or depleted, or on vague somatic
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pains rather than on the shame itself. Often embarrassment is substituted for
shame, and is used to deny it as well. By focusing on a feature of shame, of which
embarrassment may be a milder form, one can avoid the intensity of its full
emotional force (HB Lewis, 1977). One may also focus on the mental confusion
and impaired thinking that is characteristic of shame. Instead of experiencing the
full array of shame phenomenology, one may be unable to understand what has
happened. By focusing on a single feature of the emotional state, one can avoid
dealing with the whole experience. This shame is unacknowledged and as a result,
the meaning and understanding one gathers from a shame situation is inconsistent
with what is really happening. The result is intrapsychic conflict.
Felt shame can also be avoided by substituting an entirely new feeling.
One defensive substitution for shame seems to entail a kind of mania,
characterized by compulsive verbalization (Scheff & Retzinger, 1995). Often,
sadness or anger is substituted for shame, one is the focus on the self and the other
externalizes the focus onto a transgressor, real or imagined (M Lewis, 1992). In
this sense, it would seem that shame-proneness and depression would have a
significant relationship as has been indicated by Tangney (1992).
Sadness as a shame substitute occurs for a number of reasons. They both
have similar general emotional tones, they are both negative and aversive, and
they share an internal focus. Attributions for sadness are very similar to those for
shame, internal and global. Substitution of sadness for shame may also be
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facilitated by their social natures. Sadness is often the result of some negative
relational outcome or a transgression by another. Sadness may be substituted for
shame by focusing on the wrong done to the self by another, rather than on the
behavior or social disposition of the self. Sadness, at least in its less extreme
forms, is more comfortable to experience than shame and for this reason may
make a desirable substitution.
Anger substituted for shame may have several bases. To feel shame
implies a cause and anger is generally an adaptive emotion to confront a painful
source. Anger also feels powerful and can help a wounded, vulnerable self feel
strong. Anger substitution of shame is more prevalent among men (HB Lewis,
1971; M Lewis, 1992, 2000; Scheff and Retzinger, 1995; Tangney, 1996) and
may contribute to the male propensity for violence. Instead of externalizing anger,
others may become angry with themselves for their inadequacies, reactivity, or
poor choices.  Even though the cause, in this case, may be the self, anger at
oneself still feels more powerful than shame.
The causes of shame and subsequent substitution with anger can be
directed at specific others. This is a type of scapegoatism, which allows
externalization of blame, thereby reducing one’s own part in the experience. This
use of anger does not provide for rectification of mistakes, but rather merely
dissociates an individual from blame (M Lewis, 1992). Externalization is a
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prominent feature of overt, aggressive narcissism and may account, at least in
part, for the relational difficulties of narcissistic persons.
Bypassed shame affects social interactions not only by the defenses of
substitution and externalization. As M Lewis (1992) has indicated, a state exists
whether or not it is in conscious awareness.  Unacknowledged emotions may be
communicated socially through the body, voice, and verbal content. If one is
shame-prone, others may take their reticence, gaze avert, or empty, rapid verbal
style as negative indicators for a relationship. Mental confusion may be
interpreted as unfriendliness. If one is prone to shame-inducing self-attributions,
he may not have the confidence, desire, or motivation to engage in social
interactions, friendships, or community. The intense self-focus attributed to the
shame-prone (Tangney, et al., 1992) probably impedes connection with others as
does characterological externalization of blame.
Shamelessness
The theologian Carl Schneider (1992) writes of shame, and a sense of
shame. The absence of a sense of shame and a lack of appropriate respect before
the world of life is an important theme in modern philosophy (Nietzsche, 1964).
Schneider refers to shamelessness as “the most destructive form of shame.”
James Fowler (1996) has placed shame experiences on a continuum: healthy
shame (protector of membership in valued communities and the custodian of
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personal worthiness), perfectionist shame, ascribed shame due to minority status
(internalized shame based on social discrimination), toxic shame (the result of
persistent abuse or objectification), and shamelessness (in its extreme forms—
narcissism and sociopathy).
Shamelessness is partially constituted by a denial of modesty, self-
promotion, instrumental use or display of one’s body or self, self-objectification,
and imagined transcendence of the shared meanings and values of one’s world of
life.  Shamelessness may be characterized by a lack of empathy, or an initial
empathic sentiment that regresses into an inward focus on the injustices done to,
and the sufferings of the self, or “egoistic drift” (Hoffman, 1984).
Broucek echoes Fowler’s idea that shamelessness is a form of self-
objectification, or “embracing objecthood” (1988; 1991).  He notes the cultural
pressures on women to regard themselves as objects is greater than any other
similar pressure on males, although the objectification of the male body in the
media has increased exponentially in the nine years since the publication of
Broucek’s book. He suggests that turning oneself into an object for the visual
appropriation of others is a common symptom of narcissistic and histrionic
personalities. In this case, aesthetic considerations predominate over moral
considerations. According to Broucek (1991), the aestheticism of hysteria is
concerned with many variations on two basic themes: “Am I pretty, or manly?”
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and “Am I bright?” Combined, these two themes produce the questions “Am I
interesting?” and “Do you like me?”
For Broucek (1991), individual manifestations of shamelessness are a
defense against shame. He believes that shame is triggered by the experience of
being objectified when wanting to be related to dialogically. The painful
discrepancy of these experiences can be removed by “embracing objecthood” and
renouncing one’s claims as a subject. This solution replaces the self with an
artificially constructed persona and replaces spontaneous responsiveness with a
rehearsed performance. Two different forms of being undressed may illustrate
this. There is nakedness, which is “unself”conscious, and there is nudity, which is
the presentation of the self as an object.
For Broucek, the “average person” as portrayed in the media, is a
corporate product. The goal is to make the objectified self a desirable object and
to persuade others that their only hope of happiness lies in their acquiescence to
the image of desirability and success promoted by the media. Shamelessness
makes the acceptance and promotion of object idolatry easier to swallow. Erich
Fromm (1948) offered the same analysis fifty years ago with the concept of the
“personality market” and a perspective towards the world of life he referred to as
“the marketing orientation.”
Broucek (1991) notes, “witness the general shamelessness and corruption
of our public officials and the leaders in the corporate and financial worlds as well
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as the ever-increasing tawdriness, vulgarity, and tastelessness of the entertainment
products offered to us.” The pop culture heroes offered to the young, in particular,
are noted for their pride in their aggressiveness, crudity, narcissism, and
disrespect for others. These traits are cause for shame in other cultures and in the
recent American past.  Eric Hoffer (1974) refers to this as a “moral inversion,”
and proposes that most of the acts that provoke shame are not punishable by law,
and that the everyday world of life depends on the observance of “unenforceable
rules.” Broucek may overstate it, “The whole structure of civilized society is thus
a house of cards precariously balanced on shame as a defense” against narcissism,
exhibitionism and voyeurism, and the objectification of self and of others. He
believes that exhibitionism and voyeurism are rampant, and that this is
attributable to a general breakdown of restrictions against objectification of self
and others.
Broucek adds, “Capitalism has always been based on objectification of
workers and consumers.” The marketing orientation (Fromm, 1948) has conjoined
objectification, greed, and sexuality as the prime movers of the current economic
system. American society has failed to acknowledge the economic reasons for its
current valorization of shamelessness and pretends that it is a patriotic respect for
the constitutional right of free speech and aversion to censorship that promotes
tolerance of objectification.  A hermeneutic analysis of current contents and
ideologies of mass culture would explore the utilitarian individualism inherent in
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these phenomena. It would take the moral position that promoting any and every
type of “free speech” has resulted in the “colonization of the lifeworld”
(Habermas, 1987) by new possibilities that champion the objectification of self
and other, under the disguised ideology of rapacious capitalism.
Guilt
Guilt is produced when individuals evaluate their behavior as failure, but
focus on the specific actions that led to the failure (Lewis, 2000; Tangney, 1994).
Another feature of guilt is the possible ameliorative actions that are likely to
repair the failure (whether or not they are carried out). Phenomenologically,
persons are distressed by their failure, but the pain is directed at the cause of the
failure or the object of harm done, generally another person. The attribution
process converges on the action of the self rather than on the self as a whole. This
is why guilt experiences are not as painful or immobilizing as shame. There is
generally no concomitant confusion or inarticulacy.
Guilt is usually associated with thoughts or intentions of corrective action
that the transgressor can enact to repair the failure (Helen Block Lewis, 1971; M
Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1992). Amelioration can be proactive or guilt may serve
as a learning experience that one will hesitate before repeating. With guilt, the
body does not collapse in on itself as with shame, rather researchers have noted
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that participants in guilt-eliciting experiments seem to increase motor activity, as
if trying to undo or repair the potential damage (Baumeister, Atwell &
Heatherton, 1995; Zahn-Waxler, 1987).
Ridding oneself of the distressing affect in guilt is easier because the
attribution is specific and situational rather than global. Coping generally consists
of reparative actions directed towards the self as well as the other or the object.
Even though there may not be an easily enacted reparative action convenient at
the time guilt is experienced, research participants have been observed enacting
other, sometimes unrelated “good” or conciliatory behaviors (Tangney &
Niedenthal, 1995). There are levels of guilt seemingly associated with the
availability of corrective action, the scarcer the likelihood of reparative action, the
greater the intensity of guilt. When no corrective action is available or effective, a
person may lapse into shame (HB Lewis, 1971).  A person can be ashamed over a
guilty action (or inaction), but cannot be guilty over being ashamed (Lewis,
1992a). Guilt lacks the painful intensity of shame. It is not “self-destroying,”
which seems to make guilt an all around more useful and pro-social emotion
(Tangney, et al., 199-). However, because guilt is not as intense as shame, it may
not goad a habitual transgressor into changing established moral, interpersonal, or
characterological patterns.
HB Lewis (1971) and Tangney (1988) have proposed that individuals may
be guilt-prone and have correlated this dimension with absence or minimal levels
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of psychopathology (JPT, 1992), lower levels of anger arousal, resentment, and
tendencies to blame others for negative events (JPT, 1996), and for constructive
responses to anger inducing situations.  Guilt proneness has been strongly
correlated with empathy and a sense of interpersonal connection. Baumeister,
Stillwell, and Heatherton (1995) propose that guilt is most frequently experienced
in close interpersonal relationships. This suggestion makes sense in light of the
signal importance of intimate relationships to most people.
Additionally, guilt may help to solidify a developing relationship by
modifying the actions of the partners to conform to the expectations and desires of
the other. Guilt plays a powerful role when thought of as the ability to put oneself
in the place of the injured party and to experience identification with their
suffering or vicariously experience their distress. This, and the importance of
relationships in human life, often motivates reparative action. This may be
enacted by apology, correction, or compensation. Guilt has been valorized as a re-
integrative emotion, communicating to the self the necessity of attending to the
social bond with the wronged party and instantiating action to repair or maintain it
(Scheff & Retzinger, 1991). Although guilt was once the bete noir of
psychopathology, most recent explorations insist that it is an overwhelmingly
positive emotion. When guilt does appear to be excessive or debilitating, writers
such as Tangney and Scheff & Retzinger insist that it is really shame
masquerading as guilt.
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 In Demotic Greek, the term Hubris refers to a tragic pridefulness that
ultimately brings down the prideful. Unfortunately, in Greek drama, this often
entailed the ruin and suffering of many others as well. Michael Lewis defined
hubris as “an exaggerated pride or self-confidence often resulting in retribution by
others” (1992). The antiquated term “pridefulness” refers to an individual who is
haughty and so taken with himself as to be as to be repugnant. As one of the
Seven Deadly Sins, it has a long history. Hubris is a consequence of an evaluation
of success in regards to one’s standards, rules, and goals where the focus is on the
global self. In hubris, the person focuses on the total self as successful, and thus
there is there is a fusion of subject and object such as is characteristic of shame.
Mueller and Dweck (1998) have observed associations between too much praise
of children and negative performance. It is possible that too much praise enhances
hubristic tendencies, resulting in a lowering of standards, rules, and goals to avoid
possible disconfirmation by failure.
Because of the global nature of hubris, it is likely to require frequent
“fixes” to maintain. The individual must alter standards or re-evaluate what
constitutes success. Unlike shame, hubris is highly positive and emotionally
rewarding, the experiencer feels good about himself. Hubris is difficult to sustain,
since no specific action precipitates it. Lewis (2000) refers to hubris as
“addictive.” Because of the “addictive” nature of this positive self-attribution,
those prone to hubris derive little satisfaction from the feeling. Consequently, they
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must seek out or invent situations likely to produce this emotional state. This can
be accomplished either by altering their standards, rules, and goals or by re-
evaluating what constitutes success in their actions, thoughts or feelings, as well
as denigrating witnesses to their perceived failures.
Others generally describe individuals with hubristic tendencies with
disdain (Capps, 1993; Kohut, 1971; Wink, 1991). Hubristic people have difficulty
with interpersonal relationships since their self-absorption is likely to interfere
with the wishes, desires, and needs of others. Given the contemptuousness
associated with hubris, other people are likely to feel shamed by the actions of a
hubristic individual (Rathvon & Holmstrom, 1991; Wink, 1991). Lewis (2000)
notes three problems associated with hubris: (1) it is a transient but addictive
emotion; (2) it is not related to a specific action, and thus requires altering
patterns of goal setting or evaluation; and (3) it interferes with interpersonal
relationships due to its self-centered, insolent, and contemptuous nature.
Pride is the consequence of a successful evaluation of a specific action.
Phenomenologically, pride is experienced as joy over an action, thought, or
feeling well done. The focus of pleasure is specific and related to a particular
behavior. In pride, the self and the object are separated, as with guilt. Pride
focuses a person on her action; she is engrossed in the specific action that gives
her pride. Pride, in this definition, has been compared to achievement motivation
(Stipek, et al, 1992; Lewis, 2000). Because pride is linked to a specific action, it
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can be replicated. Unlike in hubris, pride’s specificity allows for action. Other
studies have associated pride of this sort with a “mastery” learning orientation
(Dweck & Leggett, 1988).
The Positive Qualities of Shame
M. Lewis (1998, in Gilbert & Andrews) believes that shame and guilt
function to interrupt any action that violates either internally or externally derived
standards or rules. Although Lewis treats shame as a pathological, debilitating
condition, it can serve in the capacity of protecting relationships, protecting the
self, and for better or worse, preserving boundaries in social relationships and
propriety. Thinkers in the field of evolutionary psychology such as Paul Gilbert
and Michael McGuire (1998) suggest that the self-conscious affects are concerned
primarily with integrating and forming action plans with social information. In
this way of thinking, shame is primarily concerned with processing socially
threatening information, especially in the areas of social rank, status, and social
exclusions and rejections.
Shame provides feedback to an actor about success or failure of social
strategies and may act as an “off switch” for competitive behaviors after a defeat
(Gilbert & McGuire, 1998).  The evolutionary psychology approach tends to see
current human phenomenon as socially evolved remnants of a fantasized hunter-
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gatherer period early in human history. This reasoning is almost spurious, given
that there is no reliable history available about this distant period and recent
studies of similar extant cultures reveal a broad array of social organizations,
many without “traditional” social hierarchies. A questionable theoretical
assumption aside, this view of the social utility of shame in structuring
relationships holds some power.
Writers from other disciplines may offer a richer exploration of the
functions of shame and guilt. Contemporary cultural anthropologists such as
Benedicte Grima (1992) and Catherine Lutz (1988) have written that
manifestation of emotions in particular cultures, and specifically in the women,
reveal the differential power relations between genders. For example, women of
the Paxtun, a Muslim group from Afghanistan, are permitted only two emotions,
grief and shame (Grima, 1992). Grima takes this as an indicator of the constructed
nature of emotions in the service of male domination. From her experience with
the Paxtun, Grima arrived at the antiessentialist generalization that “Emotion is
culture” (1992). In her work among the people of the Ifaluk atoll, Lutz found that
women had a surprising measure of individual autonomy and wielded
considerable power, although to overtly display it, particularly in the company of
men, was a cause for shame.
Byron Good and Mary Jo Delvecchio-Good (1988) present a penetrating
analysis of the interplay of the self, emotions, and political power in Iran. The
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self, as it is perceived in Iran consists of several levels, or spheres. There are the
external, or social spheres, variant upon contextual factors such as status and
gender, the self in the family, and a “secret core,” or private self that one shares at
one’s will and with only a few people (1988). For the Iranians, shame seems to
serve as a protectant emotion that signals that one may be in danger of exposing a
contextually inappropriate self, or that another may be acting in relationally
inappropriate ways. Shame is also a concomitant of the sequestration of women,
who pay a high price in shame for desiring to live beyond their ascribed status.
Obeyesekere (1990) has attempted to show that in certain local cultures in
Africa that public shame, in the form of stigma, can actually be the impetus for
meaningful spiritual or social growth. For example, persons with mental illness
are generally stigmatized transculturally. In certain African groups, a journey
through a psychotic disorder, or spirit possession, can actually valorize the
sufferer and they may be seen as a sage or a prophet.
Theologians from Augustine to the present have offered various notions,
often indirectly, about shame and guilt. Augustine of Hippo is known for, among
many other things, the elaboration of the concept of original sin. In this way of
thinking, the “fall” of humans from grace began with the curiosity, arrogance, and
disobedience (hubris) of Adam and Eve, who through submitting to the
temptation offered by Satan forever changed human nature. Augustine infers that
the fall was a result of the deception of Satan, but also of hubris on the part of
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Adam and Eve to be like God and independent of her/him.  The first scene after
they eat from the tree of life is of Adam and Eve being aware of their nakedness
and attempting to hide from God as he/she comes to them in the garden. Adam
offers “I was afraid because I was naked and ashamed, and hid myself.” (Genesis
4, NRSV) Later, after casting the pair out of the garden, God makes them clothes
of animal skin, caring for them even after their disobedience (Battenhouse, 1979).
The message, at least in part, is that humans alone are insufficient,
incomplete, and given to error. Shame comes about when humans recognize their
insufficiency and incompleteness in the course of selfish, sinful, or hubristic
pursuits. Only in God can humans be whole. Shame, in this sense, seems to serve
a powerful role in highlighting the futility of hubristic endeavor and re-directing
people towards a wholeness and integrity in their relationship with their creator
and harmony with her/his creation. The same is true on a human relational level.
As many theorists have elucidated, shame, although it can occur in solitude, has
an inherently relational character. In this way of thinking, shame is an inescapable
part of human social and emotional bonds and is extinguished only at the peril of
these.
The theologian Carl Schneider (1992) has “sought to call attention to a
disvalued dimension of human experience—shame and the sense of shame.” For
Schneider, shame is closely tied to covering and uncovering, speech and silence,
the literal and the inexpressible, concealment and disclosure, community and
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alienation. He offers that the predominance of rationalism, science, and
individualism have resulted in the rejection of many profound aspects of human
experience. The contemporary rejection of shame is based on a faith-commitment
to reason, science, and self-realization. It is an incarnation of the enlightenment
ideals of reason and individual autonomy (Schneider, 1992). Some of the aspects
of human existence devalued by scientism, like shame, are profoundly negative
and yet, Schneider feels, play intimate roles in the meaningful human drama. A
part of the damage done to meaningful human life by the growing hegemony of
scientism is the valuation of the literal, the explicit, and the utilitarian and the
devaluation of reticence, the unspoken, and the personal (Schneider, 1992).
Shame and a sense of shame can be likened to two different terms in the
French, honte and pudeur, and two German words, Scham and Schande.  Honte
and Schande may be translated as being ashamed, as the experience of shame with
its attendant pain, confusion, and desire to shrink or hide. Pudeur and Scham, in
their closest English equivalents, refer to a sense of shame, modesty, and
discretion and play a significant role as a positive restraining influence in human
interaction (Lasch, 1978). Shame as discretion or modesty has been noted as a
companion of virtue among philosophers and ethicists for thousands of years.
Augustine felt that shame as discretion or modesty helped to maintain “the right
order of values and actions” (Battenhouse, 1979). In this sense, shame sustains the
personal and social ordering of the world, just and oppressive. What is right,
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good, and just varies culturally, and according to predominating forms of social
organization. However, shame, or the sense of shame is present in all extant
societies no matter their character. Shame can be used as a depersonalizing,
oppressive force, but may also function to maintain the integrity of self-
responsible individuals. The theologian and sociologist Kurt Riezler (1951, p.
243) offers that
Shame interferes in the relation between man and himself and is a
powerful source of hate. A man puts another being to shame and he is
confronted with his own meanness, his image of himself is broken, he
despises himself and the one he has put to shame.”
For reflective persons, shame may act to prevent shaming and thus damaging self
and other.
In perhaps its best manifestation, the sense of shame also protects that
which is private and vulnerable in an individual from public violation. Although
most cultures vary as to what and how much may be revealed, most have some
notion of privacy and of what should be kept private, not only to sustain social
hierarchies, but also to protect the psychological individual. Privacy need not be
equated with withdrawal from community or uninvolvement with one’s
neighbors. It is not a “fall from a primal condition of social communion or
personal wholeness,” (Schneider, 1992) or avoidance of social responsibilities.
Privacy is not necessarily a selfish or individualistic dimension. Privacy is a
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boundary between a self and various social contexts and actors, and as such helps
protect it from inappropriate intrusions and makes possible relationships of
different degrees of intimacy. In this way, privacy is crucial to familial bonds,
love relationships, and friendships. The philosopher Hannah Arendt (1958) wrote,
“Where privacy is prohibited, man can only imagine separateness as an act of
stealth.”  The sociologist Irving Goffman (1969) observed that all social
interactions involve risks to the self. In any interaction, both parties are made
vulnerable. Human relationships require both protection and risk of this
vulnerability through a relationship of bi-directional and measured self-disclosure
(Goffman, 1969). The protection of self lies in the reciprocity of self-disclosure
and shame may serve as a signal of inappropriate intimacy.
According to Arendt (1958), there are three different qualities and
experiences that are protected and made possible by the private: (1) the private
realm guarantees a depth of life. It contains many things that cannot survive the
scrutiny of others. Arendt states, “a life spent entirely in public, in the presence of
others, becomes …shallow, it is a life lived at high noon, devoid of darkening
shadows.” One possible interpretation of the recent proliferation of media-driven
self-disclosure on talk shows and on the Internet is through the theoretical
distanciation possible with electronic media, people feel an illusory freedom to
project the private into the public sphere, debatably without cost. The actual
effects of lurid publicization of the private are still a matter of argument and
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research, but cynicism about human nature and a lowering of standards of human
relational conduct may be the least deleterious outcome. Arendt continues (2)
Privacy undergirds the public. There could not be a public realm without the
establishment and maintenance of privacy. The private establishes boundaries,
which in turn comprise, at least in part, identity. (3) Until recent times, the realm
of the private has had the characteristic of the sacred. In the past, the private was
surrounded by the mysterious. It belonged to the realm of creation, birth, illness,
and death (Arendt, 1958).
Many things belong to the private because their meaning is altered, and
the self de-stabilized, by public display. Shame acts, in its positive forms, to
restrain the self from inappropriate exposure. Shame protects the self from
alteration by public display, protects fragile qualities of the self, and may buffer
the self from violations of its embodiment and emotional essence (Schneider,
1992). In Schneider’s way of thinking, there are some parallels with Kohut’s
(1976) notion that shame protects the self by restraining displays of grandiose
exhibitionism and resultant reactions. Given Schneider’s and Arendt’s ideas about
shame and privacy, it is not difficult to connect the current predominance of
shame with trends towards unfettered self-expression, individualism, and the
current cultural obsession with exhibitionism/voyeurism in the form of
excruciatingly personal web sites, television talk shows, and confessional writing.
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M Lewis (1992) proposed that one way out of shame is confession. These current
“technologies of the self” (Foucault, 1979) are probably not what he had in mind.
For Schneider (1992), shame as an emotional experience also contains a
revelatory potential. In the painful self-awareness engendered by a shame
experience, a part of the self is revealed to the self. The self, or self-aspect
revealed in the shame experience is a reflexive apprehension of one’s qualities,
values, or ethics. Therefore, it realizes an intimate relation of the self to the self
and reveals a possibly hidden aspect of one’s being. Jean-Paul Sartre (1948)
wrote, “Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the other sees
me.” Shame has a special capacity to disclose the self. The process that occurs in
shame is not necessarily a constricted or unchangeable one. Through the shame
experience, identity may be illumined, and also shaped, elaborated, and put into
perspective (Schneider, 1992). The painful self-consciousness of shame is
intimately linked with its revelatory potential. It makes self-confrontation difficult
to avoid. If shame is not defensively transmuted into anger, self-hatred, or
shamelessness, and is instead faced, it offers an instructive encounter with one’s
identity and the evaluations, values, and attributions that comprise it. In other
words, shame may be a form of revelatory “strong evaluation” (Taylor, 1991).
Francis Broucek (1991) believes shame is innately linked not only with
the self, but also with sexuality and protects adolescents, who are in “the delicate
and necessarily private unfinished process of psychosexual maturation from
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premature public exposure to the adult world of the already completed.” In other
words, shame serves to protect from precocious sexuality, enforce incest
prohibitions, and is a protection from the public in all its forms.
Culture and Self-Conscious Emotions: Guilt and Shame
In recent decades, many social science researchers have challenged the
idea of the universality of emotions. Their general claim is that there are radical
differences in emotional experience and behavior across cultures (Geertz, 1973;
Lutz, 1988; Russell, 1994). Universal notions about emotional expression like
those of Ekman (1988) have been particularly challenged. Social Constructionists
such as Kenneth Gergen (1985) and James Averill (1985) also promote the idea
that emotions are socially constructed. This perspective, while challenging the
universalism (and some might say imperialism) of mainstream social science,
completely fails to consider the neurophysiological components of emotions, for
embodied beings.
Cultures provide “horizons of meaning” (Taylor, 1991), or the
“background of intelligibility” against which desires, preferences, and opinions
make sense. A culture’s focus on shared meanings and values is significantly
related to emotional experiences within that particular culture (Taylor, 1989,
1991; Wallbott & Scherer, 1995). This is certainly true of the self-conscious
emotions, which rely on the comparison of thought and behavior with standards,
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rules, and goals. Wallbott and Scherer observed that the relationship between
shame and identity, or ethical orientation is short lived in collectivist cultures
compared to individualist cultures. These researchers also observed that
differences associated with ethical orientation for guilt were not significant. The
conclusion of this particular study was that shame experience seemed to vary
across cultures.
Emotions can vary broadly in the degree that they connect or separate the
self from interdependent relationships (Kitayama et al., 1995). Recent
anthropological literature (Menon & Schweder, 1994) highlights the importance
of emotion in social connectedness in primarily in non-western cultures. In one
study, Menon and Schweder (1994) presented participants from India and the
United States with three emotions: anger, shame, and happiness. The participants
were then asked to choose the emotion that was different from the other two. The
Indian participants chose anger and generally explained that anger disrupts
interpersonal relationships and is related to disconnection from others (1994). The
U.S. participants chose happiness because it is positive, while the others are
negative. Thus, for the U.S. cohort, the evaluation of the aesthetic dimension of
positive versus negative appeared to be the more salient feature than social
connectedness.
Catherine Lutz (1988) has challenged the idea of universal emotions by
claiming to have demonstrated that specific cultural systems and social
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environments essentially organize emotional meanings. Her conclusion was that
“emotion can be viewed as serving complex communicative, moral, and cultural
purposes rather than as simply labels for internal states whose nature or essence is
presumed to be universal” (Lutz, 1988). What may be universal is that emotions
serve “complex communicative, moral, and cultural purposes,” some of which
vary culturally. Shaver, Wu, and Schwartz (1992) addressed the universality of
emotions by examining similarities and differences in emotions across cultures.
They observed that there are general conceptions about emotions that apply to
most cultures and do not seem to vary widely between east and west. They
warned that their findings do not indicate that everything about emotions is the
same across the globe. However, people everywhere do seem to share many of the
same motives, attribution capacities, emotional reactions, and need to control
emotions.
The social nature of emotion is explicitly recognized in Japan (Doi, 1971;
Lebra, 1985) and Korea (Ha, 1995). In both countries, there are extensive
vocabularies that describe the often-subtle aspects of relationships. Many
emotions arise from and strengthen cohesive communal relationships. The
Japanese term “amae” characterizes the relationship between a mother and her
children and may be defined as a “sense of indulgent dependence on the other”
(Lebra, 1985). The Japanese term “haji” is shame that occurs when one fails to
meet the expectations of the other and occurs in the presence of those about whom
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one cares. Haji also highlights one’s indebtedness and inferiority to the others and
the significance of the others to oneself.
Francis Inki-Ha (1995) writes that Koreans are more aware of their shame
experiences than Westerners, and links this with different values concerning
relationships and involvement in relational bonds. The frequency with which
Euro-Americans acknowledge feeling shame is significantly less than their
Korean-American counterparts.  Ha (1995) believes that this may be attributable
to Euro-American cultural deficits in the identification of negative emotions.
Euro-Americans also tend to use shame and guilt interchangeably and to provide
trivial and impoverished accounts of their shame and guilt experiences. The
avoidance of shame feelings among Euro-Americans may also have to do with the
singular and detached self of modern America, wherein there is no collectivity in
which to disperse one’s shame.
The Euro-American cultural deficits in negative emotion recognition are
probably a result of cultural beliefs and attitudes about the self, connectedness,
and about shame and guilt. In Western cultures, shame may be the least socially
acceptable emotion, as it is believed to be the mark of a weak or incompetent
person (Goffman, 1979). Goffman observed that to appear ashamed in Western
society is “considered evidence of weakness, inferiority, low status, defeat, and
surrender” (1967).
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Conversely, in Korean culture there is a cultural acceptance of shame (Ha,
1995). A popular Korean insult directed towards persons acting selfishly
translates, as “you have no sense of shame.” At certain times, Koreans feel that
shame is virtuous, a form of modesty. In the Korean language, there is an
elaborate vocabulary of words and phrases related to shame. Ha (1995) suggests
that shame is “hypercognized” in Korean culture, which suggests its importance
in the everyday world of life.  This difference in the language and experience of
shame between the U.S. and Korea is also attributable to different cultural beliefs
and values about relationships, which are a component of ethical orientation
(Liem, 1997).
In a study comparing Asian-American Protestants and Euro-American
Protestants, Ratanasiripong (1996) investigated the relationships between self-
construal, acculturation, grace, self-conscious emotions, and depression. The
results suggest that shame experiences were more frequent among Asian
Americans. An interdependent self-construal was significantly related to shame,
while independence was inversely related to it. Shame and guilt both had
significant correlations with depression and no relationship with acculturation.
In the United States, anger is often substituted for shame (Tangney,
Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992; Lewis, 1992). This may suggest a
connection with the dominant ethical orientation in American culture,
individualism. The logic of this argument rests on the observed negative cultural
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attitudes towards socially engaging emotions such as shame, which is depicted
broadly in American culture as a sign of weakness, inferiority, and defeat. The
findings of many of the studies in this review reflect the positive cultural value of
shame in interdependent, or dividual cultures, and the aversion to any mention or
display of shame, as well as the potential for interference with self-actualization,
in the individualist United States. The positive necessity of shame seems left to
theologians.
Psychological Perspectives on the Self
A distinguishing characteristic of being human is the capability for self-
reflection. While a large proportion of organismic existence is out of the range
and control of objective self-awareness, that which seems to most vividly signify
human-ness involves an objective awareness that allows conscious processing of
information and choice in paths of action and engagement. Many writers have
emphasized this capacity for self-reflection. William James (1890) referred to this
self-aspect as the “Empirical Self,” or “the me.” He referred to the unconscious,
or subjective self as the “I,” or the material self.
There are many ideas about the self and its development, Western,
Eastern, and local. The most notable Western theories generally fall under the
rubric of psychoanalytic, object relational, or self-psychological. There are many
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other theories about the self, which both parallel and diverge from analytically
oriented ideas. These include cognitive theories and those based on notions about
interpersonal connectedness. In this section, three psychological genres of self
theories will be considered, Self Psychology, Adlerian Individual Psychology, and
Cognitive-Affective models of the self and its development. A fourth alternative
found in the hermeneutic philosophical writings of Charles Taylor, Mikhail
Bakhtin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon will be
explored, as will theories about the self and its development from non-western
traditions.
Sigmund Freud conceived of the self as involving conscious and
unconscious processes. In his later writings he proposed the structural model of
the tripartite self, consisting of Id, Superego, and Ego, as a means to understand
the different levels of self and to define the psychological self. What is perhaps
most important for present purposes is not an comprehensive explication of the
three parts of the Freudian self, which are by now common knowledge, but rather
that Freud pointed out that actions by persons are part of their selves and that
there are parts of the self that operate outside of conscious awareness.
The Self Psychology of Heinz Kohut is simultaneously a powerful critique
of psychoanalysis and a new theory of the self. Rather than the primacy of
instinctual drives, Kohut emphasized the psychology of the self and object
relations (Eagle, 1984). In Kohut’s theories there are three main stages of normal
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or healthy development: primary narcissism; the grandiose, exhibitionistic self;
and healthy narcissism. In the autoerotic, primary stage, there are only a
fragmented self and “ego nuclei.” (Eagle, 1984) The primary narcissistic stage is
characterized by the child’s feelings of omnipotence and “absolute perfection”
(Kohut, 1977). A sense of the self as cohesive and unitary begins to emerge at this
point, but is disturbed by the unavoidable shortcomings of naturally imperfect
parents to meet the child’s demands and needs for perfect mirroring. In the
subsequent stage, the “grandiose and exhibitionistic self,” (Kohut, 1971) a sense
of narcissistic equilibrium is maintained by the child through relinquishing the
previous state of perfection to a loved, omnipotent “transitional self-object” in the
form of an “idealized parent image” (Broucek, 1991; Eagle, 1984; Kohut, 1976;
Morrison, 1989).
Early mirroring and the allowance of idealization by caregivers facilitate
the transition to this state of normal exhibitionism and grandiosity. This allows
the child to maintain her sense of power and efficacy in the face of the
unavoidable demands and vicissitudes of reality. As the child develops, her
unrealistic grandiosity and exhibitionism are tamed as she recognizes others as
separate individuals. Maturity and autonomy are gained through “transmuting
internalizations” (Kohut, 1971) that form stable structures for action in the world.
Internalizations of the mirroring and idealized “parental imago” together with
“twinship experiences” with close self-objects in childhood, establish a dimension
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of social connectedness that provides continuing affirmation of the self.  When
there are consistent failures in mirroring and idealization at this stage, the self
remains essentially stuck and does not progress into the final stage of healthy
narcissism (Eagle, 1984).
 Mature, healthy narcissism is characterized by a cohesive sense of self,
adequate self-esteem regulation, tension reduction and development of ambitions,
values and ideals. The mature self is a “bipolar structure” (Kohut, 1977). One pole
consists of innate talents and ambitions of the primal “nuclear self” as they are
shaped in earlier experience; the other pole consists of values and ideals derived
from the idealized parental image (Richardson, Fowers & Guignon, 1999).
 In Kohut’s way of thinking, a child’s basic biological and survival needs
can be met by the parents, but his developing self can be damaged and fixated by
their failure to supply “confirming and admiring responses of approval” and
“maternal empathy.” (Kohut, 1977) Kohut also discards the Freudian notion of
aggressive drives, instead labeling destructiveness as a “disintegration product” of
a fragmenting self. Kohut makes a claim for the primacy of self and object
relations over biological drives, repudiating a major tenet of psychoanalytic
dogma. Self-Psychology emphasizes the self almost to the exclusion of biological
considerations.
Francis Broucek, a contemporary proponent of Self-Psychology and
Object Relations suggests that early self-development grows out of a child’s sense
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of “efficacy, fulfilled intentionality, and the joy and excitement attendant on that
experience.” (Broucek, 1991) In this model, early experience of the sense of self
is fundamentally sensori-motor. This initial sense of self is grounded at a bodily
level in “kinesthetic flows” (1991) through which the intentional activities of the
child are carried out. Intentionality, while not generally attributed to infants at this
stage, is more likened to “willing.” Willing, in this sense does not require
objective self-awareness or knowledge of motives. Out of this early intentionality
and its inherent reflexivity, its success and failure, and the attendant positive and
negative affects, the sense of self begins to form.
A sense of efficacy or ineffectiveness is grounded in the responses a child
receives from his parents. If a parent is sensitive, responsive, or “good enough,”
his sense of efficacy is maintained and enhanced. In the case of insensitive,
inattentive, or neglectful responses, “the primitive sense of self will be damaged,
and the capacity for initiative may be nipped in the bud, leading to a more or less
robotic type of existence in which the child, as he grows older, attempts to
establish a compensatory sense of self by the suppression or repression of his
original action tendencies, based on an identification with the mother” (Broucek,
1991, p. 83). The sense of self is based on the interactions and communications,
effective or not, with significant others. In the case of consistently ineffective
experience with caregivers, a child’s emerging sense of self is based on inhibitory
activities in relation to itself. In other words, a child forms defenses against itself
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and its ineffectiveness by inhibiting what it takes to be the source of inefficacy,
itself. Broucek suggests that early experiences with failed intent or inefficacy,
before the emergence of objective self-awareness, result in early shame
experiences. With the emerging ability for self-reflexivity, these early experiences
of unworthiness and powerlessness are elaborated into beliefs about the self and
its relations to others.
Like Lewis (1992), Broucek believes that objective self-awareness is an
innately human phenomenon and develops out of a young child’s relations with
others. These others “experience the self as an other, and as an other who makes a
difference” (1991). Thus, the sense of self and the sense of other are inextricably
intertwined. This intersubjectivity is a crucial element of a model of
consciousness that consists of (1) intentionality, knowing what one is doing and
why; (2) awareness of the here and now reality, knowing what is being sensed and
what it means; and (3) shared consciousness, the sharing of knowledge and
personal feelings, and an awareness of relational and moral responsibility to
others, and of they to oneself (Broucek, 1991). Intentionality and shared
consciousness are closely linked with the affect system. Until the development of
language, intersubjectivity is based on shared affective experiences and meanings,
and these continue to constitute the core of shared consciousness throughout life.
Through mirroring by others, a child begins to take himself as an object of
reflection and, in a sense, objectify himself. The intercession of others is
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necessary to the capacity to self-objectify.  This capacity requires the ability to see
things, including herself, as others see them. A child becomes aware that just as
others are visible to her, she is visible to others. A part of the self has at least two
exterior dimensions, one of which is visible to others and reflected back to the self
and another, which will remain imperceptible to the self.
Developmentally, Broucek (1991) believes that the emergence of the
faculty for self-objectification is signified by the child’s ability to recognize her
reflection in a mirror as her own. The consolidation of this capacity is indicated
by increasingly accurate use of personal pronouns. The acquisition and correct
usage of personal pronouns “indicates an awareness that he is capable of
assuming different perspectives on a situation and knows that others may also”
(Broucek, 1991). In this way of thinking, subjective self-awareness and self-
objectification are incompatible as psychological experience and, on some level at
least, this dissonance may in fact hasten the development of a more complex
identity. Broucek suggests that part of this transition may precipitate a “tearing of
the self from itself” and the subsequent development of a compensatory idealized
self-image, similar to Kohut’s grandiose, exhibitionistic stage. This is tempered
by the emergent possibilities of self-reflexivity and increasing capacity for higher
order shared consciousness.
After the emergence of objective self-awareness, a child may experience
mirroring of their intentionality, excitement and interest, and sense of an
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indwelling self, or may be disconfirmed in these experiences and treated as an
object by insensitive, neglectful, or abusive caregivers. The former is akin to
Kohut’s notion of “healthy mirroring.” The latter, however results in the
experience of objectification by powerful, significant others. Objectification may
come to dominate the consciousness of an individual and thwart the development
of empathy, insight, and an indwelling sense of self (Broucek, 1991). The
experience of shame is in some ways akin to the experience of being treated as an
object, by others and defensively so by the self.
The development of objective self-awareness is the prerequisite for the
emergence of other related capacities. Broucek lists: “(1) a heightened
vulnerability to shame affect; (2) the division of experience into subjective and
public modes; (3) the split of the self into the immediate “I” and the socially
mediated “me”; (4) the loss of primary communion, the original I-Thou; (5) the
beginning of ‘object relations’; (6) the formation of an ideal self and an ideal
other; (7) the beginnings of conscience; and (8) the birth of narcissism.” This
process is unavoidable, except in cases of failures in neurological development,
illness, or injury. The affective undercurrent of self-development seems to be
traumatic loss, even when parents are better than “good enough.”
Alfred Adler was an early member of Freud’s circle and served as the
president of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Association. Freud and Adler eventually
had a parting of the ways over divergences in their theories. Adler’s childhood
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was an important factor in his later ideas about the human world of life, a fact he
embraced. He was born the second of six children and was “a sickly child”
(Manaster & Corsini, 1993). Adler was greatly affected by the death of his
younger brother when he was three years old. The ideas of illness, weakness, and
belonging by status and beliefs are a major theme running throughout Adler’s
work.
Adler’s metapsychology includes several concepts that have recently re-
gained popularity in theoretical psychology. The first basic tenet is Holism, or the
idea that humans are not collections of parts, or mechanistic assemblages of ego,
id, and superego. Manaster and Corsini (1993) explain, “The individual in
Individual Psychology does not mean the opposite of social or group,” it refers to
the unique individuality of each person. Holism also rejects the notion of
determinism, embracing instead the idea of creativity. If everything is determined,
there can be no responsibility or creativity. Works of art would be caused, not
created, as would human beings.
Another idea of signal importance to Individual Psychology is its
phenomenological, or “subjective, personal” emphasis (Manaster & Corsini,
1993). For everyday intents and purposes, reality is what people interpret it to be.
For Individual Psychology, subjective reality refers to human impressions, views,
perceptions, and conclusions, not to physical or scientific reality. Adlerian
phenomenology has some important implications for the human world of life, it is
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“… a psychology of use rather than of possession” (Manaster & Corsini, 1993), or
a matter of what a person does with what they have, whether it be intelligence,
motivation, athletic ability, or whatever, rather than what gifts or deficits a person
may have been born with.: (Manaster and Corsini, 1993) In this way of thinking,
happiness, success, or whatever it is that people want to achieve are a result of
their perceptions, beliefs, and motivations rather than any innate giftedness.
However, Adlerians do not believe that people can become whatever they want,
objective, or cultural realities set limits on what is attainable. In this way,
Individual Psychology seeks to avoid the dualism of determinism-indeterminism
and may be generally characterized by the statement “Within the limits
established by your biology and the environment, there is generally a lot that you
can do” (Manaster & Corsini, 1993).
Individual Psychology sees people as teleological beings, purposive,
moving towards goals. Individuals are viewed in terms of constantly striving. In
this way of thinking, people are best understood by asking questions such as
“What is she after?” or “What is her goal?” Teleology is another challenge to both
objectifying and existential interpretations of the human. It challenges the notion
that people are determined by their pasts, are “trained or conditioned,” as well as
the idea that humans live totally in the present, making radically free choices. In
Individual Psychology, people are best understood in terms of where they are
going. Individual Psychology acknowledges that there is some truth in
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deterministic and existential views of the person. People are seen as making
choices and pursuing goals based on “what happened to us in the past, what the
situation is now, and what we are after” (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). There is a
dynamic interplay among the past, the present, and the future.
Individual Psychology is anti-dualistic and anti-reductionistic. The
individual is embedded in her/his culture and cannot be studied in isolation. No
sense can be made of humans by a dissection or reduction of the self into its
alleged elements. The individual is seen as a totality that cannot be reduced to
parts. Individual Psychology is a relational psychology in which people are
always seen as embedded in a social field. Although one is a unique individual,
they are not apart from others. Adler saw people as always in motion, directed
towards personal and social goals in a social matrix.
Social Orientation is perhaps the most crucial idea of Individual
Psychology. It is ultimately concerned with morality, with ideas of good and bad.
The good comes from social integration and social concern (Manaster & Corsini,
1993). Adler was primarily concerned with using knowledge for the general
human good, allowing people to grow and develop. Human science for its own
sake is fine, but the use of knowledge is more important. The human scientist
should always be aware of the social and moral implications and its possible
effects on the world of life. In this way of thinking, the psychologist must rely on
his or her own experience of living and offer, “Messages, should give
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instructions” rather than just publish information in academic journals (Manaster
& Corsini, (1993). In the Adlerian way of thinking, to be happy and successful,
one has to be good, in a socially connected way.
Individual Psychology sees each individual as different, and yet very
much alike. Each person has a different personality called a “style of life”
(Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956). As humans develop, they each accumulate a set
of conclusions about life, about right and wrong, how to obtain what is desired
and avoid what is not, what others are like, and what he/she is like. This set of
personal concepts is known as “private logic” and represents a personal
philosophy of life (Manaster & Corsini, 1993).  In any situation, people tend to
act in terms of their private logic, which may be unacknowledged or unknown by
the actor. Even though one’s personal philosophy may be cognitively articulated,
she still has a large measure of freedom in making decisions and acting. The
choices may be influenced or “contaminated” by past experiences, but they are
still free choices for which one is responsible. People are often able to rise above
their pasts and make unexpected choices.
Adler believed that mental health or personal success was a function of a
person’s social interest. Social interest means “identification with humanity, a
feeling of community, or a belonging to life” (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956).
Manaster and Corsini offer (1993), “The best antonym for social interest might be
selfishness, although anomie also conveys the opposite of social interest.” In this
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way of thinking, all important problems in life are social problems. How an
individual perceives of and operates in the world always affects others, whether
on the job, within the family, or within the larger society. Adler believed that it
was a lack of social interest that pushed “children to “become the criminal, the
problem children, neurotics and suicides” (Manaster and Corsini, 1993). Those
who are lacking in social interest, concomitantly lack courage and self-
confidence.
Adler believed that each person strove for self-improvement and has an in-
born desire to become better, to move forward. This is referred to as the “growth
force” and is common to many theories of personality (Manaster & Corsini,
1993). “Striving for perfection” is movement directed at self-improvement and
greater competency. This has been frequently interpreted as a will to power or
domination over others, which is not the case. Children are born helpless and rely
on others to care for and nurture them. An individual’s style of life cannot be
understood without understanding their understanding of the people who look
after him and compensate for his inferiority. Inferiority is a basic concept of
Individual Psychology. This term is not wholly employed in the pejorative by
Adlerians; rather it describes the condition into which every one is born. Much of
subsequent life is a reaction to or compensation for this basic inferiority.
Inferiority is a basis for the socially embedded nature of humans. Behavior is
affected by inferiority feelings. Awareness of one’s deficiencies may generate
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feelings of distress and ideas as to compensate for or overcome one’s self-
perceptions of inferiority. Individual Psychology sees feelings of inferiority as
normal and widespread. They may serve to motivate a person to movement, but
the direction taken because of suffering from inferiority feelings influences
whether the strategy is useful or useless.
To summarize Individual Psychology: People are seen as unique,
organized, socially embedded, indivisible units. People react according to their
phenomenology, their perceptions, memories, ideas, and values—their private
logic. For heuristic purposes, the mind can be arbitrarily separated into cognition
and affection. Cognition predominates and emotions serve the purposes of the
intellect. Emotions are the result of the interpretation of both internal thoughts and
external events. There are no deterministic emotional elicitors in the external
world. Behavior is an extension of the teleolgies of individuals, many of which
are unknown to the actors. The individual is meaningless except in social terms,
and people are embedded in a social world. The normal, healthy, and successful
individual see herself as a part of a family, local groups, a profession, and
humanity, in others words, she has social interest.
 Briefly, Adler’s ideas on personality development hinge on the
importance of others in self- formation.  Although Adler himself did not organize
his thoughts about the self along developmental lines, he did concern himself with
how people become the way they are.  For Adler, the main issue for all people
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was “how to belong, to fit in” (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). The family is the main
social milieu and socialization agent for a growing child. Children with an in-born
potential for social interest want to belong to the family and must figure out just
how they fit in. A family is composed of people who live together with a
hierarchical structure, directionality, and some overall common goals. The
hierarchical structure consists of the adults, one of whom may or may not claim
the main authority, siblings, and perhaps others.
The birth order of children in a family is very influential in influencing
how children solve the problem of finding their place. Siblings affect each other's
personalities. Within any family, there are differential expectations of the children
according to gender and birth order. Birth order refers to the sequential
chronological position of individuals in a sibship and to the psychological
position of a child (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). Adler noticed some general trends
in self-formation that were influenced by birth order, with each successive sibling
affecting the thoughts, feelings, and perceptions of position in the family
hierarchy of those already born. Firstborns generally achieve more than do those
born later; firstborns show a greater need for affiliation; those born later seem to
have a better developed capacity for empathy; and firstborns seem to adhere to
authority and respect traditions more than those born later. Sibling rivalries and
strivings to find their place in a family greatly influence the development of
personality.
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Once an individual’s “style of life” is developed, they maintain it through
adaptation, self-reinforcement, and by achieving success as they see it. One seeks
out social and occupational situations that allow him to fit in, given his style of
life. People are motivated by their teleolgies and the human need for affiliation.
As people mature, they develop strategies for reaching their goals and justifying
their actions, to themselves and others.
Individual Psychology views emotions as human motivators. They serve
to goad people into action and are a part of a person’s style of life. Emotions are
not elicited by events, but are the results of interpretations of events, including
thoughts, by an actor according to her private logic. Emotions are controlled by
goals, by ideas, and by intentions (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). Adler described
emotions as “conjunctive,” or socially oriented, and “disjunctive,” socially
aggressive or alienating. In this way of thinking, guilt is a conjunctive emotion,
while shame is a disjunctive one, at least in its current manifestations. Some
emotions like irritability, frustration, and ambivalence serve to “keep one
equidistant from others” (Manaster & Corsini, 1993). They may essentially be a
“cover-up” for one’s real purposes and a mechanism by which people make
themselves seem complex or superior. Adler viewed emotions as helpful and as
facilitating movement in accordance with one’s goals. People are seen as
responsible for their emotions and a flare of temper cannot be attributed to
biology or temperament.
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The capacity for objective self-awareness empowers humans to deal with
information and choose a best course of action. This intentionality is a quality of
the objective self. Objective self-awareness allows humans to step outside of their
processing and generate novel explanations and solutions.  This facet of
consciousness has been variously referred to as the “me,” the objective self, and
the “I,” or subjective self (James, 1890). The self, for present purposes, will be
what Lewis (1992, 1999) refers to as the “reflecting self.” Different levels of the
self involve different ways of knowing and different modes of consciousness. The
notion of a multifaceted self is not new. Psychoanalytic theories including
Freudian, Object Relations, and Self Psychology have all proposed that the
subject is comprised of differing psychological components, even if the optimal
product was a unitary, close-ended self.
The conceptual differences of emotional states and emotional experiences
may be helpful in framing the problems of the complex self. Emotional states
operate at the level of subjective, that is, non-reflective self –awareness. However
unarticulated these states may be, they have goals, they learn and profit from
experience. Emotional states influence conscious thought and behavior and react
to external events and people. Emotional experience of states is the equivalent of
objective self-awareness.
Epistemologically, humans have knowledge of many things, and yet what
seems to separate people from most animals is the capacity to have knowledge
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about knowledge and about themselves. The human self has knowledge and can
function more or less efficiently in the world, but also has the capacity to reflect
on itself. Some of the most interesting research on the development of objective
self-awareness began with observing toddlers of various ages reacting or not
reacting to their reflection in mirrors and video images of themselves or another
toddler (Broucek, 1991; Lewis, M. & Brooks-Gunn, J., 1979; Lewis, M. &
Michaelson, L., 1989). The age at which children begin to recognize themselves
in reflective surfaces and on videotape without any prompting occurs generally
during the second half of the second year of life (Lewis, 2000).
Consistently correct usage of personal pronouns normally occurs at more
or less the same time (Lewis, 1990). This may indicate the emergence of the
ability to linguistically represent the self. Although children are referred to my
others as “you,” “he-she,” and never as “I or me,” they nonetheless develop the
capacity to employ self-referential pronouns correctly rather rapidly. This
suggests a maturational sequence of self-recognition, which may be used as an
indicator of the development of objective self-awareness. The result of
development, barring any trauma, is the existence of all modes of self-awareness
in the adult, with the earlier modes preserved. As a child develops and articulates
different modes of self, earlier modes continue to exist and are not replaced by
later ones. Lewis (1992) points out that all modes are likely to become more
elaborate over the span of a life.
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Adult modes of self may be delimited according to three categories: (1)
Sensorimotor affective ways of knowing; (2) representational knowledge; and (3)
abstract knowledge (Lewis, 1995). Each continues to be elaborated as a person
matures, in part due to ontogenetic factors, but also in response to environmental
transactions. The period from birth to eight months is dominated by sensorimotor
affective knowledge of the self. The earlier part of this period is characterized by
reflexes that more or less determine a child’s environmental transactions
(Bowlby, 1969). They allow a child to survive from the moment of birth and
include sucking, startle, and crying, blinking, and clinging reflexes.
The latter half of the sensorimotor affective period involves reflexes, but
behavior patterns learned from interactions with caregivers and the environment
also begin to emerge. An example is the “reaching action pattern” (Lewis, 1992).
Children of this age seem to know, in some sense, their place in space and are
able to reach for and grasp objects in space. They also seem to have a grasp of
distance and the reaching response seems to be affected by whether an object is
far or near. Representational self-knowledge begins to emerge at approximately
none months of age and is a component of implicit spatial positioning in the
reaching response. It may also be a factor in the emerging capacity to recognize
others, as opposed to self (Lewis, 1991).
Representational knowledge is possible with the development of an active
memory and is a major cognitive milestone. Memory allows children to develop
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different aspects of self-knowledge and releases them from dependence on the
here and now, characteristic of sensorimotor knowledge.  At this point, memory
may be limited to actual representations of people and objects and does not
include abstract representations. Self-knowledge is enhanced, given memory, and
a child can remember actions that provoked certain consequences. This is true of
the social world as well as the world of objects. The child develops the capacity to
repeat successful actions, but because this connection remains somewhat vague
and abstract, a child initially is unable to integrate both good and bad aspects of
caregivers or events. This means that children may split representations of a
parent into a good and a bad mom or dad. Failure to integrate in the course of
development leads to later difficulties explored prolifically in the literature of
psychopathology (Kernberg, 1975; Broucek, 1991).
Memory allows a child to accumulate permanent self-representations,
those of significant others and of interactions. Children are observed to
demonstrate very complex, sophisticated social patterning during the second year
of life, despite lack of facility with language. Children of age eight to fifteen
months know that there are action-consequence tendencies, know what it is like to
interact with others, and are familiar with failure.
The child has an elaborate representational knowledge of her own actions,
those of others, the ability to differentiate between self and other, and knowledge
about interaction in general (Lewis, 1992b). Several things are evident in the
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behavior of children of this age: (1) She knows of events that her as the center
(self in time/space); (2) she is differentiated from others (self/other); she has
enduring patterns (permanence); and (4) in certain transactions she knows which
of her actions coincide with those of others (Lewis, 1992a). This self-knowledge
is representational, and as such, is subjective.
The objective self emerges only with abstract knowledge from about the
second half of the second year on. Children develop the ability to abstract and
their representations are no longer limited to the realistic. It is now possible for
the child to create representations of representations, memories of memories. This
allows the child to categorize objects and people, and to think about both past and
future events. Memory is expanded to longer periods and the memory system
itself has become abstract. This allows for the learning of language and with it the
further abstraction of cognitive abilities.
Lewis echoed Kohut and Broucek in emphasizing mirroring by caregivers
in the development of the self-concept, but diverged in arguing that it is not
sufficient for the emergence of objective self-awareness (2000). He argues that
the meaning system attributed to the child by his parents is the change agent in
development. Drawing on the work of Kenneth Kaye (1982), Lewis theorizes that
the adult’s meaning system, as expressed in treatment of the child, produces that
which the parent thought that the child already possessed. The fact that parents
believe that their child possesses self-awareness serve as the mechanism by which
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the child becomes self-aware. Echoing the sentiments of hermeneutic philosophy,
Lewis suggests that meaning is not found within the individual, but results from
collective agreement as to meaning. The achievement of objective self-awareness
is no different from any other meaning, since self-awareness is an idea that people
have about themselves (Lewis, 1995). The acquisition of self-knowledge and its
various levels is embedded in social contexts. In tandem with biological
maturation, it seems reasonable that social-contextual factors hugely influence the
development of self.
To summarize Lewis’s theory of self-development: by the end of the
second year a child has developed an elaborate self system (2000; 1999; 1992a;
1990). The fundamental aspects of a fully functioning self-system are in place,
although it will undergo important changes over the span of life. This is inclusive
of the three modes of self-knowledge, objective self-awareness emerging last.
Normal individuals over three years old employ all modes, but it is objective self-
awareness that is associated with the emotions of shame, guilt, pride, and hubris.
Interpretive Social Science and the Self
Heidegger wrote of the self as being, and as constituted by the world in
which beings find themselves (Richardson, Fowers & Guignon, 1999). A self is
most fully realized by taking on the roles made available to it by the familiar
contexts of the world in which it acts. These familiar contexts are themselves
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given their content by the wider context of practices and customs of historical
culture. People are initiated into the practices and forms of the shared world of
being; they gain partial mastery of some of the norms and standards that mediate
interpretation and actions in context. People come to be selves, sons and
daughters, Euro-American or African-American, through their inclusion in the
conversation of the world of life.
The idea that children develop certain capacities because adults treat them
as if they are capable of such (Lewis, 1992) is consistent with the general
hermeneutic notion of being constituted in dialogue. Children “show up” in a
world always already saturated with shared meanings that are part of the historical
nature of the “event” of culture, family, and selfhood. A part of this endowment is
the possibility for reflection on experience and reasoning somewhat beyond
enculturation, although interpretation limits the possible options of choice to the
available contents of the world of life. Humans are essentially social agents who’s
most basic way of being is to be a part of a “we” (Richardson, Fowers &
Guignon, 1999).
To be a self is to be in ongoing dialogue with notions of the good, the true,
and what is worth doing (Taylor, 1989). It is to be in ongoing dialogue with the
“we,” and with the world of life. Joseph Dunne (1996) and others think of the self
as “storied” or as constituted by, and participating in many narratives that
comprise understanding for individuals, families, genders, ethnicities, and whole
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cultures.   Dunne writes that the young child is highly dependent and
impressionable, but confronts others and the world “in an active mode” and with
an “open and interrogative stance.” The child is drawn into language and practices
that shape its experiences and self-understandings from the start (Richardson, et
al., 1999). A sense of self emerges, not from a separation-individuation process,
but through assimilating and participating in current cultural practices and
conversations.
The mature self is not a center of monological consciousness, an inner
space or a mind full of representations of the external world and its own inner
contents, but rather the self is a nexus of dialogue (Richardson, et al., 1999). A
mature self is essentially an interplay or conversation of various “voices,”
commitments, identifications, or points of view (Richardson, et al., 1999).
Mikhail Bakhtin (Holquist, 1989; Morson & Emerson, 1990) imagined the self as
a conversation or struggle among multiple voices, speaking from different
positions and invested with different kinds and degrees of authority. Becoming a
self means interiorizing the dialogue from the world of life. Bakhtin (Morson &
Emerson, 1990) calls some of these voices “authoritative,” these are not in
dialogue with other voices, generally go unquestioned, and are accepted whole
cloth or rejected outright. Other voices are “innerly persuasive,” they have been
evaluated, assimilated, and retold in the self’s own voice. This kind of dialogue
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between and within selves always involves evaluations (Taylor, 1985) that
concern the moral quality of one’s motivations and actions
According to Taylor (1985), A fully competent human agent always has
some understanding (or misunderstanding) of herself and is partly constituted by
this understanding. Self-understanding incorporates agents seeing themselves
against a background of “strong evaluation,” or of distinctions between things that
are acknowledged as of higher importance or worth and things that are of lesser
value (Taylor, 1985). To be a self is to exist in a space defined by distinctions of
worth. A self is a being in a space where things are “in question,” and for whom
at least some of these questions have been partially answered. These answers have
often been given authoritatively by the culture, as well as elaborated through the
experience and evaluations of the individual.
Taylor (1988) has argued that the notion of the self is inextricably
intertwined with human understandings of their moral predicament and moral
agency. Self-descriptions of being are inseparable from existence in a space of
moral struggle and evaluation. For Taylor (1991), being a self is not like having
“biologically given organs, say eyes, or faculty like vision,” but existing in a
world of issues, of how one ought to be and how one measures up against what is
good, right, and what is worth doing. A part of being a self is finding one’s
standpoint in moral space and acting according to this perspective.  The self exists
in essentially moral space and the most basic languages of the self incorporate
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spatial terms: within/without, above/below, inner/outer, deep/superficial. Taylor
(1988) refers to this as “the moral topography of the self.”
 There is no true or genuine self that is despoiled by the world.
Embeddedness in a wider shared culture cannot be thought of as a burden that
constricts self-actualization. Participation in the “they” or “we” is what enables
the self to become a self, in the sense of having some meaningful identity.
Authenticity consists not in transcending the public but in realizing its
possibilities in a coherent, focused, and creative way. Heidegger proposed that
human being is an ongoing “happening or event” (Richardson, et al., 1999).
Humans are self-interpreting beings and care about their own lives, about who
and what they are, and about what is as at stake or in question for them. Because
people care about their lives, they always take some stand on their existence by
the adoption of roles, lifestyles, and personality traits made accessible by the
world of life. In taking these stands, people understand what it is to be.
In the dialogical view, different aspects of a person’s own experience
converse with one another and struggle towards some kind of agreement, or
disagreement. An individual’s identity is always an attitudinal stance towards
different meanings or perspectives, not a single standpoint. In this way of
thinking, human agency is “interpretation dependent” (Taylor, 1988). Human
agency consists of, in the greater part, the meanings and interpretive structures
into which one is “thrown” and of which the particular self is a part.  Being a self
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has varied radically over time and culture. Persons in different cultures can have
broadly diverse notions of self and identity, in keeping with their different self-
understandings (Taylor, 1989).
Ethical Orientation
Given the hermeneutic notion that embeddedness in cultures, occupations,
local groups, and families largely comprises identity, the complex interactions
between these modes of life largely influence how groups and individuals
perceive themselves and set certain priorities for thought, emotion, and behavior.
The work of culture is a moral endeavor. Taking a broader definition of ethics and
morality like that of Taylor (1985a), most human thought, emotion, or action can
be characterized as involving evaluation of such against some standard, rule, goal,
or ideal. This does not mean that all human phenomena are of the same
equivalence in terms of their ethical character or import. The concept of strong
evaluation rests on notions of the good, the true, and the just that give differing
values to actions. Taylor (1995) argues that there are criteria besides what people
think or feel about a phenomenon that determine, or influence what is ultimately
good.
Taylor (1991) has described humans as “beings for who things matter,”
and identity or selfhood as existing in an “ethical space” wherein having a
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coherent sense of self is knowing “where you are coming from when it comes to
questions of value, or issues of importance.” It might be said that people,
whatever their cultural embeddedness, “always have a sense of self, in this sense,
that they situate themselves somewhere in ethical space.” (Taylor, 1991)  This
ethical space, and indeed self and identity, makes sense only within what Taylor
has referred to as “frameworks of meaning,” which, simplistically put, are the
total background, including culture, in which persons thoughts, beliefs, emotions,
and actions make sense of some sort.
People are generally aware of where they stand relative to standards, rules,
goals, and ideals or how their thoughts, beliefs and actions compare to them.
People’s reactions when they compare their own beliefs, thoughts, and
particularly behaviors against ethical criteria consist of and are mediated by
memory, cognition, and emotional responses. The emotions that precede, or
accompany an ethical operation are, in part, a language or thoughts about the self
in regards to one’s being in moral space. Michael Lewis (1992) defines shame and
guilt as “the consequences of the self’s failure in regard to a standard, goal, or
rule,” and differentiates guilt as generated by “a specific self-failure,” while
shame attends “a total self-failure vis-à-vis a standard.” (1995). Persons are bound
to have feelings or emotional concomitants that result from existence in an
“ethical space,” and which are, in fact, an inescapable dimension of this existence.
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“Moral emotions” are an integral component of human being. It is the
contention of this project, based on Taylor’s portrayal of selfhood and identity as
inescapably ethical, that the “self-conscious” or moral affects, shame, guilt, pride,
and hubris are an integral part of the horizon of meaning for “beings for who
things matter,” regardless of framework or culture. These emotions, it will be
offered, have somewhat different or contrasting manifestations, seemingly
dependent on the frameworks, the ethics of selfhood and identity of the culture,
sub-group, and family from which a self emerges.
Individualism and Collectivism
Individualism and collectivism are ethical orientations that vary cross-
culturally, within a culture, between genders and socioeconomic statuses
(Matsumoto, 1994; Mead, 1967).  Hofstede (1984) identified four main cultural
dimensions that can be related to basic human science issues: (1) Individualism-
Collectivism, (2) power distance, (3) uncertainty avoidance, and (4) masculinity-
femininity. Hofstede (1984) argued that these four dimensions provide an
approach for understanding the dominant value systems in different cultures that
influence institutions, social organizations, thought, and feelings. In this way of
thinking, individualism-collectivism is a dimension that can be used to explain the
relationship between individuals and the various collectivities that comprise a
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culture. For example, in some cultures individualism is seen as a blessing and a
source of well-being. In other cultures, individualism is seen as alienating.
As is obvious from the previous explication of a hermeneutic-dialogical
self, these ethics of the self and identity are more than mere characterizations of
being. They are inextricably implicated in the total psychological, social, political,
and economic dynamics of persons, groups and cultures. The ethics of self and
identity are an integral part and result of the larger ethico-religious systems
dominant in various societies at various times. Notions of identity as
individualistic and “dividualistic” (Ho, 1995) differ broadly in terms of these
frameworks, what comprises ethical space, and how one goes about locating
oneself within it. David Ho (1995) characterizes the self or a range of ideas on the
concept of identity and personhood in Asian cultures (in general) as “dividual,”
embedded, relational, or connected. It is simplistic and inappropriate to describe
all “eastern” cultures as having the same sense of personal identity and relational
ethics. Ho has described four different philosophical traditions in which identity
and constitutional frameworks vary. Inki Ha (199- ) has explored different ways
of being a self in Korea, and in how Koreans experience and discuss shame that
also vary from the generalized
Hofstede (1984) characterized the I-C dimension as placing cultures on a
bipolar continuum, where individualism and collectivism are the opposite ends of
the same dimension. Other theorists (Gelfland, Triandis, & Chan, 1996;
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Kagitcibasi & Berry, 1989) have disagreed with this dichotomous position and
have defined I-C as independent constructs and proposed two separate
dimensions, individualism and collectivism. This allows for occasions in which a
person could be simultaneously high on both dimensions. In this way of thinking,
being low on individualism does not infer that a person is necessarily high on
collectivism.
The basic features of collectivism include: (1) Concern with the in-group’s
outcomes and as prioritizing the in-group’s goals over individual goals; (2)
maintaining harmony, interdependence, security, and cooperation; (3) avoiding
open conflict within the in-group with more attention paid to maintaining the
approval of others in the in-group and an emphasis on helping others save face;
(4) defining social norms and duty in accordance with the in-group; (5)
reciprocity among group members who are bound by interlocking responsibilities
and obligations (6) self-definition based on intense emotional attachment to the
in-group; and (7) sharp distinctions between in-groups and out-groups (Markus &
Kitayama, 1994; Triandis, 1994; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990).
Theorists from a multicultural perspective (Markus & Kitayama, 1994;
Triandis, 1994) have identified the basic features of individualism as: (1) a greater
concern for personal rather than in-group outcomes and prioritizing personal goals
over in-group goals; (2) motivation by personal preference, needs, rights, and the
social-contractual relationship established with others; (3) the importance of
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autonomy and emotional detachment from the in-group; (4) emphasis on rational
assessment of associating with others; (5) accepting confrontations within in-
groups as inevitable; and (6) independent self-definition.
Extensive research on individualism and collectivism has been performed
in recent years. Schwarz (1994) executed a study utilizing participants from more
than 40 countries and identified elements of individualism and collectivism in
every country. The study supported the notion that collectivist values include
family security, social order, and respect for tradition, honoring elders, security
and politeness. Individualist values included curiosity, open-mindedness,
creativity, and an exciting life full of pleasurable experiences. In a study of
American and Japanese workers, Engel (1988) found that each group emphasized
different values in the workplace. American workers valued individualism,
independence, and self-sufficiency. The Japanese workers in this study valued
group involvement and loyalty to the employer.
Individual perception is impacted greatly by individualism and
collectivism (Triandis, 1995). For collectivists, social perception is made up of a
series of relationships that revolve around an individual. For individualists, the
focus is on an individual who has relationships. In interviews with both Japanese
and American women, Lebra (1984) found large differences. The Japanese talked
at great length about their relationships, and said almost nothing about
themselves. The American women hardly talked at all about their relationships
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and extensively about themselves. In a study comparing the association of ethical
orientation to social interaction between college students from Hong Kong and
their American counterparts, Wheeler, Reis, and Bond (1989) observed that the
Hong Kong students had significantly longer interactions and with fewer people
compared with the American students.
Individualists have been noted to attribute events to internal individual
causes more often than collectivists, who tend to attribute them to external
circumstances (Newman, 1993). Newman also found that individualists pay
attention to internal processes such as principles, while collectivists pay attention
to the social contexts and saving face. Collectivists also have a hard time when
they have to communicate an unpleasant message. Although they may value
honesty, they value keeping harmony in relationships even more and would rather
tell a white lie than risk damage to a relationship.  Individualists may see this as
dishonest because it is inconsistent with the Western value of truth and
authenticity. The emotions of collectivists tend to focus on others and are short
duration (situational), while the emotions of individualists are ego-focused
(shame, anger) and of longer duration (do not change with the situation) (Smith &
Bond, 1994). In East Asian collectivist cultures, people try to display only
positive emotions towards acquaintances and tend to control negative emotions
(Gudykunst, 1993).
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Bettancourt and Dorr (1997) conducted two studies in the U.S. and
observed, perhaps surprisingly, that in individualistic cultures, the importance of
in-groups appears to play an integral role in the experience of positive subjective
well being. Results also suggested that those people concerned about their in-
groups were likely to evaluate them in more positive ways, which enhanced
perceptions of happiness and well being. They also found that within an
individualistic culture, both individuals’ evaluations of themselves (subjective
self-esteem) and evaluations in their in-groups (Collective self-esteem) play
mutual roles in happiness and well-being. However, when one’s in-group was
considered outré’, or failed to support individuals in their personal goals, blame
was externalized and a substantial portion of the participants indicated they tend
to move away from their in-groups.
The philosophical and religious traditions of various parts of the world have
greatly influenced the development of ethical orientation and identity. Most
people in the past were probably not individual selves in the modern Western
sense (Truett-Anderson, 1997). In “Sources of the Self” (1989), Charles Taylor
observed “we can probably be confident that at one level human beings of all
times and places have shared a very similar sense of ‘me and mine’.” Julian
Jaynes (1976) has proposed that before a certain point in history, roughly
equivalent to the age of the Homeric Iliad, people did not possess a unitary
consciousness like that of most moderns (regardless of culture). He argued that
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the style of thinking that is now referred to as consciousness is not an innate
human characteristic, but is a learned process, which is the result of a social
invention that formed sometime after the Trojan war. Jaynes (1976) came to this
conclusion from studying the literature of the ancient Greeks, in particular the
Iliad, a conflation of legend, poetry, and history. In this literature, people
frequently heard voices of the sort that would today be considered auditory
hallucinations, but at that time were considered to be communications from the
gods. These messages were generally obeyed, or disobeyed at peril. Jaynes
believed there was probably no such thing as introspection at this point, the
characters in the Iliad do not sit down and think out what to do (1976). Whether
or not Jayne’s assumptions are correct, ancient texts may be read as statements of
how people felt, thought, and understood their worlds.
Writings from later Hellenic culture, including the Odyssey and the works
of Heraclitus, portray a self that is radically unstable, devoid of certainty and
permanence, not bounded or unique as in modernity. At about the same time as
Heraclitus (500 B.C.), but half a world away, Gautama Buddha proclaimed a very
similar notion of the unstable and illusory notion of the self (Truett-Anderson,
1997). The Dialogues of Plato, written more than a century after Heraclitus’ time,
reveal a self that may be the forerunner of the modern Western self. For Plato, the
self was the earthly manifestation of the immortal soul, which exists in the world
of eternal Ideas or Forms. All things on earth were merely reflections, or shadows
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of the supernatural. In Socratic-Platonic dialogues, the human self had its own
moral life and experienced conflict between the baser desires of the body and the
transcendent aspirations of reasoning intelligence, which was characterized by
Socrates as a personal, inner struggle (Truett-Anderson, 1997). In this way of
thinking, the soul is the self and had an immortal identity.
The multicultural psychologist Triandis (1995) traces these important
sources of modern individualism to the Greek Sophists. The Sophists taught their
students to aspire to excellence in law, in debate, and in politics. Individual
success was considered a sign of virtue. According to the Sophists, the ends of
success justify any means used to attain them. Socrates and Plato thought that this
idea was immoral and valorized the pursuit of truth, even if it meant not
succeeding. These two currents in ancient Greek philosophy, individual success
and truth, have been enormously essential parts of modern individualism.
Theorists from outside the discipline of cross-cultural psychology such as
Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven
Tipton (1985), Christopher Lasch (1979), as well as writers within the
psychological tradition (Cushman, 1990; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999)
have explored individualism in its many forms. In “Habits of the Heart” (Bellah et
al., 1985), the authors propose that individualism lies at the heart of American
culture. It is the modern framework of meaning (Taylor, 1989) that influences and
guides almost every institution, group, and individual in the culture. Bellah, ET al.
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explore four different strands of individualism: biblical, civic, utilitarian, and
expressive. The differing types of individualism have many commonalities
including the belief in the dignity, “and indeed, the sacredness of the individual”
(Bellah, et al., 1985).
This innate dignity is protected by the notion of rights, which are
sacrilized by connecting them to God in the US constitution and explicitly in
churches, schools, social organizations, the military, and the like (MacIntyre,
1988). Anything that may violate the rights of the individual to think for himself,
decide for himself, and to live his life as he sees fit are regarded as morally
wrong, if not sacrilegious. Daily lives, as well as Americans’ highest aspirations
for self, others, society, and the world are informed by individualism. However
noble this may seem, many of the direst dilemmas of modernity, for individuals
and society, can be closely linked to individualism (Bellah, et al., 1985). Many
forms of mental illness, social pathology, civic decay, and breakdown in ethics
and morality can be associated with a hypertrophied form of individualism
labeled variously as modern individualism (Bellah, et al., 1985) or liberal
individualism (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999), or as “The Culture of
Narcissism” (Lasch, 1979). The self has become “the main form of reality”
(Coles, 1980, in Bellah, et al., 1985).
Liberal individualism is the ideological and moral perspective that
undergirds much of modern social science (Richardson, et al., 1999). It consists of
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two often-oppositional strains, utilitarian and expressive. Utilitarian individualism
takes as a certain particular human appetites, fears, and dispositions and “sees
human life as an effort by individuals to maximize their self-interest relative to
these given ends” (Bellah, et al., 1985). This view of life has been criticized as
promoting a way of life that is detached, calculating, emotionally isolating, and
overly preoccupied with instrumental control over events to the neglect of other
important concerns and purposes in living (Richardson, et al., 1999).
Expressive individualism is an outgrowth of the Romantic reaction to what
was perceived of as the growing hegemony of the rational-empirical utilitarianism
of the Enlightenment. It holds that “each person has a unique core of feeling and
intuition that should unfold or be expressed if individuality is to be realized”
(Bellah, et al., 1985). Unlike utilitarian individualism, the romantic notion of the
individual allowed for the importance of and merger with others under certain
conditions.  Expressive individualism emphasizes an inner, true self independent
of the influence of others.
Liberal individualism is a predisposition to thought, feeling, and a way of
life that imbues modern consciousness (Taylor, 1991). Moral reasoning is
theoretically limited to evaluation of means-ends relations. The focus on
procedural or means-ends rationality is aimed at expanding human instrumental
prowess and protecting individual freedom from dogma or authoritarian control
(Richardson, et al., 1999). The romantic and postmodern reaction to this is the
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valuation of aesthetics over morality (Gergen, 1988). In this way of thinking, the
good is comprised of what is most compelling, entertaining, or pleasing. If
reasoning about worthy ends is left to a narrowly procedural and utilitarian
rationality, or to personal aesthetics, then no one is entitled to impose their values
or way of life on others. What supposedly prevents this from always degenerating
into an amoral struggle is the view of individuals as possessing natural rights and
as invested with dignity and worth. Liberal individualism portrays a one
dimensional, self-centered picture of human thought and action.
Taylor (1991) proposes that the passing away of unquestionable
frameworks of meaning, wherein everyone had a place in a cosmic order, has left
people with a dizzying and often terrifying array of options, or perhaps no
consistently identifiable framework at all. Taylor (1989) writes of an agent
without a framework as “pathological,” and as “a person in the grip of an
appalling identity crisis.”  A person without a framework exists outside the space
of engagement, outside of orientation in a shared ethical space. It is precisely this
agent that scientific psychology promotes as the ideal of the detached and self-
contained individual.
At about the same time as Heraclitus and Gautama Buddha, roughly 500
B.C., Confucius emphasized the importance of virtue (Ho, 1995; Triandis, 1995).
This was also seen in other Asian religious-philosophical traditions such as
Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Shinto. Ho (1995) writes of these different
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ethico-philosophical traditions, which have long guided thought, belief and action
in different Asian societies and how they have influenced, and in turn been
influenced by notions of the self and identity. Just as various strains of ancient
Greek thought, particularly as it was incorporated into Christianity by Augustine
and other Platonic and Aristotelian theologians of the early church, utilitarianism,
Romanticism, and scientific instrumentalism have formed and been formed by a
general western notion of the self. So too has the self shaped and been shaped by
the systems of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Vedanta (not to mention
various local, isolate ethical systems).
Considering Eastern conceptions of identity and selfhood requires that
several caveats be taken: many theorists have written of Asia in inclusive terms,
as basically a monoculture. There are significant differences in Asian cultures,
identities, and their various philosophical worldviews. Another observation that
deserves close attention is that, unlike many western philosophies, most eastern
systems are not concerned with theory, nomenclature, or attitudes, but rather they
“are concerned with a transformation of experience itself.” (Ho, 1995)
Eastern ways of life are typified more by “juxtaposition and identity” than
by western notions of “unit in diversity” (Haas, 1956). Asian ideas about
personality concentrate on communal “goods,” lived experience, insight, religious
and philosophical approaches to life, and the value of taking a more oblique path
in interpersonal relationships (Ho, 1995). Differences between the four eastern
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religious-philosophical traditions and western models can be analyzed in three
dimensions (Ho, 1995): subject-object distinctions; boundaries between self and
other, including individual personhood; and the centrality and de-centeredness of
the self.
The nature of the self-nonself boundary is a basic dimension along which
cultural conceptions of identity may be differentiated (Sampson, 1988). In the
West, identity is predicated upon the development and maintenance of clear self-
other boundaries. A common thread in Western developmental psychology insists
that a basic task of maturation is the unfolding of a distinct sense of self through
the processes of separation and individuation (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 19--). A
failure in this crucial task supposedly results in a loss of identity and subsequent
psychopathology.
Markus and Kitayama (1991) believe that most Asian cultures have
conceptions of identity that are predicated on the fundamental relatedness of
individuals to one another. The self is construed as interdependent, not
independent. The relational sense of identity found in Confucian societies, does
not support a clear demarcation between self and nonself (Ho, 1993).
Interpersonal relations are of crucial importance historically in the formation of
character and contemporaneously in defining what it means to be human across
the lifespan. The life of an individual is incomplete; it derives meaning only from
its relationship to others. Confucianism does not require the dissolution of the
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self-nonself boundary; it demands that selfhood be moral and reciprocal. The self
is malleable through education, but it is not changeable in its essence, hence its
rigidly hierarchical nature. In other Eastern philosophical traditions, the self-other
boundary is negated. The Taoist self is a part of and in harmony with the cosmos.
The selfless person thinks of others as I (Ho, 1995). In Hinduism, the idea of
individual selfhood is an illusion. The Buddhist doctrine of ‘no self” denies the
very existence of an individual self.
Communitarianism
Taylor (1991b) believes the idea that modern societies can be run on a
single principle, such as an abstract notion of the "general will" of the people, or
that of free market allocations, is untenable if any sort of despotism is to be
avoided. A better approach, one that in many ways echoes a hermeneutic-
dialogical stance, is one that brings into open dialogue multiple positions as to
how things are, or should be.
Mary Ann Glendon (1991) refers to the United States as "the land of rights
and the missing language of responsibility," reflecting a major tenet of a broad
and diverse group of notions generally referred to as "Communitarian."
Communitarianism differs from both individualism and collectivism not only on
basic ethics of identity and on the world of life, but it is not received, or a
culturally inculcated position, people are not born into communitarian cultures.
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Rather, Communitarianism requires a conscious and intentional engagement with
the various frameworks such as individualism and collectivism, their benefits and
dangers. This often requires a struggle within the self and in communities to
think, feel, and interact from a stance that acknowledges the inherently dialogical
nature of the self. Also there is an identity and a commitment to the common
good, to responsibilities, as well as preserving individual liberties within the
limits of the potential deleterious effects their exercise may hold for others.
The political and social philosopher Michael Walzer (1983) sees any
measure of individual autonomy as contingent upon membership and participation
in the community. Walzer distinguishes between self-esteem and self-respect.
Self-esteem, he offers, "is a relational concept, dependent on a social hierarchy, it
has to do with a favorable opinion of oneself as measured against others" (Walzer,
1983). He sees self-respect as having to do with living up to a standard, of having
dignity and integrity for oneself and position. Unlike self-esteem, self-respect is
non-competitive, is free from rank, available to anyone who understands her
proper dignity and can act on it (S. Dolan-Henderson, 1994). Community
circumstances are central to self-respect. It is crucial, for Walzer, that people be
allowed to, and actually participate in society's many institutions.
Walzer works out a place for autonomy. It begins with conscience, with is
also a key component of self-respect. In Walzer theory, conscience is shared
knowledge, "an internalized acceptance of communal standards" (Walzer, 1983).
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Self-respect, echoing but diverging from individualism, is "self-possession," the
ownership not of one's body, but of one's character, qualities, and actions. It also
means being accountable. The autonomous individual, in Walzer's (1983) words,
"knows his place; he reigns in his own company, not elsewhere; he does not
desire power over the whole world. He is the very opposite of a tyrant, who uses
his noble birth, or his wealth or his office, or even his celebrity, to claim other
goods that he has not earned, to which he has no right."  One can only be
autonomous in the context of membership and participation in the community.
For Walzer (1983), liberal individualism misrepresents life. Humans
cannot be self-contained, strangers to one another when each is born with parents,
and when these parents have friends, relatives, neighbors, work associates, co-
religionists, and fellow citizens. The language of liberal individualism takes away
the sense of connectedness, and leads to an over-dependence on the rights of the
individual, as protected by the courts and the state. In this way of thinking, the
self is not a pre-social configuration, but is capable of "reflecting critically on the
values that have governed its constitution" (S. Dolan-Henderson, 1994). This
requires the faculty that M. Lewis (1992) and Broucek (1991) refer to as
"objective self-awareness."
In this sense, communitarian thought is a dialogue between two broad
positions, one that gives primacy to liberty--individual rights and freedom, and
the other that gives highest priority to order--the good of the collectivity. Amatai
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Etzioni (1996) characterizes his particular take on Communitarianism as having
the goal of a "good society that nourishes both social virtues and individual
rights… and requires a carefully maintained equilibrium of order and autonomy,
rather than a maximization of either." A good society requires an order that is
aligned with the core moral commitments of its members.
Bellah, et al. (1985) define community as "a group of people who are
socially interdependent, who participate together in discussion and decision
making, and who share certain practices that both define the community and are
nurtured by it." A community usually has a history and is defined in part by its
past and its memory of the past. In the course of this project, the United States has
generally been targeted as a bastion of self-contained individualism. The United
States has also been identified as “a nation of joiners" (Bellah, et al., 1985). In
many spheres of life, people are expected to get involved, to choose themselves to
join social groups. Most people say they get involved in social institutions to
achieve their self-interests or because they feel an affinity with others.
These groups usually result in what Bellah, et al. (1985) refer to as
"lifestyle enclaves." People who share some features of private life form a
lifestyle enclave. They express their identity through shared patterns of
appearance, consumption, and leisure activities, which often serve to differentiate
them from those with other lifestyles. A lifestyle enclave is not interdependent, do
not act together politically, and do not share a history. However, if any of these
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things begin to appear, a lifestyle enclave may evolve into a community. Many of
what are referred to in the United States as communities, are actually lifestyle
enclaves, or mixtures of the two.
A Communitarian-Hermeneutic Social Science Inquiry
Hermeneutic theorists such as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer,
Jurgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor may offer some new ways of thinking
about the human situation (Richardson, et al., 1999). The word hermeneutic
comes from the Greek word for interpretation and may be characterized as range
of theories about “understanding understanding.” Briefly, contemporary
hermeneutics de-emphasizes the role of the human subject as an “epistemological
being” (Richardson, et al., 1999) and finds the methods of natural science
unsuitable for studying humans. Scientific ideology and methodology is
explanatory, which it accomplishes by subsuming events under general laws. It
treats the world as a collection of de-contextualized objects that may appear in
certain causal interactions. Such an objectifying stance towards things
presupposes a capacity for abstraction, in which all meanings and values are
removed from experience so that things that are investigated as inherently
meaningless objects in time and space, obedient to general, or natural laws
(Gadamer, 1964). The ideology and methodology of science excludes the human
122
subject and promotes the belief that a true scientific detachment and objectivity
can, and must me attained.
The primary goal of the human sciences is to understand what humans do
by grasping the aims and interpretations of agents in the meaningful situations in
which they find themselves. This understanding requires that the investigator put
into play the “full totality of life” within herself, including her insights into what
is crucial in life and the experience and skills that she has picked up herself as a
feeling, thinking, desiring human subject within a framework of shared meanings.
Although some hermeneutic thinkers eschew the possibility and necessity
of a method for a human science such as the “methodological dualism” proposed
by Dilthey (1962), contemporary hermeneutics retains Dilthey’s basic goal of
understanding as a major element of this philosophy. There are three basic ideas
which are common to most hermeneutic thought: The first commonality is that the
conception of the human situation as knowers that is inherited from mainstream
natural science gives a distorted view of things when used to make sense of
human events. The idea of the detached, neutral researcher makes no sense in the
human sciences, because people are always contextualized in a public life-world,
caught up in a web of practices and linguistic conventions that can never be fully
articulated or controlled. That is why researchers must draw on their
preunderstanding of what things are all about and apply it to the understanding of
others. The initial preunderstanding must be open to revision in the course of
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interpretation, giving the human sciences an inescapable circular structure that
moves from part to whole to part to whole, ad infinitum.
Secondly, humans are self-interpreting beings whose defining traits are
shaped by the stands that they take in participating in a way of life that includes
others. Possible self-interpretations and self-assessments circulating in the culture
make possible the intentions, desires, and beliefs from which one makes a stand.
To understand another involves seeing where they stand in relation to the public
meanings and practices of their community. From this comes the understanding of
selfhood and identity as composed of stories in a shared context of meaning
(Dunne, 1996), what Richardson, et al. (1999) refer to as a “historical-dialogical
conception of the self.” This is a way of thinking of humans as unfolding
narratives whose being is shaped by an ongoing dialogue with others in a
communal context (Taylor, 1989).
Lastly, because humans are what they interpret themselves as being within
their social contexts, it follows that social theory cannot be thought of as a neutral
process of data collection and analysis. Social science pronouncements find their
way into the culture and so define and alter the reality that they describe.
Hermeneutics recognizes that the practice of interpretation, particularly of
humans, has wide-ranging ethical and political implications. Given the impact of
human science on ways of life and understanding, hermeneutics requires a
124
capacity for moral and political awareness that is excluded by empirical
approaches to human phenomena (Richardson, et al., 1999).
Inescapable Ethics
The ethical turn in the human sciences rigorously questions the “value-
free” rationality of mainstream social science and the “destructive social effects
that follow from it” (Aldin, 1996). Hermeneutical ethics attempts to delineate a
type of inquiry that is historically situated and practical, involving choice,
deliberation, and judgment. Hermeneutics is generally anti-epistemological and
advocates a cultural change from notions of truth to notions of meaning and value.
This is a knowledge-model based on “conversation” rather than scientific
experiment (Aldin, 1996). The idea of culture as a conversation rather than a
structure standing on foundations fits well with the hermeneutical notions of
knowledge (Rorty, 1980). Therefore, getting into conversations with others,
including strangers may be analogous to acquiring a new virtue or skill by way of
the interaction. In this sense, hermeneutics is a model based on ethical self-
education, in some ways akin to the Aristotelian notion of phronesis (Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6).
Another person or an entire culture cannot be understood by examining its
parts. Understanding is best achieved by finding out how a whole (individual or
larger social unit) hangs together, and yet holistic understanding is necessarily
125
incomplete without consideration of its constituent parts. Coming to understand is
more akin to getting to know a person than closely following some methodology.
There is a constant interplay between the parts of a conversation and the point of
the whole thing. Interlocutors play back and forth between self and other, present
and past.
Hermeneutical ethics is based on the ideas of “dialogue,” back and forth
play between self and other, part and whole. It includes notions about the
cultivation of wisdom, in the Aristotelian sense, which depends on dialogue,
friendship, and the impossibility of understanding another by detaching,
withholding judgment and feigning impartiality. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1979)
substitutes the notion of “bildung,” or education and self-formation, for that of
knowledge as the goal of thinking. This character formation makes possible “an
openness to the other, to the past or the alien” (1979). In this way of thinking, one
always goes into a new situation with some pre-formed opinions or “prejudices,”
requiring that she always be aware of her own biases so as to encounter the new,
or alien in such a way as to allow for its own truth.
In spite of the emphasis on historicity and tradition, the crucial notions of
openness to the truth of the other and dialogue hopefully make hermeneutical
ethics essentially anti-ethnocentric. Charles Taylor (1992), in particular has
offered his own interpretive ethics based on respect for alterity, or difference. The
increasing pluralism of cultural institutions has provoked some thinkers to an
126
acrimonious skepticism about the defensibility of any moral principles or
perspectives (Guttman, 1992). Public institutions, including government, schools,
and universities have come under heavy criticism for failing to recognize or
respect the cultural identities of citizens.
In earlier societies, identity was largely fixed by social position (Taylor,
1991; Triandis, 1996; Truett-Anderson, 1998). The frameworks of meaning that
explained what individuals recognized as important was largely determined by
their place in society, and the roles and activities attached to their positions. While
these frameworks have not totally receded and many people still define
themselves by their social roles, Taylor (1992) offers that what decisively
undermines socially derived identity in the modern West is the individualist
notion of authenticity. In this sense, authenticity is being true to an inner nature
that is in danger of being lost through external pressures to conform, and in taking
an instrumental stance towards the self. Authenticity is the notion that each person
has his or her own individual way of being human and should measure themselves
by their own internal standards, rules, and goals. In this sense, authenticity cannot
be socially derived, but must be inwardly generated. This authenticity is a
monological “song of myself.”
Given that there is no such thing as interior generation understood in this
monological fashion, in order to understand the close connection between identity
and what Taylor (1992) refers to as “recognition,” the dialogical character of the
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human world of life must be considered. Humans become realized agents capable
of self-understanding and of defining an identity by way of their “acquisition of
rich human languages of expression” (Ibid). In this sense, language is not
restricted to the verbal, but is expanded to encompass other modes by which
humans define themselves. This particular conception may include the languages
of art, of gesture, of love, or of disconnection and alienation. The languages
required for self-definition are not acquired by a detached knower, collecting facts
and data, but rather by interaction with others who matter. In this way of thinking,
the origin of the human mind is in dialogue. As people grow, they expand and
elaborate on their original languages and develop opinions and stances of their
own. Nevertheless, identity is defined always in dialogue with, toward, or against
the things that significant others ascribe to a person. The languages learned in
early “constitutional conversations” and in fact much of the conversation itself
remains with a person as long as they live. Gergen and Gergen’s (1988) essay on
grief and mourning in the Victorian era may illustrate this point. Before the rise of
modernity and the de-sacrilization of the world of life, the dead, even in American
culture, were an integral part of everyday life. They remained alive in the
memories, conversations, and manner of living that the survivors lived out (not to
mention mortuary daguerreotypes). In the dialogical view, the influences of
significant others, even if acquired in childhood, continues indefinitely.
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This may seem to replicate the developmental determinism of most
mainstream psychologies, but the languages obtained early in development can
and do join in dialogue with those learned from interactions with significant
others encountered later in life, as well as dialogue among the multiple voices of
the self. One’s notions about some “goods” can be transformed by enjoying them
in common with mentors, partners, husbands, wives, and friends. Some goods
only become accessible through common bonds. Unfortunately, liberal, or modern
individualism tends to portray relationships as contractual, as an exchange of
goods and services rather than as constituting one’s identity.
The idea of authenticity, that people must inwardly generate their true
identity and live according to their own genuine nature and self-derived goals can
be said to be an essential component of expressive individualism (Bellah, et al.,
1985; Richardson, et al., 1999). In earlier times, there was no pressing need for a
"special" form of recognition as one's identity was based on social categories that
everyone took for granted. The inwardly generated "authentic" identity of
modernity is not automatically given recognition, it has to be earned through
exchange, and the attempt can often fail. Taylor (1992) notes, "What has come
about with the modern age is not the need for recognition but the conditions in
which the attempt to be recognized can fail." That may be why the clamor for
recognition has recently become so intense. In earlier times, people did not think
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of themselves as having identities, not because they did not have them, but
because identity was tightly interwoven into the fabric of life.
Authenticity, in the expressive individualist sense of the term, is at least in
part a repudiation of an identity constituted in dialogue. As hierarchical
frameworks of meaning have de-stabilized and been at least partially replaced by
individualist ideologies, recognition has come to play an essential role in the
culture that has arisen around this ideal. An original identity is vulnerable to
recognition given or withheld, in both intimate and public spheres. In the culture
of authenticity, relationships are seen as the crucible of self-discovery and self-
affirmation for the inwardly generated identity (Taylor, 1992). In the public
sphere, identities formed by dialogue and less shaped by predefined social scripts
have made equal recognition a central issue. Equal recognition is the appropriate
mode for a healthy democratic society and its refusal can inflict damage on those
who are denied it (Sandel, 1982). The ascription of a demeaning or inferior image
to another can distort and oppress to the degree that it is internalized.
Returning to the notion of self-conscious affects, it is easier to see one
reason why shame has become so debilitating in modern, individualist culture.
The self, while still constituted in dialogue, is vulnerable to failures and the
rebuffs of others, real or imagined, as never before.   Recognition, particularly for
the white male individualist, has been rephrased as unquestioned privilege,
achievement and self-esteem. Some degree of the so-called "white male backlash"
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against women and groups outside the dominant discourse may be attributable to
not only the insecurities wrought by challenges to patriarchal authority, but also
by a general feeling of misrecognition, of de-legitimation of white male identity.
This is not necessarily regrettable, but requires a period of adjustment like any
psychological or social change.
The need for recognition, in the sense of a validation of the basic truth of
an individual or group in the public sphere, may energize people to engage in the
politics of the world of life. It may serve as a new goad to commitment and
investment in the communities of which people are, or desire to be active
members. While some individuals or groups may have hidden agendas or base
their efforts on a kind of victimology, at least these motivating factors may be
brought into public dialogue. Writing almost two centuries ago, Alexis de
Tocqueville (1969) discussed the danger of Americans ending up as the kind of
individuals who are "enclosed in their own hearts." Individuals may then be
subject to a new form of despotism, whereby overweening self-concern and
apathy about things beyond the personal sphere result in a nation where few
desire to participate actively in self-government. Taylor (1991b) writes, “They
will prefer to stay at home and enjoy the satisfactions of private life, as long as the
government of the day produces the means to these satisfactions and distributes
them widely." In such a case, the danger of "soft despotism" (Tocqueville, 1969)
is immanent. It will not be a regime of oppression and terror, but in fact
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everything will be run by an "immense tutelary power" (1969) over which people
will have little control.     The only defense against this, Tocqueville thinks, is a
vigorous political culture in which participation is valued, in the local as well as
higher spheres. Unfortunately, the encroaching solipsism of the self-contained
individual undermines this engagement.
132
Chapter Three
Statement Of The Problem
Interpretive Social Science
This dissertation takes a broadly interpretive social science or hermeneutic
approach to studying human action or social life. This interpretive approach is
“postmodern” in the sense that it insists that all human understanding, including
in the natural sciences, is thoroughly creative and interpretive rather than simply
obedient to an objective order of fact. However, the interpretive or hermeneutic
view rejects the conclusion of many postmodern thinkers that all human
understanding is ultimately arbitrary or merely contingent. A key to this
interpretive view is its contention that while both natural and human science
inquiry are thoroughly interpretive or judgmental and do not admit of final or
certain conclusions about their subject matter, still there are important differences
between them. As Richardson and Fowers (1998) put it:
Perhaps the main point of contrast is the central place occupied in the
natural sciences by the exercise of a special capacity for abstraction that
we might call "objectification." To adopt an objectifying stance toward
things is to ignore or abstract away from "subject-related qualities"
(Taylor, 1980, p. 31). Such qualities are most of the meanings of and
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relationships among things that show up within our ordinary experience,
concerned with our shifting desires, values, and aims. Thus, to take an
objectifying stance means to "regard the world as it is independently of the
meanings it might have for human subjects, or of how it figures in their
experience (ibid.). Obviously this approach has proved its mettle in
modern science and its applications. (p. 487)
These authors go on to argue that in spite of the evident successes of the
natural sciences in modern times, there is no good reason to deny the validity of
other kinds of interpretations of our experience and human action, ones reflecting
different ways of being involved with the world, especially the world of human
events and activities. Thus, in their opinion, “It no longer seems proper to many
of us to insist that reality must be only that which is formulated through the
approach of abstraction and objectification” (p. 488). Indeed, many of us have
learned to question the detached, somewhat depersonalizing, "spectator" view of
knowing and relating to the world this approach entails. In fact, this approach, in
the opinion of many has yielded very little in terms of its own goal of empirical
theory permitting extensive prediction and control of the everyday human realm,
settling often for fragmented islands of inquiry and findings that often seem
merely commonsensical or of questionable significance. Slife and Williams
(1995, p. 195) point out that many critics feel that "the language of science" is a
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"relatively impoverished language" for characterizing human activity because "we
force ourselves to study human beings at a distance.” (ibid)
Therefore, the basic view of social inquiry I have adopted in this
dissertation holds that much of it consists neither in finding universal laws of
human behavior nor in throwing up our hands in despair with the relatively
sophomoric cry that “everything is relative.” Rather, in this view, we patiently
and painstakingly seek to make sense of the meanings that imbue and shape social
and personal life or, as hermeneutic thinkers often put it, “interpret the
interpretations” that serve as the goals and guidelines of meaningful human
activity. According to an interpretive social science perspective, all sorts of
quantitative, qualitative, theoretical, and interpretive modes of inquiry and the
data they unearth can contribute to insightful and/or useful accounts of human
action. But these accounts are likely to be much less revealing, or even be quite
trivial, unless they are framed with the understanding that their constructs and
explanations represent interpretations of meaningful, partly moral events in the
social world. For example, in an interpretive approach, quantitative data may be
sought and found that detect correlations among events or patterns in human
affairs that, when insightfully interpreted, shed light on meaningful human
dynamics and striving.
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Given this interpretive perspective, what I propose to do in this study is to
examine the relationships between (1) proneness to certain self-conscious
emotions that are basic to human life (guilt and shame), (2) two kinds of ethical or
political orientation that many people feel is morally and emotionally significant
in today’s world, (individualist vs. communitarian), and (3) two types of attitudes
toward ones social world that might be thought to reflect whether or not has
succumbed to a “culture of narcissism” (narcissistic emptiness vs. Meaningful
Connectedness).
In the literature review I examined the empirical and theoretical works of
both Michael Lewis and June Price Tangney and her collaborators. An admirable
feature of these authors’ work is the way in which they go beyond narrowly
empiricist approaches and concern themselves with the actual experience and felt
meanings of people in everyday life contexts. Also, they do not pretend to an
impossible and sterile “value neutrality.” Rather, they are concerned to
rehabilitate the notion of a certain kind of healthy guilt and sense of responsibility
without which we would not be, in the best sense, human beings at all. An
interesting feature of Lewis’ point of view is the way in which he appropriates the
Kierkegaardian notion of commitment. Soren Kierkegaard (Lewis, 1992) wrote
150 years ago that the loss of commitment leads to the loss of identity and that
relationships, a source of identity, are maintained only through commitment.
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While both Lewis and Tangney stress the importance of moderate, healthy
guilt in human life, they also, in line with much current psychology and popular
opinion, insist that emotions and attitudes associated with shame are always
harmful or pathological, and have little place in a healthy or fulfilled life.
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that this view of shame is limited and
incorrect, and ultimately quite harmful in its own right. I have suggested that there
is healthy and unhealthy shame as well as healthy and unhealthy guilt, and that
the right kind of shame may be one of the most human and essential features of
the moral life. In the research study conducted as part of this dissertation, I have
utilized two new, experimental scales (which have garnered some empirical
support for their reliability and validity, however) to try to obtain some support
for this more affirmative view of shame.
Guilt and Shame
A number of contemporary theorists and researchers, like Lewis and
Tangney [affect researchers—take out phrase] have rehabilitated guilt while
continuing to treat shame as only pathological. Shame is identified as a major
culprit in many different types of individual psychological difficulties including
depression, social anxiety, addictions and eating disorders, personality disorders,
and sexual dysfunction (Gramzow & Tangney, 1994; Hibbard, 1992; Kaufman,
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1991; Lewis, 1992, 1996, 2000; Morrison, 1991; Tangney & Gramzow, 1991).
Perhaps more importantly, some researchers have identified shame as the primary
source of disconnection and moral disorientation in modern persons. What all of
the current research has in common is: 1) its narrow definition of shame as only
pathological, and 2) a precipitant temporal order wherein shame precedes and
then reinforces estrangement and self-centeredness.
If the emotion of shame is treated dimensionally, as distinct from guilt and
embarrassment (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski,
1994), and given its status as a complex human emotion, I believe that with few
exceptions these contemporary investigations of shame neglect or fail to
recognize its multiplicity of its degree and form. Every other human emotion has
many degrees and types of occurrence, for example, happiness runs the gamut
from mildly amused to euphoric. Euphoria, except when it occurs in certain
contexts, is generally treated as bizarre, if not pathognomonic. June Price
Tangney and her various collaborators deal with this inconsistency by
conceptualizing shame and guilt proneness as a trait, or as an attributional style
that causes differential experience of shame, guilt, or some combination of both in
by persons in response to the same scenarios. The TOSCA (Tangney & Gramzow,
1991) is a measure of pathological shame and healthy guilt, reflecting the current
biases of empirical psychology and individualism.
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Why then do cross-cultural psychological studies continue to insist that
shame is functional and constructive in those cultural contexts? A review of the
PsychINFO and other social science databases yielded not one citation in which a
measure of healthy, protective, or constructive shame was reported. Cross-cultural
studies involving shame as a variable use discourse analysis (Ha, 1996), narrative
self-report (Markus & Kitayama, 1994), or extant instruments such as the TOSCA
or the Harder Personal Feelings Questionnaire (Harder, 1990, 1995) that measure
what I believe to be pathological shame. In these studies, participants from
cultures with a more connected sense of identity may score high on the shame-
proneness scale of the TOSCA, but otherwise appear to function successfully
(Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, Norasakkunkit, 1995; Ratanisiripong, 1996).
 Cross-cultural results are generally read through a practical hermeneutic
of the function and manifestation of shame as it relates to study participants from
a particular culture. These studies seem to have a much broader definition of
shame as involving “face,” modesty, humility, and privacy. In all fairness, shame
also seems to function in collectivistic cultures as an enforcer of social hierarchies
and classism, which is generally abhorrent to Americans. What I believe to be the
distinctive factors in the differential manifestations of shame between American
and primarily Asian cultures are the differences in ethical orientations and the
divergence in the nature of identity that fall along the lines of autonomy and
connectedness, or Individualism and Collectivism.
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Francis Ha (1996) observes in his study that shame is not avoided in
Korean conversation because identity is construed by relationality and
relationships are given more importance than in individualistic American
contexts. Shame may hurt less for Koreans because it is diffused among group
members through its frequent confession and sharing. Ha briefly explores the
importance of modesty and humility in Korean relationships in a way that puts
them squarely within the shame continuum. June Price Tangney’s most current
writings have addressed humility as a desirable personal quality for Americans
(2000, 2002).
Individualism and Ethical Orientation
In the literature review, several models of the self were examined
including self psychology, cognitive-affective viewpoints, individual psychology
(Adlerian psychology), and ideas about selfhood from an interpretive social
science perspective. While there are many admirable and practical qualities to the
Self psychological and cognitive-affective models, they both are thoroughly
imbued with the individualistic ideals of modern American culture.
Self psychology, with its notion of development proceeding from primary
narcissism to mature, healthy narcissism, is a salient exemplar of the largely
unexamined individualistic assumptions of psychology. In the theories of Heinz
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Kohut and his followers, the primary unit of importance is the individual, and
others including parents, siblings, teachers, and partners are to a great extent
reduced to “self-objects” for the fulfillment or impediment of the developing self.
The Kohutian teleology of self is the expansion of the individual’s creativity and
talents, and it seems as if the main purpose morality and ethics perform is
instrumentally in the service of the self, to keep it from dissipating or losing its
boundaries and returning to an earlier stage of narcissism. It is not much of a
stretch to regard the implicit moral vision of Self Psychology and many other
modern therapy theories as straightforward, if uncritical, expressions of a modern
individualistic ethical orientation. They assume that a mature person’s outlook on
the good life and moral or social obligation are centered upon and largely limited
to what is commonly termed “liberal individualism,” with its focus on the
maximization of individual fulfillment, human rights, and a contractual,
instrumentalist view of human relationships.
According to many historians and critics American culture was once
significantly more socially connected and community oriented than it has become
in the last half century, partly as a result of the enormous expansion of personal
mobility and freedoms in our society (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler &
Tipton, 1985; Bellah, 1991; Bell, 1995; Glendon, 1991; Guttman, 1992; Lasch,
1978; Sandel, 1996). This well documented loss of a sense and the practices of
141
community seems to develop apace the expansion of the self and the individualist
ethical orientation.
Somewhat paradoxically, as a result of these developments, shame has
come to predominate in what was once primarily a culture of guilt (Benedict,
1946; Broucek, 1991; Karen, 1992; Lewis, 1992, 2000; Morrison, 1989). Shame
can be a healthy reaction to falling out of step with or being at odds with the best
values and practices of ones family, community, or society. In the absence of
shared practices and values—which may have to criticized and reworked in the
social or interpersonal process, rather than blindly adhered to—the individual’s
sense of being morally or socially out of joint lacks an appropriate remedy. To
make matters worse, in our current society, with its exaggerated stress on “doing
one’s own thing” and “being one’s own person,” all sorts of normal human
feelings of and needs for connectedness with others are interpreted as personal
failings or immature dependencies—leading to intense feelings of shame! To a
great extent, our culture is limited to offering as a cure for shame a kind of
defensive self-esteem (Watson, Hickman & Morris, 1996) and the elusive promise
of more, better, different commodities with which to temporarily sooth the self
that can not tolerate itself (Fromm, 1948). Self-esteem divorced from
accomplishment, self-respect, and humility is ultimately empty, selfish, and self-
defeating (Lewis, 1992; Broucek, 1991). As a possible way out of these
dilemmas, I have explored in this dissertation the possibility of cultivating,
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instead of a singular, bounded self, a historical-dialogical conception of the self
(Dunne, 1996; Richardson, Fowers & Guignon, 1999), a way of thinking of
persons as unfolding narratives whose being is shaped by an ongoing dialogue
with others in a communal context.
A “communitarian” moral outlook differs from both individualism and
collectivism on several dimensions. There is a deep appreciation of but not a
slavish obedience to, nor rejection of traditions and respected cultural and moral
authorities. A communitarian ethic emphasizes the equal importance of
responsibilities as well as rights and recognizes the great extent to which our very
identities as persons are shaped by history and culture, giving us built-in
obligations and meaningful moral ties to others from the outset. The
communitarian view places a high value on both individual initiative and
creativity and on community and the common good. The former is necessary for
achieving the latter and the latter gives a sense of purpose and direction to the
former. Human life is seen as a rich, ongoing kind of cooperation and
conversation between the individual and community dimensions of human
existence. In the dissertation, I have suggested a number of reasons why a
balanced communitarian more than a one-sided individualistic moral outlook
might be associated with a number of different positive and fulfilling outcomes in
living. A new scale, The Basic Beliefs Inventory (BBI), that assesses the degree to
143
which individuals adhere more to an individualistic or to a broadly communitarian
moral or social outlook was employed to investigate these relationships.
Narcissistic Emptiness Vs. Meaningful Connectedness
Contemporary psychology and psychotherapy view narcissism and
feelings of emptiness as a species of individual, or at most family, pathology. But
many of the social theorists discussed in this dissertation argue that many
narcissistic phenomena result from our way of life, from a one-sided
individualism that is too “thin” to support its own best values and tends to
cultivate individuals who can no longer fend off painful feelings of emptiness and
emotional isolation but only defend themselves against such feelings in an
ultimately self-defeating manner. So, these are moral and social problems at their
root, not just or mainly psychological maladies. Richardson et al. (1999, pp. 14-
15) remind us that an appreciation of this situation is not really new in
psychology. It has often been noticed by important theorists over the years, even
if the mainstream of the field chooses to ignore it. For example, they note that in
the 1930's and 1940's Erich Fromm, Karen Horney and others argued persuasively
that our rather shallow and overly-competitive way of life, oriented so much
toward individual popularity and success, was in fact the source of many modern
emotional problems in living. These noted thinkers may not have described an
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alternative approach, beyond individual therapy, for getting at the root of such
deep-seated cultural deficiencies, and it is probably unfair to expect them to have
done so. Solutions in this arena come slowly at best, and are more a matter of
calling for cultural evolution than any sort of quick fix that psychology or
psychologists might devise.
In the dissertation, in order to begin to investigate these social and
psychological dynamics in an empirical fashion, I have employed another new
scale, the Common Feelings Inventory (CFI), that assesses the degree to which
individuals see their everyday lives more in line with the attitudes of life in a
“culture of narcissism” or more in terms of the opportunities and challenges of
Meaningful Connectedness of a broadly communitarian sort.
Research Questions
I believe that the hypotheses investigated in the research portion of this
dissertation follow directly from the theoretical and ethical framework I have tried
to articulate and defend. These hypotheses predict clusters of relationships
between pathological shame, externalization, depression, malevolent anger,
individualism and Empty Selfishness, on one side, and healthy guilt, constructive
anger, communitarianism, and a sense of Meaningful Connectedness, on the
other. The first hypothesis holds that the study will replicate the findings of
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Tangney and Gramzow’s (1991, 1992), who found significant partial correlations
between the variables of shame-proneness, externalization, depression, and
malevolent anger. They also found a significant association among guilt-
proneness, absence of substantial depressive symptoms, and constructive anger.
The second hypothesis consists of two parts, the first tests for differences
in shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, externalization, depression, anger, Empty
Selfishness, and Meaningful Connectedness between groups categorized
according to levels of individualist ethical orientation. The groups will be formed
by dividing the sample into thirds according to scores on the Basic Beliefs
Inventory (BBI). Tests of mean differences (ANOVA) will discern whether there
are significant distinctions between the groups. The second part of this hypothesis
will test for differences on the same variables between groups categorized by
level of communitarian ethical orientation (BBI). Again, tests of mean difference
will assess whether the groups are distinct.
Given the theoretical orientation of this study, it is expected that there will
be significant differences on part one of the second hypothesis between the group
scoring high versus the groups scoring lower on individualistic attitudes. The high
group will be significantly more shame-prone, externalizing, depressed,
malevolently angry, and higher in Empty Selfishness than the other two groups.
Also, the high individualism group will show less guilt-proneness, constructive
anger, and Meaningful Connectedness. These findings will lend support to the
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theoretical assumptions of this project that pathological shame is related to one-
sided individualism, psychopathology, and an empty or culturally narcissistic way
of life,
The test of the second part of the hypothesis, with the sample categorized
according to level of communitarianism will, I predict, yield significant
differences between the groups in guilt-proneness, constructive anger, and
Meaningful Connectedness, with the high communitarian group, as compared
with the other groups, being significantly more guilt-prone, constructively angry,
and endorsing an approach to life suggesting that well-being comes from having
meaningful connections and commitments to others. In order to gain additional
insight into the interaction of individualism and pathological shame, a multiple
regression analysis will be run with shame as the dependent variable and
individualist ethical orientation, depression, malevolent anger, and Empty
Selfishness as the potential predictors. I anticipate that individualism will have the
greatest weight in the equation.
The third hypothesis concerns relationships between variables of the Basic
Beliefs Inventory (individualism and communitarianism), the Test of Self-
Conscious Affects (shame and guilt-proneness), and the Common Feelings
Inventory (emptiness and meaningful Connectedness). Significant positive
correlations are expected between an individualist ethical orientation as measured
by the BBI, emptiness measured by the CFI, and shame-proneness (TOSCA).
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This result might be interpreted to mean that the absence of broadly
communitarian beliefs and values are an important source of the kind of
emptiness and disconnection that are theoretically linked to many negative shame-
related experiences and problems in living in today’s world. In the same vein,
significant positive correlations are also expected between a communitarian
ethical orientation (BBI), guilt-proneness (TOSCA), and Meaningful
Connectedness (CFI).
I hope that these results will encourage future research—quantitative,
qualitative, or interpretive, whatever seems most appropriate or potentially
revealing—concerning the dynamics and influence of a different, positive
conception of shame, one that appears to form an essential part of the kind of
meaningful social connectedness and commitment involved in the best sort of
human life.
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Chapter Four
Methodology
Overview of the Dissertation Study
In the previous chapter, Statement of the Problem and Research Design,
the basis and rationale for the dissertation study was established. In general, the
study looks at the relationships among ethical orientations of two types
(Individualism and Communitarianism), self-conscious emotions (guilt and
shame-proneness), as well as depression, anger (malevolent and constructive), and
dimensions of common commitments characterized by Meaningful
Connectedness or Empty Selfishness.
The first hypothesis is a replicatory analysis of Tangney and Gramzow’s
(1991, 1992) studies connecting shame-proneness with depression and malevolent
anger, and guilt-proneness with constructive anger.  The second hypothesis tests
the differences between groups of participants categorized by the Basic Beliefs
Inventory (BBI). Three groups, categorized as high, moderate, and low
Individualist by the Basic Beliefs Inventory are contrasted on measures of shame-
and guilt-proneness, externalization, depression (BDI), malevolent or constructive
anger (ARIA-A), Empty Selfishness and Meaningful Connectedness assessed by
the Common Feelings Inventory (CFI).  Additional tests of difference are
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performed between groups categorized by the BBI as high, moderate and low
Communitarian on the same study variables. The third hypothesis concerns the
relationships between ethical orientation, self-conscious emotions, Empty
Selfishness and Meaningful Connectedness.
Instruments
Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II) (Beck, 1990).
The Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition is the most popular self-
report measure of depression in both clinical and academic settings. The items on
the BDI-II are designed to assess criterion symptoms of depression coinciding
with the DSM-IV. Its psychometric properties are well-established. The
respondent is asked to endorse the statements most characteristic of their
experience of a range of depressive symptoms occurring in the two weeks prior to
the administration of the test. Values on each symptom vary from 0- Not at all, to
3- Severe. Scores are derived by summing the ratings for the 21 items. Scores are
interpreted by comparing the sums to optimal cut scores derived from the use of
receiver operating curves. Scores are then classified as: minimal; mild; moderate;
or severe.
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Test of Self Conscious Affect- Adult (TOSCA-A) (Tangney & Gramzow, 1991).
The TOSCA-A is a paper and pencil measure designed to assess
individual differences in proneness to shame, proneness to guilt, externalization of
blame, detachment/unconcern, pride in self (alpha-pride), pride in behavior (beta-
pride). The TOSCA is comprised of 15 brief scenarios (10 negative, 5 positive in
valence) that respondents would be likely to encounter in day-to-day life. Each
scenario is followed by a number of associated responses, two of which capture
phenomenological aspects of shame and guilt as described in the literature (Lewis,
1971; Tangney, 1989). Respondents are asked to rate on a 5-point Likert type
scale their likelihood of reacting in each manner indicated. This allows for the
possibility that some respondents may experience both shame and guilt in
connection with a given situation (Tangney, et al., 1996). The scenarios were
derived from written accounts of personal shame, guilt, and pride experiences
provided by a sample of several hundred college students and non-college aged
adults. The response options were derived from a pool of affective, cognitive and
behavioral responses provided by second sample of non-college aged adults. The
TOSCA purports to measure shame, guilt and pride at the level of traits (Tangney,
1996) or “affective dispositions.”
The fundamental idea behind the measurement of affective traits being
that most people experience most emotions at some point in their lives, but that
there are individual differences in the degree to which people are prone to
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experience certain affects across a variety of situations provoking self-evaluation.
A number of measures tap one affective dimension only, such as guilt, shame or
pride (self-esteem). These measures employ a range of instrumentation from
adjective checklists, ratings of descriptive statements, forced-choice formats,
attitude ratings and qualitative analysis of narrative responses to given situations
(Tangney, 1996).  Examples of one-dimensional affective trait measures include:
the Guilt scale of the Buss-Durkee Hostility-Guilt Inventory (Buss & Durkee,
1957); the Guilt Inventory (Kugler & Jones, 1992); the Mosher Forced-Choice
Guilt Inventory (Mosher, 1996); the Situational Guilt Scale (Klass, 1987); the G-
Trait Scale (Otterbacher & Munz, 1973). Across these various instruments, guilt
and shame are frequently employed interchangeably with little attempt to
differentiate between these two similar, but phenomenologically distinct
emotional states. The importance of discriminating between guilt and shame is
supported exhaustively in the literature (Lewis, HB. 1971; Lewis, M. 1989, 1992,
1996, 2000; Tangney, Wagner and Gramzow, 1992). Numerous empirical studies
have strongly supported these two states as distinct, phenomenologically and in
their correlations to other psychological and psychopathological phenomenon.
When shame and guilt are measured distinctly, they each show different and
divergent relationships to adjustment and maladjustment and social behavior.
As was explored in the literature review, both bear some strong
associations with psychological states, symptoms and dispositions such as
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narcissism (Hibbard, 1993; Broucek, 1991; Morrison, 1989; Kohut, 1971)
sociopathy (Brodie, 1995), anger arousal and response (Tangney, et al., 1996),
obsessiveness, depression (Tangney, et al., 1992, 1996) and empathy (Tangney,
1991). What psychometrically differentiates shame and guilt in their correlations
to other psychological dimensions is the direction of the relationships. With
shame, the correlations with psychopathological phenomena are almost
overwhelmingly positive. The inverse is true of guilt, which tends to exhibit either
negative or insignificant correlations with various psychopathologies. Guilt-
proneness, as measured by the TOSCA, evidences a strong positive relationship
with empathy as measured by the Empathy Scale for Adults (Feshbach & Lipian,
1987).  Shame, as measured by the TOSCA, also has a positive relationship to
empathy, although it is not significant. Tangney found significant inverse
relationships between shame and empathy when controlling for guilt using the
Self Conscious Affects and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI) (1991).
The TOSCA and other measures are based on theoretical differences
between shame and guilt. These measures vary as to the format employed to
assess shame and guilt, as well as how these emotions were operationalized and
defined. The TOSCA and the Beall Shame-Guilt Test (1972) are both scenario-
based instruments, but differ as to definitions of shame and guilt and in how they
ask respondents to answer (Tangney, 1996). Beall’s instrument asks respondents
to rate how “upset” they would become if exposed to various scenarios in which
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shame or guilt might be the affective outcome. The idea behind the Beall rests on
prototypicality, that certain situations evoke shame or guilt in almost everyone,
and that these two affects are defined by the situation in which they are
experienced. Shame allegedly occurs in situations involving moral failures and
guilt in situations involving behavioral transgressions. The situations themselves
are labeled “guilt-inducing” and “shame-inducing” and thus are not consistent
with Lewis’s notion of shame and guilt as originating in the agent rather than the
context.
Another approach to assessing shame and guilt involves the use of global
adjective checklists. Adjective checklists require the respondent to endorse
whether or not a word or phrase describes them. The Revised Shame-Guilt Scale
(Holblitzelle, 1987) is an example of an adjective checklist consisting of 16
supposed shame adjectives (mortified, humiliated, embarrassed) and 20 alleged
guilt adjectives (unethical, culpable, liable). Respondents are asked to rate the
extent to which each adjective describes them. The Personal Feelings
Questionnaire-2 (Harder, Cutler & Rockhart, 1992) presents the respondent with a
list of shame and guilt related emotional descriptors (“intense guilt,” “regret,” or
for shame “feeling ridiculous,” “feeling disgusting to others.”) and asks them to
rate the frequency with which they experience each descriptor. The PFQ-2
consists of 10 shame and 6 guilt items. Drawbacks to the adjective checklist
format include: (1) asking respondents differentiate between shame and guilt
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feelings in an abstract context, while, in fact, shame and guilt frequently co-occur;
(2) requirement of advanced verbal skills; (3) adjective checklists may actually
assess diffuse, negative self-directed affect rather than specifically shame, guilt or
any of their variants. (4) The most potentially compromising aspect of adjective
checklists involves their face validity, which, according to almost every theory of
shame, may provoke a defensive, self-preservative response set involving denial,
repression, and avoidance.
Advantages of using an instrument such as the TOSCA are many. The
scenarios used in the TOSCA were derived from a non-clinical sample of
respondents, rather than from an abstract research perspective. For each scenario,
the respondents endorse to what degree they would think, feel or behave on
several dimensions tapping shame, guilt, externalization, detachment, alpha-pride
(or hubris) and beta-pride (or positive feelings about an achievement). This allows
that some respondents, for example, may simultaneously experience guilt and
shame and may deal with it by blaming others or the situation. The TOSCA is
very clear in its basis on a well-defined differentiation of shame and guilt. The
authors (Tangney & Gramzow, 1991) have very explicitly defined what they take
to be shame and guilt based on the work of Helen Block Lewis (1971) and
Michael Lewis’s Cognitive-Attribution theory of self-conscious affects (1989,
1992). Other strengths of the TOSCA are that it does not require the respondents
to discern between shame and guilt in the abstract, its face validity is low and thus
155
it probably elicits a less defensive response set from the respondents than
instruments such as the PFQ-2, and it is easily adaptable for use with younger age
groups (There are also adolescent and child versions of the TOSCA). The
psychometric properties of the TOSCA are generally high with reliabilities
ranging across populations for the subscales: Shame .80; Guilt .83;
Externalization .76; Detachment .71; A-Pride .66; B-Pride .58.
Anger Response Inventory-Adult (ARI-A) (Tangney & Gramzow, 1991).
The Anger Response Inventories (Tangney, Wagner, Marschall &
Gramzow, 1991) are a series of paper and pencil measures intended to assess a
variety of anger related dimensions in adults, adolescents and children. The adult
version of the ARI purportedly assesses (1) proneness to anger, (2) typical
responses to anger, and (3) respondents perceptions of the possible consequences
of anger episodes. The ARI is a scenario-based measure, similar to its author’s
Test of Self-Conscious Affects (TOSCA). Respondents are presented with a series
of common experiences that are likely to invoke anger. They are asked to imagine
themselves in each scenario and then indicate, on a 5-point scale, (1) how angry
they would be (arousal); (2) their intentions—what they would feel like doing, not
necessarily what they would actually do (intentions—constructive, fractious,
malicious); (3) their likely behaviors, including a variety of aggressive and non-
aggressive responses; (4) their use of cognitive reappraisals of the self, the target,
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and the situation; and (5) their beliefs about the long-term consequences for the
self, the target and the relationship.
The ARI was constructed based on the cognitive appraisal theories of
James Averill (1982) and Hoshmand and Austin (1987).  Lists of anger-provoking
situations were drawn up, a team of graduate students generated a pool of context-
specific cognitive and behavioral responses to anger, and “best exemplars” of
each of the five categories were selected. The potential items were then
administered in an interview format with 20 adults. A working version of the ARI
was administered to 199 undergraduates at a large state university in the eastern
United States, along with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale.
Distributions of all items were analyzed for restriction of range and violations of
normality. Item–total correlations were examined, as were correlations with items
of the social desirability scale. Based on the results, 23 scenarios were selected for
inclusion in the final version of the ARI-A. The current study utilizes only two of
the subscales concerning two types of anger in response to the scenarios:
Constructive and Malevolent.
Internal consistencies of the ARI are generally high across the two
subscales. Cronbach’s alphas for the Constructive and the Malevolent anger
subscales are in the 90’s. The validity for the ARI tends to be high and the
intercorrelations were consistent with psychometric theory for scenario-based
measures (Tangney, Marschall, Wagener & Gramzow, 1991). For example,
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malevolent anger was strongly correlated with a range of aggressive
responses—direct aggression, indirect, and displaced aggression, as well as with
pessimistic projections of consequences for the self, the target and the
relationship. Constructive anger and actions were strongly correlated with
beneficial long-term consequences.  Given the already complex design of the
current project, only the Malevolent and Constructive Anger subscales of the ARI
will be examined. A correlation matrix with the excluded subscales and other
study variables is presented in Appendix A.
Basic Beliefs Inventory (BBI) (Richardson & Wicker, 1995)
The Basic Beliefs Inventory is designed to measure two fundamental value
orientations widely held by members of American society. The first orientation is
labeled “liberal individualism.” It stresses personal autonomy and healthy self-
interest on the part of separate, self-responsible individuals. It views the social
realm as a neutral milieu in which people pursue their self-realization and enjoy
mainly contractual relationships with others based on the exchange of goods,
services, or mutual satisfaction. This orientation stresses the rights of individuals,
including the rights to pursue their own goals and development without the
interference of the state or social obligations, providing that the similar rights of
others are respected. Most moral or spiritual values are viewed as personal or
subjective. One overarching value is acknowledged by this orientation, namely a
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formal or procedural justice sometimes referred to as “fairness” or the “rule of
law.” This orientation shapes many Americans sense of having rights, a sense of
justice, and a sense of privacy or personal space. In other times and cultures, the
overarching ethic of the purpose of life revolve around honor, “face,” right
thought/action/livelihood or achieving spiritual salvation. In modern American
culture, the overarching ethic seems to consist of unencumbered individual
freedom.
The second dimension assessed by the BBI is labeled “Communitarian.”
Within this perspective, people are viewed as less separate and self-interested than
individualistic perspectives. It stresses the importance of a feeling of community,
shared meaning and purposes, and lasting social ties with others.
Communitarianism emphasizes personal responsibility and the common good, as
well as a healthy sense of personal limits, discipline, and character development
as opposed to self-actualization. Spiritual values are viewed not as a purely
subjective or private matter, but as defining the broad outline and purpose of
virtuous human life. The communitarian perspective, its proponents and
theoretical antecedents criticize individualism for its suppression of social and
historical context and its valorization of self-interested pursuit of fulfillment and
as breeding emptiness, undermining lasting social ties, and resulting in social and
psychological fragmentation and isolation. This perspective shares the liberal
individualist emphasis of protecting and advancing personal autonomy, and
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respect for, and protection of differences across gender, race and ethnicity and
sexual orientation. Liberal individualists criticize communitarian ideas as
authoritarian, antiquarian and as limiting individual freedom.
The BBI was developed to assess where respondents’ broad moral-
political values fall on a continuum from extreme individualism to a fully
communitarian ethical orientation. The BBI may help describe the value
orientations of contemporary individuals and groups. It may facilitate
investigation of the interrelationship of these orientations with various other
attitudes, values, aspects of personality, and even psychopathology. It may be
helpful in identifying bias in measures or research that many critics have targeted
as unreflectively grounded on naïve or dogmatic modern individualistic values.
The BBI may also be helpful in exploring the consequences of individualistic or
communitarian value orientations for different social and personal outcomes such
as individual and relational adjustment, personal well-being or distress, moral
reasoning, conflict resolution styles, and many others.
The BBI consists of 33 statements to which respondents are asked to
indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement. The Likert-type scale ranges
from 1-Strongly Agree to 7-Strongly Disagree, with some items requiring reverse
coding before data analysis. The psychometric properties of the BBI are generally
high with reliabilities ranging across populations for the subscales: The
individualism subscale’s internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) estimate of
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reliability from the present study is .78 and the communitarianism subscale’s
reliability is .87.
Common Feelings Inventory (CFI)
The CFI asks respondents to indicate their level of agreement or
disagreement with a series of statements on a 7-point, Likert-type scale. It consists
of 33 statements tapping the degree to which respondents experience a sense of
psychological well-being consisting of connectedness to others and an
engagement in a life marked by shared meanings and purpose, and a type of self-
interested, self-contained narcissism, empty of a sense of belonging to a
community of shared meaning and purpose.   The statements on the CFI are
drawn from the same theoretical orientation as the BBI and it is expected that they
will evidence strong correlations, positive and negative along a continuum from
empty narcissism to psychological well-being. Internal consistency (Cronbach’s
alpha) reliability estimates for the two subscales were derived using the study data
and yielded the following: Empty Selfishness .89 and Meaningful Connectedness
.84.
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Procedure
The data was collected over five sessions, with participation limited to 50
participants per session. Session registration was accomplished at the beginning
of a class period, and via electronic mail for those who may have been absent
during the initial sign-up. The fifth session was a “make-up” session, and allowed
those who missed the initial sessions to complete the study and receive credit.
Each participant received a packet upon arrival consisting of: an Informed
Consent form; a form describing the study in very general terms and including a
list of contacts should their participation invoke undue emotional distress, as well
as notification that each protocol will be checked for random answer patterns; a
demographic data form asking the participant to indicate their age, gender,
race/ethnicity, religious affiliation, and primary language; and the test
instruments, sequenced randomly. Participants received a participation credit form
from the primary researcher outside of the testing room after they turned in their
completed packet and the protocols were reviewed for random response sets.
Exclusionary criteria for use of each protocol in the study include: Incomplete
Informed Consent form; incomplete demographic data form; incomplete
instruments; randomly answered instruments. In all, thirty-two cases were
excluded from the final analysis. All participants were treated in accordance with
the ethical standards of the American Psychological Association as well as the
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University of Texas “Policies and Procedures Governing Research with Human
Subjects.” The study was approved by the UT Institutional Review Board.
Hypotheses
In general, this study purports to examine several dimensions that have
been connected, at least theoretically, in the review of the literature.
Configurations of ethical orientation of at least two general types are investigated:
(1) Individualism and (2) Communitarian ethical orientation. These variables are
investigated in terms of whether they associate significantly with two clusters of
variables differing generally along affective lines. These two clusters of variables
include: (1) shame, externalization (blaming), malevolent anger, as well as
depression and Empty Selfishness; (2) guilt, constructive anger, and Meaningful
Connectedness. The following hypotheses are based on a critical synthesis of the
literatures of empirical and clinical psychology, pastoral psychology,
anthropology, and interpretive social science on the topics of self-conscious
emotions, identity, and ethical orientations.
Hypothesis #1: The results will confirm previous findings of significant
positive partial correlations between shame-proneness malevolent anger, and
depression, when controlling for guilt. Significant positive relationships between
guilt-proneness and constructive anger are also expected, when shame is factored
163
out. The first hypothesis test is a replicatory analysis of Tangney and Gramzow’s
(1991, 1992) studies that found significant part correlations between shame-
proneness, externalization, depression, and malevolent anger; guilt-proneness,
absence of substantial depressive symptoms, and constructive anger.
Hypothesis #2:  There will be significant differences in shame proneness,
guilt proneness, externalization, depression types of anger, Empty Selfishness,
and Meaningful Connectedness between groups classified by 1) level of
Individualist ethical orientation; and between groups categorized on 2) level of
Communitarian ethical orientation. The second hypothesis consists of two parts,
the first tests for differences in the dependent variables between groups
categorized according to level of individualist ethical orientation. The groups will
be formed by dividing the sample into thirds according to scores on the Basic
Beliefs Inventory (BBI) Individualism subscale. Tests of mean difference will
discern whether there are significant distinctions between the groups. The second
part of this hypothesis will test for differences (ANOVA) on the same variables
between groups categorized by level of communitarian ethical orientation (BBI).
Again, tests of mean difference will assess whether the groups are distinct.
 Given the theoretical orientation of this study, it is expected that there will
be significant differences on part one of the hypothesis tests between the
individualism groups in that the high group will be significantly more shame-
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prone, externalizing, depressed, malevolently angry, and higher in Empty
Selfishness than the other two groups. The high individualism group will be
significantly different in the inverse for guilt-proneness, constructive anger, and
Meaningful Connectedness. These findings will lend support to the theoretical
assumptions of this project that individualism is related to pathological shame,
psychopathology, and an empty, selfish approach to life.
The second part of the hypothesis, with the sample categorized according
to level of communitarianism, will hopefully yield significant differences between
the groups in guilt-proneness, constructive anger, and Meaningful Connectedness,
with the high communitarian group being significantly more guilt-prone,
constructively angry, and endorsing an approach to life suggesting that well-being
comes from having meaningful connections and commitments to others.  In order
to gain insight into the interaction of individualism and pathological shame, a
multiple regression analysis will be run with shame as the dependent variable and
individualist ethical orientation, depression, malevolent anger, and Empty
Selfishness as the potential predictors. I anticipate that individualism will have the
greatest weight in the equation.
Hypothesis #3:   The third hypothesis concerns expected correlational
relationships between variables of the Basic Beliefs Inventory (Individualism and
Communitarianism), the Test of Self-Conscious Affects (Shame and Guilt-
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proneness), and the Common Feelings Inventory (Empty Selfishness and
Meaningful Connectedness). Given the close relationships of the two types of
ethical orientation, investigation of the relationships among the variables will be
performed utilizing partial correlational tests, controlling, in turn, for
Individualism and Communitarianism.
Significant positive partial correlations are expected between an
Individualist ethical orientation as measured by the BBI, Empty selfishness
measured by the CFI, and Shame-proneness, with Communitarianism held
constant, suggesting that the absence of broadly communitarian beliefs and values
are a source of the kind of emptiness and disconnection that are theoretically
linked to many negative shame related experiences and problems in living.
Significant partial correlations are also expected between a Communitarian
ethical orientation (BBI), Guilt-proneness (TOSCA), and Meaningful
connectedness (CFI), when Individualism is held constant.
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Chapter Five
Results
This dissertation study was designed to explore the relationships between
some factors of particular interest for both psychology and the study of culture
and persons. The project, is in part an attempt to elucidate changes in both the
experience and treatment of negative self-evaluation and its attendant emotions,
and to explore some possible reasons why shame, in particular is such a signal
affect in contemporary contexts. Through the data analysis, relationships between
negative self-referent emotions, ethical orientation, and attitudinal approaches to
life will be examined and will provide insight into the interplay of these factors.
Although both clinicians and empirical researchers have implicated shame in
many of the emotional and relational disorders of modern times, scant
psychological research before this project has attempted to frame emotional
functioning and dysfunction in terms of larger ethical and cultural dynamics.
The results are presented in two major sections. The first section focuses
on the descriptive aspects of the sample and includes the means, standard
deviations, and/or frequency distributions of age, gender, ethnicity, and self-
reported religious affiliation (Tables 1, 2, 3).
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The second major section consists of three subsections. The first
subsection presents the results and discussion of Hypothesis 1, which attempted to
replicate the earlier work of June Tangney and Richard Gramzow (1991, 1992)
linking shame-proneness with depression and malevolent anger, through partial
correlational analyses controlling for guilt; and guilt-proneness with constructive
anger when shame is factored out. The second subsection presents the results and
discussion of Hypothesis 2, which proposed significant mean differences in
shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and externalization, as measured by the
TOSCA, as well as Empty Selfishness and Meaningful Connectedness as assessed
by the CFI, between groups categorized according to levels of 1) Individualism
and 2) Communitarianism respectively. The analyses necessitated the
categorization of groups of scores on levels of Individualism (Low, Moderate, and
High) and levels of Communitarianism (Low, Moderate, High), from these
subscales of the Basic Beliefs Inventory.
The third major subsection presents the results for Hypothesis 3. This
examines the associations between ethical orientation (Basic Beliefs Inventory),
shame-proneness and guilt-proneness, (Test of Self Conscious Affects), empty
self-centeredness and Meaningful Connectedness (Common Feelings Inventory).
Given the considerable relationship of the Individualism and Communitarianism
subscales of the BBI (r= .34, p= <.000), two partial correlational analyses were
performed, first controlling for Communitarianism, and then for Individualism.
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Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
Participants were 160 undergraduates (62% female, 38% male) attending
the University of Texas-Austin who received credit towards an upper division
undergraduate course requirement in return for their participation. As reported in
the Methodology chapter, several cases were excluded for neglecting to complete
demographic sheets and waivers, for turning in incomplete instruments, and for
turning in instruments with obvious response sets (All extreme, all minimal, and
random). Cases with partially completed demographic sheets were included if the
waiver was complete. Approximately 10 participants only partially completed the
demographic sheet. The students ranged in age from 19 to 42 years old (M= 22.7,
SD= 3.74). The sample was representative of the general university student
population and was majority Euro-American 60.2%, followed by Latino/a 14.8%,
East Asian 8.6 %, African-American 5.5 %, South Asian 3.9%, “Asian-
American” 2.3%, and Native American .8% (Table 2).  Primary religious
affiliation was reported as Protestant 46%, Catholic 16.4%, Jewish 9.4%, Hindu
5.8%, Buddhist 2.3%, and Atheist/Agnostic 14.8% (Table 3). Only one analysis
based on demographic difference was significant. There was a significant mean
difference between males and females on shame-proneness F= 6.03, p= .01. This
finding is similar to Tangney and Gramzow’s observations (1989, 1991). No other
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analyses utilizing demographic variables were feasible given uneven and
inadequate group sizes. Descriptive statistics for all study variables are presented
in Table 4.
Table 1: Frequency Distribution of the Sample by Age
Age Frequency Percent
19 1 .8
20 23 18
21 34 26.6
22 32 25
23 6 4.7
24 5 3.9
25 2 1.6
26 7 5.5
28 4 3.1
29 1 .8
31 2 1.6
32 1 .8
33 1 .8
35 1 .8
40 1 .8
42 1 .8
Total 122 95.3
Missing 6 4.7
170
Table 2: Frequency Distribution of the Sample by Ethnicity
Frequency Percent
Native American 1 .8
Asian-American 3 2.3
South Asian 5 3.9
African-American 7 5.5
East Asian 11 8.9
Latino/a 19 14.8
Euro-American 77 60.2
Total 123 96.1
Missing 5 3.9
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Table 3: Frequencies and Percentages of the Sample by Self-Reported
Religious Affiliation
Frequency Percent
Buddhist 3 2.3
Hindu 5 5.8
Jewish 12 9.4
Atheist/Agnostic 19 14.8
Catholic 21 16.4
Protestant 61 46
Total 121 94.5
Missing 7 5.5
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Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics for All Study Variables
Variable Mean SD Cases
GUILT 57.63 5.65 127
SHAME 45.95 10.68 127
EXTERNAL 38.56 8.47 127
BDI 7.44 6.52 127
INDIV  81.87 9.41 127
COMM 59.89 18.56 127
EMPTY 66.48 17.19 127
CONNECT 47.04 11.02 127
CONAnger 89.01 12.41 127
MALAnger 64.79 17.30 127
Note:
Variable Abbreviations
Guilt Guilt-Proneness
Shame Shame-Proneness
EXTERNAL Externalization
BDI Depression
INDIV Individualism
COMM Communitarianism
EMPTY Empty Selfishness
CONNECTMeaningful Connectedness
CONAnger Constructive Anger
MALAngerMalevolent Anger
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Self-conscious Affects, Anger and Depression
Hypothesis #1: Two partial correlation analyses were performed to test
hypothesis 1. The results of the first analysis confirm the previous findings of
Tangney and Gramzow (1992) reporting significant positive partial correlations
between shame-proneness, externalization, malevolent anger, and depression,
controlling for guilt (See Table 5). When guilt was held constant, shame-
proneness was found to bear significant positive relationships with
externalization, or tendency to blame or make external re-attributions, depression
as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory-II, and malevolent intentions
when faced with anger-provoking situations (Table 5). A significant relationship
between malevolent anger and depression, as well as malevolent anger and
externalization were also observed when guilt was held constant. Part two of the
hypothesis test replicated Tangney & Gramzow’s finding of a significant, though
weak association between guilt-proneness and depression, holding shame constant
(Table 6). However, the test of the present data failed to substantiate significant
positive relationships between guilt-proneness and constructive anger, controlling
for shame (Table 6).
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Table 5:  Partial Correlations between Shame-Proneness, Depression,
Externalization and Malevolent Anger, (Guilt Held Constant)
SHAME BDI EXTERNAL MALAnger
SHAME --- .25** .23** .23**
BDI .25** --- .14 .21*
EXTERNAL .23** .14  --- .30**
MALAnger .23** .21* .30** ---
* Significance .05 **Significance .01         (2-tailed)
Note:
Variable Abbreviations
SHAME Shame-Proneness
EXTERNAL Externalization
BDI Depression
MALAnger Malevolent Anger
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Table 6:   Partial Correlations between Guilt-Proneness Depression, and
Constructive Anger (Shame Held Constant).
PGUILT BDI CONAnger
PGUILT --- .18* -.03
BDI .18* --- .01
CONAnger -.04 .01 ---
*Significance .05 **Significance .01 (Two-tailed)
Note:
Variable Abbreviations
Guilt Guilt-Proneness
BDI Depression
CONAnger Constructive Anger
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Interaction of Levels of Ethical Orientation and Other Study
Variables
Hypothesis #2:
To test Hypothesis 2, the sample was first grouped according to scores on
the Individualism subscale of the Basic Beliefs Inventory. In order to maintain
group sizes sufficient for the analysis, the sample was divided into three groups,
1) the low group made up of 43 subjects, 2) the moderate group with 42, and 3)
the high group with 43 participants. The three groups were significantly different
on the criterion, level of Individualism, at F = 26.4, p= <.000.
An Analysis of Variance was conducted to evaluate the relationship
between Individualism, as measured by the BBI, and shame-proneness, guilt-
proneness, and externalization (tendency to blame or make external re-
attributions) measured by the TOSCA, malevolent and constructive anger
assessed by the ARI, and Empty Selfishness and Meaningful Connectedness
measured by the CFI. The independent variable was the Individualism factor; the
dependent variables consist of those taken from the TOSCA, ARI, and the CFI.
The ANOVA was significant for relating Individualism to Guilt-proneness F=
6.85, p= <.00; Shame-proneness F = 10.33, p= <.00; Externalization F= 2.10, p=
.03; and Empty selfishness F= 2.20, p= .01.  The results of the ANOVA are
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presented in Table 7. The means table for all variables by levels of Individualism
are presented in Table 8.
Planned post hoc analyses using the Tukey’s procedure offered a more
detailed view of the differences on the dependent variables between the low,
moderate, and high individualism groups. The high Individualism group was
significantly less guilt prone (F= -3.28, p= .05), more shame-prone (F= 7.23, p=
<.00), more externalizing (F= 2.26, p= .05), and more likely to endorse an empty
selfish approach to life (F= 6.3, p= .05) than the moderate group. The high
Individualism group was significantly greater on the Empty Selfishness variable
than the low group (F= 6.1, p= .05).
The moderate Individualism group was significantly more guilt-prone than
either the low (F=3.3, p= .01) or high groups (F= 3.97, p= <.00). The moderate
group was less empty than the high Individualism group (F= -6.3, p= .05) and less
shame-prone than either the high (F= -7.23, p= <.00) or the low Individualism
groups (F= -4.12, .01). There were no other significant mean differences between
the Individualism groups on the connectedness, malevolent or constructive anger
variables. Curvilinear relationships were observed between the Individualism
groups on both the guilt-proneness (Figure 2) and shame-proneness variables
(Figure 3). On the shame-proneness comparison, the low group mean was 46.33,
the moderate group lesser at 42.20, and the high Individualism group evidenced
the greatest mean at 49.43.
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The second set of analyses for Hypothesis 2 required grouping the sample
according to high, moderate, and low levels of Communitarianism taken from this
subscale of the BBI. Results of the ANOVA are presented in Table 9.  A one-way
ANOVA was performed and found that the groups were significantly different on
levels of Individualism, F= 56.41, p= <.00. The test of means difference on the
dependent variables was significant for Communitarianism and guilt F= 5.41, p=
.006, and Meaningful Connectedness F= 16.48, p= <.00, and significant in the
negative direction for Empty Selfishness F= -21.21, p= <.00. There was no
significance for Communitarianism and shame, externalization, and malevolent or
constructive anger. Means of all variables grouped by Communitarianism are
presented in Table 10.
Planned comparison analyses using the Tukey’s procedure helped to
illuminate the specific differences on the dependent variables between levels of
Communitarian ethical orientation. The group endorsing a high level of
Communitarianism was significantly more guilt-prone than the moderate group
F= 2.62, p= .05, and the low group F= 3.74, p= .05. The high group was
significantly less likely to endorse an empty selfish approach to life than either the
low group F= -19.51, p= <.00, or the moderate group F= -11.96, p= <.00. The
moderate group was significantly different from the low group on the Empty
Selfishness variable F= -7.54, p= <.00. The high Communitarian group was
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significantly more likely to endorse a meaningful connected approach to life than
the low group F= 12.05, p= <.00, as was the moderate group F= 12.85, p= <.00.
A multiple regression equation was constructed to explore the relative
power of contributing factors to pathological shame scores. Shame was utilized as
the dependent variable, with Individualism, Communitarianism, Empty
Selfishness, malevolent anger, and externalization entered as predictor variables.
The regression analysis was significant overall and yielded R=.39, R2 = .15, F
Change = 6.52, p= <.000. The variables accounting for the power in the
regression are, in descending order, Individualism (b= .24). Externalization
(b= .23), and malevolent anger (b= .20). Communitarianism (b= -.27) provided
negative predictive power. A summary of the regression is presented in Table 11.
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Table 7:  Analysis of Variance for Levels of Individualism
Source F p
GUILT 6.85 .00**
SHAME 10.38 .00**
EXTERNAL 2.10 .03*
EMPTY 2.20 .01**
CONNECT 1.22 .29
MALAnger .68 .31
CONAnger .77 .53
*Significance .05     **Significance .01 Note: df= 2, 128
Note:
Variable Abbreviations
Guilt Guilt-Proneness
Shame Shame-Proneness
EXTERNAL Externalization
EMPTY Empty selfishness
CONNECT Meaningful connectedness
CONAnger Constructive Anger
MALAnger Malevolent Anger
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Table 8: Means for all Variables by Levels of Individualism
Variable N Mean SD
Guilt 1 40 60.90 6.36
2 44 62.18 4.70
3 44 58.20 4.97
Total 128 60.42 5.34
Shame 1 40 46.33 8.12
2 44 42.20 7.55
3 44 49.43 7.05
Total 128 45.98 7.57
External 1 40 40.75 7.87
2 44 38.75 6.98
3 44 42.38 7.83
Total 128 40.62 7.56
Empty 1 40 63.10 13.68
2 44 59.95 14.55
3 44 69.31 18.86
Total 128 64.12 15.69
Connect 1 40 50.35 11.38
2 44 54.47 11.23
3 44 51.18 15.52
Total 128 52.00 12.71
MALAnger 1 40 66.30 17.01
2 44 65.86 15.56
3 44 62.34 18.87
Total 128 64.83 17.14
CONAnger 1 40 88.37 10.83
2 44 89.27 12.64
3 44 89.34 13.71
Total 128 88.99 12.39
Note: 1=Low group; 2=Moderate group; 3=High group
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Table 9: Analysis of Variance for Levels of Communitarianism
Source F p
GUILT 5.41 .00**
SHAME 1.16 .31
EXTERNAL .511 .60
EMPTY -21.21 .00**
CONNECT 16.48 .00**
MALAnger .960 .38
CONAnger .51 .60
*Significance .05     **Significance .01    df= 2, 128
Note:
Guilt Guilt-Proneness
Shame Shame-Proneness
EXTERNAL Externalization
EMPTY Empty Selfishness
CONNECT Meaningful Connectedness
MALAnger Malevolent Anger
CONAnger Constructive Anger
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Table 10:  Means for all Variables by Levels of Communitarianism
Variable N Mean SD
Guilt 1 43 58.16 5.09
2 42 59.28 6.47
3 43 62.90 4.52
Total 128 60.11 5.36
Shame 1 43 47.46 7.92
2 42 44.90 9.41
3 43 45.53 6.71
Total 128 45.96 8.01
External 1 43 37.97 7.83
2 42 39.59 7.82
3 43 39.16 7.31
Total 128 38.90 7.65
Empty 1 43 73.09 16.22
2 42 65.54 14.03
3 43 53.58 11.32
Total 128 64.06 16.08
Connect 1 43 43.79 7.02
2 42 56.64 10.42
3 43 55.83 15.65
Total 128 52.05 12.93
MALAnger 1 43 62.53 18.01
2 42 67.86 13.56
3 43 64.34 19.26
Total 128 64.78 17.16
CONAnger 1 43 90.37 11.73
2 42 88.27 12.24
3 43 89.02 13.64
Total 128 89.01 12.40
Note: 1=Low group; 2=Moderate group; 3=High group
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Figure 2:  Curvilinear Relationship of Levels of Individualism and Guilt-
Proneness
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Figure 3:  Curvilinear Relationship of Levels of Individualism and Shame-
Proneness
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Table 11:  Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Shame-
Proneness
Model Unstandardized Standardized Sig.
B b
(Constant) 23.44
Individualism .211 .244 .01**
Communitarian -.118 -.271 .01**
Empty -4.88 -.097 .34
MALAnger 9.38 .199 .025*
External .242 .228 .01**
* Significant at .05 ** Significant at .01
Note: F Change = 6.52, p= <.000
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Shame and Guilt, Ethical Orientation, and Approach to Life
Hypothesis #3:
The third hypothesis, namely that there are significant partial correlations
between ethical orientation, affect proneness, and approach to life, was tested by a
two partial correlation analyses.  A preliminary correlational analysis was
performed to illuminate possible overlap between the two subscales of the BBI,
Individualism and Communitarianism. They were significantly related at .34,
p=<.000. With this in mind,  partial correlational analyses were performed
between the variables of the TOSCA, BBI and CFI, namely Guilt- and Shame-
proneness, Individualism, Communitarianism, Meaningful Connectedness, and
Empty Selfishness. The first partial correlational test was performed between
Individualism and Shame, Guilt, Meaningful Connectedness, and Empty
Selfishness, while Communitarianism was held constant.  For this analysis, the
only significant positive relationship found was between Individualism and
Empty Selfishness r= .25, p= <.000. No other significant relationships were found
when controlling for a communitarian ethical orientation.
A second set of partial correlational tests was performed between
Communitarianism and guilt- and shame-proneness, Meaningful Connectedness,
and Empty Selfishness, while holding constant Individualism. Significant
relationships were found between Communitarianism, guilt- and shame-
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proneness, Meaningful Connectedness, and Empty Selfishness. Most notably, a
communitarian ethical orientation was significantly related to guilt-proneness and
Meaningful Connectedness, and related in a negative manner to shame-proneness
and Empty Selfishness, when Individualism was held constant. Meaningful
connectedness also bore significant associations in the negative direction with
shame-proneness and Empty Selfishness under this same condition. The results
for this analysis are presented in Table 12.
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Table 12:  Partial Correlations between Communitarianism, Guilt, Shame,
Meaningful Connectedness, and Empty Selfishness, with Individualism Held
Constant.
Guilt Shame Empty Connect Comm
Guilt --- .01 -.22** .02 .30**
Shame .01 --- .02 -17* -.15*
Empty -22** .02 --- -.25** -.54**
Connect .02 -.17* -.25** --- .42**
Comm .30** -.15* -.54** .42** ---
*Significant at .05 (2-tailed) **Significant at .01 or below (2-tailed)
Variable Abbreviations
Guilt Guilt-Proneness
Shame Shame-Proneness
Comm Communitarianism
Connect Meaningful Connectedness
Empty Empty Selfishness
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Chapter Six
Discussion
The integrative review of the literature, the theoretical synthesis, and the
findings of the statistical analyses tend, overall to support the original hypotheses
and thus the general contention of this project. A part of this assertion is that
changes in our frameworks of meaning have wrought transformations in self-
experience and perception that have made modern persons much more vulnerable
to negative emotions. These changes in the world of life have brought great good
to a great many, but have affected communities and individuals in deeply
detrimental ways as well. Mainstream psychology explains these difficulties in
terms of individual psychopathology.
 It has also been the contention of this project from its inception that the
systematic attempts to understand and “heal” human beings, often called
psychology or psychotherapy, have in fact often increased the rate of
disconnection and the painful experience of negative emotions by promoting the
ideal of the singular person, self-motivated, achievement-driven, and self-
contained as the crucial unit of being, study, and intervention. Psychology’s
answer to the increasing power of sadness, grief, shame, guilt, anxiety, and the
plethora of other distressing emotional states is to problematize and seek to do
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away with them, as if these vital parts of human life were in actuality the
dilemma. This is particularly true of psychiatry and the psychopharmacology
industry. Powerful shame hurts powerfully; abandonment by a loved one can
bring on exquisite and enduring pain, but are these not common to all humans
across history?   Our reactions and responses to unavoidable personal emotional
pain and suffering are what seem to really matter.  Dealing with the vicissitudes
of living is, for most of us, best achieved in the company and with the mutuality
of others. Working through the inevitable pain of living, often with the help of a
compatriot or a community, is a source of growth, both of the sufferer and the
people.
Shame, Guilt, Anger, and Depression
Two partial correlation analyses were performed to test hypothesis 1.
Shame-proneness was found to bear significant positive relationships with
externalization (the tendency to blame), depression, and malevolent anger when
guilt-proneness was controlled.  The second partial correlational analysis found a
weak, though significant relationship between guilt-proneness and depression.
This finding replicated Tangney & Gramzow’s (1992) earlier observations that
guilt is a negative emotion and therefore likely to associate with another negative
affect, depression. This is in spite of controlling for shame in the analysis. The
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second analysis failed to match previous findings of significant relationships
between guilt-proneness and constructive anger.
 By way of explaining the current study’s failure to replicate the prior
association of guilt-proneness and constructive anger, demographic variables
between the original study and the current one were compared. The sample for the
current study is more diverse in terms of race and ethnicity, especially in its
inclusion of Latino/a and Asian-American participants and this could account for
differences in the results.
Sample Grouped by Levels of Ethical Orientation: Comparison
on Other Variables of Interest
Levels of Individualism
The second hypothesis speculated that there would be significant
differences on the study variables when the sample was grouped according to
level of ethical orientation. The test of this hypothesis involved separating the
sample based on their scores on the two subscales of the Basic Beliefs Inventory
(BBI). For the first analysis, the sample was divided into three groups according
to scores on the Individualism subscale and classified as high, moderate or low.
An ANOVA found that the three groups were indeed different from each other on
the criterion variable.  These three groups were then compared for differences
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across the dependent variables of the study, namely shame-proneness, guilt-
proneness, externalization, Empty Selfishness, and Meaningful Connectedness.
The overall differences revealed by the experimental ANOVA indicated the
Individualism groups were different on several of the dependent variables,
including guilt- and shame-proneness, externalization, and Empty Selfishness.
Planned post hoc analysis utilizing the Tukey’s procedure indicated that the high
Individualism group was significantly less guilt-prone, more shame-prone, more
prone to externalizing (blaming), and more endorsing of an empty selfish
approach to life than the moderate group. The high group was also more likely to
endorse Empty Selfishness than the low group. The moderately individualistic
group was more prone to guilt than the low or high groups and less prone to
shame than either one. The moderate group was less empty than the high group.
The moderate and low groups were significantly more endorsing of an approach
to life marked by meaningful connection to others than was the high group.
The analysis suggests that persons who endorse a highly individualistic
ethical orientation may be more prone to shame and to an empty, selfish approach
to life devoid of meaningful connections to others, more so than those who only
moderately or barely endorse individualism. The high group was also
significantly different from the moderate or low groups on the externalization
variable, suggesting that individualists are more prone to blame others whether in
the attempt to reattribute culpability and avoid shame, or to discharge their own
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negative affect, which may primarily consist of shame. In a sense, this is what
Broucek (1991), H. Block Lewis (1976), Michael Lewis (1992, 2000), and
Schneider (1991) propose as the alienating experience of shame-proneness. For a
significant portion of the sample in this study, Individualism and its attendant
selfishness and moral relativism are a cognitive and philosophical defense
mechanism against the painful separateness of living with an identity or self-
concept inadequate to meet the unreal demands of modern selfhood. This finding
lends credence to my belief that the current working models and measures of
shame are one-dimensional and account for only pathological shame.
One finding of particular interest in the post hoc analysis concerns the
moderate Individualism group. This particular group of cases was more guilt-
prone than the high or low groups, less shame-prone than high or low groups, and
less endorsing of an empty selfish approach to life than the high group. The
oscillation of mean shame scores between the three groups reveals a curvilinear
relationship between Individualism and Guilt-Proneness, as well as Shame-
Proneness.
Levels of Communitarianism
A second analysis was performed to examine interactions between levels
of communitarian ethical orientation and the other variables. The analysis of
variance indicated significant differences for levels of communitarianism and
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guilt-proneness, Meaningful Connectedness, for Empty Selfishness. The planned
post hoc procedure indicated the high communitarianism group was significantly
more guilt-prone than either the moderate or low groups; the high group takes an
approach to life that is more concerned with meaningful connection to others in a
community of shared values than the low group. The low communitarian group
was most likely to endorse an empty narcissistic approach to life.
The high communitarian group is significantly different from the moderate
and low groups; more guilt-prone and more concerned with an approach to life
marked by Meaningful Connectedness. This finding would seem to substantiate
the “good guilt” hypothesis, in that this group endorses an ethical orientation
concerned with life and values in common with others and is more prone to good,
prosocial guilt (Michael Lewis 1992, 2000; Tangney & Gramzow 1989, 1991,
1992). The Test of Self-Conscious Affects is, I contend, a measure of “good
guilt,” and this finding lends support to my contention.
Overall, these findings tend to support the overarching proposals of this
dissertation, namely that liberal individualism permeates mass culture and
individual lives and while it has undeniable benefits, its costs include emotional
suffering and isolation, and estrangement from communities in which the
suffering might be diffused and self-respect generated from contribution to a
greater good. The findings indicate that those who endorsed a high level of
communitarian values were more prone to good guilt and take an approach to life
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that values meaningful connection to communities of shared values. This
communitarian group also seemed less prone to the call and effects of the
“Culture of Narcissism.”
Ethical Orientation, Self-Conscious Emotions and Approach to
Life
According to the third hypothesis, the dimensions tapped by the TOSCA,
BBI and CFI would bear significant relationship in the intuitive manner, namely
that Individualism would correlate significantly with Shame-proneness, and
Empty selfishness, when Communitarianism was controlled; while
Communitarianism would correlate significantly with Guilt-proneness and
Meaningful Connectedness when Individualism was held constant. Because
Individualism and Communitarianism were significantly related, partial
correlations were performed to examine the relationships between each ethical
orientation variable and the other study variables while controlling, in turn for
each. Given that Communitarianism is not the opposite of Individualism, but
rather a more connected and responsible variant of ethical orientation, the two
dimensions are apt to overlap somewhat. Significant correlations between
subscales are not an uncommon finding on tests that contain two or more
subscales (Hamilton, 1992: Stevens, 1990). For these reasons, partial correlational
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analyses were performed; the first between Individualism, controlling for
Communitarianism, and shame, guilt, Empty Selfishness and Meaningful
Connectedness. In this analysis, Individualism was related to Empty Selfishness,
but not to guilt- or shame-proneness. It was anticipated that this partial correlation
analysis would have found a significant association between Individualism and
shame-proneness, but this was not the case.
A second set of partial correlational analyses was performed between
Communitarianism and guilt- and shame-proneness, Meaningful Connectedness,
and Empty Selfishness, holding Individualism constant. Significant relationships
were found between Communitarianism, guilt- and shame-proneness, Meaningful
Connectedness, and Empty Selfishness. Most notably, a communitarian ethical
orientation was significantly related to guilt-proneness and Meaningful
Connectedness, and related in an inverse manner to shame-proneness and Empty
Selfishness, when Individualism was factored out. Meaningful connectedness also
bore significant associations in the negative direction with shame-proneness and
Empty Selfishness. In terms of this sample, persons with a Communitarian ethical
orientation are more prone to healthy guilt and to an approach to life that values
and finds meaning and purpose in connection to others and to the community.
This may suggest, in a most Adlerian turn that social interest, finding one’s place
in relationships and in the world is a source of well-being not offered by the
current ethos.
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Shortcomings of the Study
The major shortcomings of the study are evident in the experimental
design of the project. Ideally, the study should have included multiple measures of
ethical orientation and approaches to life. A comprehensive literature review of
several online databases yielded no comparable measures of ethical orientation of
the types measured by the BBI. The instrument closest in spirit to the BBI could
be the Rokeach Values Survey (Rokeach, 1982); however it does not address
categories of ethical orientation like those identified by the Basic Beliefs
Inventory. No other measure of individualism/communitarianism was identified at
the time of this writing.
The Common Feelings Inventory purports to tap two common approaches
or attitudinal sets in regards to life and living. The first is marked by a sense of
connectedness to others and appreciation of values and meanings held in common
with a community of others. The second approach to living is marked by
instrumental self-centeredness and a lack emphasis on the importance of
connection to others. This approach basically treats life as a struggle to maximize
self-interest and avoid exploitation by others. There seems to be a raw utilitarian
ethic underlying this approach to life and relationships are generally treated as
contractual, as an exchange of goods and services rather than intrinsic in and of
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themselves. There are several other measures that appear to tap similar sets of
values as those measured by the Common Feelings Inventory, including Carol
Ryff’s measure of psychological well-being (1989),  the Social Interest Scale
(Crandall, 1975), the Tavis Measure of Social Interest (Tavis, 1990), and the
Individualism-Collectivism Scale (Hui & Triandis, 1984).
Given the obvious existence of these other similar scales, the present
study’s omission of corroborative measures for the CFI seems glaring. The failure
to do this lies with the author of this dissertation, who was not aware of these
other measures when the data collection and experimental design was in the
planning stages. So a lack of thoroughness seems to be a major shortcoming of
this study.
Another rather obvious drawback concerns the relatively weak, although
significant results from many of the hypotheses tests. Although Tangney and
Gramzow (1989, 1991, 1996) found partial correlations in their various studies
that were generally in the .20 to .40 range, stronger Pearson correlations were
expected from the data analysis of the current study. Most relationships in this
study were in the .20’s, with notable exceptions observed in the relationships
between communitarianism (controlling for individualism) and Meaningful
Connectedness (.42, p= .0), and the inverse relationship between
communitarianism and Empty Selfishness (-.54, p= .0).
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Disappointing results were also observed in the lack of significant
relationships between the anger variables of the Anger Response Inventory and
other study variables. Although approximately twenty-five participants’ data was
excluded from the study for overt random responding on this instrument, it is
likely that many other participants answered the ARI in a random or cursory
manner due to its length and attendant subject fatigue. The data collection
procedure was, in hindsight, less than conducive in facilitating participants’ full
attention and truthful responding. The participants were required to complete all
of the instruments in one session and the total number of items for each case was
greater than five-hundred, possibly inducing participant fatigue and dwindling
interest and motivation as the session progressed.
Further Considerations
In this dissertation I have tried to present the notions of “frameworks of
meaning” and their constitution of who we are, how we see ourselves, and how
we make sensible the social and psychological worlds. I have presented several
modern psychological theories of the emotions, the “self,” and the interaction and
of these phenomena into what we generally, and without question consider being
experience, a sense of reality. I have tried to convey the sense that the so-called
“objective” and “scientific” ideologies of the social sciences have not only added
201
to the “malaise of modernity,” but are in fact reflections of the breakdowns of
older frameworks of meaning. These frameworks valued emotional experience of
whatever sort, promoted a set of values wherein the community or social worlds
were given much more importance, and the focus was much less on the interior
life of the individual
One implication of my study is that painful, “alienating” emotions do not
exist in a vacuum and that there are crucial places for these in our emotional
repertoires.  There are good and not so good reasons that persons experience the
debilitating effects of depression, shame, shyness, or other negative emotions.
One thread I have explored in the course of this dissertation has to do with
selfhood, particularly in how it has changed under the inward focused,
achievement-oriented, and imagistic demands of our current times. As Charles
Taylor so perspicaciously wrote “Selfhood and the good, or in another way
selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes” (1989, p.
3). So, again not all negative, painful emotional experiences are pathological as
such, but are enmeshed with our identities and our being in the world.
The results of this study have established relationships between high levels
of Individualism and pathological shame, the tendency to blame others,
malevolent anger, as well as Empty Selfishness. What does that say, given the
limited power of this particular analysis? I believe it describes a small part of the
spectrum of what Charles Taylor has called the “malaise of modernity.” This
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predicament of the self and self-experience seems very similar to Rathvon &
Holmstrom’s (1991) “depleted narcissism,” and what Christopher Lasch (1978)
referred to as a “culture of narcissism.” The culture of Individualism creates the
self and the conditions under which the self finds it difficult to measure up. The
same ethos offers empty solutions such as the commodification of sex and
identity, vacuous consumerism, and empty, groundless self-esteem.
If, as the many affect researchers reviewed in the course of this project
propose, emotions are inherently evaluative and as Taylor has made an excellent
case for our “self-interpreting being”, just what is the message that shame trying
to tell its sufferers? There are a plethora of possibilities: “I have acted childishly;”
“I have acted in such a way as to draw undue attention to myself;” “I do not
belong here;” “I shouldn’t have tried to seduce my friend’s wife.” Shame is
ineluctably affiliative as well as alienating.  But what about the pathological
shame of mainstream psychology? What about the ruined identities, the self-
disgusted selves? While Lewis offers a promising, if somewhat vague solution to
the incapacitating effects of pathological shame in his exploration of
Kierkegaard’s notion of commitment, it seems that something larger is in order.
Perhaps a change in the ways we perceive and act.
I believe that the Communitarian cluster of relationships found in the study
offers some direction not only in attenuating the devastating subjective power of
shame, but of social fragmentation as well. In the tests of the second hypothesis,
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significant differences were found between cases categorized by level of
Communitarian ethical orientation. The highest scoring group was more guilt-
prone and took an approach to life that valued connection to others and to
communities of shared meanings and purposes. Is it possible that one could
change values and begin to think and act in ways that reflect and nurture more
communal ways of living? The answer is obviously, yes. Psychology could play
an important role in helping persons to examine and change their values in this
direction, which would be a reversal of its first one-hundred years.
Many powerful intellects have written of the necessity of shame for human
existence. The religious sociologist Kurt Reizler (1958, p. 453) writes in detail of
the intimate connection of two equivalent forms of shame, aischyne is the
equivalence of disgrace or dishonor, while aidos means awe, respect, or
reverence. Reizler writes, “You feel aidos when confronted with things nature
tells you to revere and not violate. Shame in sexual matters is aidos, not
aischyne.” (1958, p. 463). So in this way, sex retains some of the awe, the power
and sacredness of transcendence rather than the commodity it has become. I
believe that Hannah Arendt would agree, given her strong notions of the private,
the sacredness that sometimes accompanies solitude.
With the progressive decay of cosmological understandings of things, with
the “death of God,” as it has been proposed, what becomes of shame, as in the
sense of awe? What are its meanings? Shame has not gone away, as many
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psychologists would like, it has increased. In the company of this increase in
shame affect there is an attending loss in the institutions that made it bearable and
solvable, that gave shame its meaning and power as a force for constructive
change. While not impossible, it has become more difficult to belong to a
community, to be a member of a social body in which sin is expected as the
natural course of human behavior, and which has in place mechanisms, rituals, or
rites for redemption. Members of communities and families and societies are
expected to fail, to err, to succumb to temptation. This is an admission of our
humanness and it goes against the psychological ideal of the bounded, masterful
self.
Liberal Individualism promotes violation of the rules of the family, the
neighborhood, or congregation and rejects the need for redemption and
reintegration in the name of the sovereign self. Witness the rate at which modern
persons change churches, denominations, even religions. More often people speak
of “spirituality, not religion,” which is often a codeword for making up one’s own
form of transcendence which ultimately consists of self-serving illusions. Faith
has become more of a treatment for the self than a relationship with a higher
reality. I believe that the egoism and imagism inherent in individualism has
promoted a notion of freedom from shared belief and tradition that is an empty,
ersatz version of a genuine relationship with a higher power.
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Modern psychology and psychotherapy are emancipatory endeavors
(Richardson & Fowers, 1998). Within their ideologies, tradition, families, all of
the institutions of development are vilified for their constraint of the burgeoning
self. Freedom from tradition is liberation. But with freedom from tradition people
are given a new set of conditions for failure. Charles Taylor (1992, p.34), offered
“What has come about with the modern age is not so much the need for
recognition but the increasing conditions in which the attempt to be recognized
can fail.” This form of authenticity, “self-generated imagism,” driven by
consumerism, and ultimately the dominant paradigm of global capitalism, has
made the clamor for recognition intense.
It helps explain the debilitating, crippling rejection and pathological shame
we as psychologists encounter so frequently in our clients (and in ourselves, truth
be told). The emancipatory framework of modern psychology, or mass-media
wisdom (think Oprah) negates the need, the desire, and the absolute necessity of
the sacred rituals of redemption, unless is it a false “redemption” of public
humiliation as on television “reality shows.” In modern psychotherapy,
redemption is a form of increasing self-esteem, or “getting the love you want.”
Psychologists, it can be argued, are prevented by our code of ethics of pointing
out our clients’ transgression, working with them to stop, and assisting them in
seeking real forgiveness and redemption.
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Real redemption, whether it comes from a public act of confession and
contrition or a heartfelt apology and amendment of behavior is a nonetheless
dialogical act. There is no monological redemption. It is an affirmation of the
constitution of oneself by the groups we belong to and a plea to continue this
belonging, of membership, of co-constitution by that body of the self. Confession
and redemption in this sense is not just another “technology of the self”, in the
sense used by Foucault (as in a further interioratization of power/knowledge,
1971, p. 134). Confession, redemption, and reintegration are ineluctably
dialogical elements of humanness.
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Appendix A
Consent Form
Emotions and Identity
You are invited to participate in a study of emotions and identity. I am a doctoral
candidate in Educational Psychology at the University of Texas at Austin
conducting research for my dissertation. My purpose is to explore peoples’ beliefs
about life and their emotional experience. You have been asked to participate
because you are a part of the subject pool and can receive partial credit towards a
class if you choose to do so. You will in no way be penalized if you chose not to
participate. If you decide to participate, you will be asked to respond to several
psychological instruments. The entire process should take between one and two
hours. The information obtained will be confidential. The information acquired
from you will be assigned a code number. To insure confidentiality, your
responses will be connected only to your code number. You will not be personally
identified.
If you have any questions, please ask me. If you have any additional questions
later, please contact August Dolan-Henderson (512 322-9607) or Frank
Richardson (471-4155).
You are making a decision whether or not to participate. Your signature indicates
that you have read the information provided above and have decided to
participate. You may withdraw at any time, if you so choose.
___________________________ _______________
Signature of Participant            Date
___________________________                              _______________
Signature of Investigator Date
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Appendix B
Basic Beliefs Inventory (BBI)
The following statements express everyday feelings or experiences. These
feelings or experiences are all normal, and normal people vary a great deal in how
much they experience them at different times in their lives. Please indicate how
strongly you agree with each statement. It is best not to dwell too long on an item.
Just give your honest first impression as to how much you agree or disagree with
the statement.
At the top of each page you will find a scale like this one:
1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Agree Disagree
Please use this scale to indicate how you feel about each statement. Just write the
appropriate number from one to seven in the space provided to the right of each
item.
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1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Agree Disagree
1. You can achieve almost any goal if you put your mind to it. ______
2. Self-sacrifice is an essential part of any long-term intimate ______
relationships.
3. The feeling of being a part of a community of people with shared ______
purposes is very important to me.
4. To accept things on faith is to relinquish personal responsibility. ______
5. Our deepest feelings cannot be shared with others. ______
6. Religious or spiritual beliefs are essential to a fulfilling life. ______
7. The “common good” is best achieved when everyone is free to pursue ______
their own ends.
8. I deeply appreciate the wisdom of past generations. ______
9. Economic success is a very high priority in my life. ______
10. All “truth” is relative; it depends on one’s personal point of view. ______
11. Personal humility is an essential virtue. ______
12. One’s first responsibility is to oneself rather than to others. ______
13. We should be at least as concerned for the common good as for our ______
own happiness.
14. The first step toward “finding oneself” is to move away from past ______
beliefs and other people’s values
15. The best advice you can give someone you care about is to first look ______
out for him or herself.
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1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Agree Disagree
16. Personal growth is more important than one’s ties to others. ______
17. Efforts to control the future are the source of many personal and ______
social ills in the modern world.
18. I am worried that I will never be able to achieve everything I want. ______
19. Fulfillment in life has nothing to do with recognition, wealth, or ______
power.
20. In the final analysis we are all alone. ______
21. It is important to accept things the way they are. ______
22. Good friendship is essentially an exchange of benefits and ______
pleasurable experiences.
23. It is wiser to focus on practical concerns than on moral or spiritual ______
purpose.
24. There are no fixed standards of right or wrong; right and wrong vary ______
according to a particular situation.
25. I have become who I am largely as a result of my own efforts. ______
26. Everyone needs some kind of moral standard or structure beyond him ______
or herself.
27. Nature is there to be exploited as fully as possible for the good of ______
humankind.
28. Healthy self-interest is the best guide to a good life. ______
29. I am deeply moved when I see someone give unselfishly to others. ______
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1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Agree Disagree
30. I judge my values by how much they fulfill my personal needs ______
and desires.
31. A sense of unity with nature is important to me. ______
32. An important virtue of democracy is that no one is asked to sacrifice ______
themselves for the common good.
33. I would not be happy unless my work was of service to others. ______
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Appendix C
Common Feelings Inventory (CFI)
The following statements express everyday feelings or experiences. These
feelings or experiences are all normal, and normal people vary a great deal in how
much they experience them at different times in their lives. Please indicate how
strongly you agree with each statement. It is best not to dwell too long on an item.
Just give your honest first impression as to how much you agree or disagree with
the statement.
At the top of each page you will find a scale like this one:
1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Agree Disagree
Please use this scale to indicate how you feel about each statement. Just write the
appropriate number from one to seven in the space provided to the right of each
item.
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1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Agree Disagree
1. Most of the time I feel a sense of purpose in my everyday life. ______
2. I am much happier when I get a lot of attention and admiration ______
from others.
3. I am usually quite interested in what is going on in the lives of people ______
 around me
4. I am easily humiliated by criticisms and putdowns. ______
5. I feel a sense of connection with people in history and societies ______
of the past.
6. I enjoy friendly competition with others. ______
7. I am often bored in my day-to-day life. ______
8. It is rewarding to discover how much people are alike in their ______
problems.
9. It is important to me to be special or unique. ______
10. I get a great deal of satisfaction from the ordinary pleasures of life. ______
11. It is possible to feel connected to someone you do not see very often. ______
12. I am very sensitive to evaluation or criticism by others. ______
13. I often have to struggle to sympathize with how others feel. ______
14. I have a sense of emptiness much of the time. ______
15. I would like to be recognized as an important or remarkable ______
person.
16. People just don’t understand my struggles. ______
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1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
Strongly Neutral Strongly
Agree Disagree
17. I feel a sense of solidarity with people in other societies and parts ______
of the world.
18. I am worried that I will never be able to achieve everything I want. ______
19. Other people’s criticism is often helpful. ______
20. I do not feel as appreciated by others as I feel I deserve to be. ______
21. I feel that the story of my life is part of a larger story. ______
22. I like it when I feel superior to other people. ______
23. I resent it when I am slighted or not given my due in a situation. ______
24. I can find meaning in simple things. ______
25. I usually find it difficult to work out differences with others. ______
26. I generally feel a sense of purpose in my life. ______
27. I often feel entitled to more than I get in life. ______
28. I can easily feel the pain of others. ______
29. I daydream a lot about being very successful or famous. ______
30. I do not feel my problems or struggles are particularly unique. ______
31. I do not get jealous when hearing about the success or happiness ______
of others.
32. I am very sensitive to evaluation or criticism by others. ______
33. It is important to me to be modest or humble without being meek ______
or unassertive.
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Appendix D
Beck Depression Inventory-II
Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read
each group of statements carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each
group that best describes the way you have been feeling during the past two
weeks, including today. Circle the number beside the statement you have picked.
If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle the highest
number for that group. Be sure that you do not choose more than one statement
for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18
(Changes in Appetite).
1. Sadness
0 I do not feel sad.
1 I feel sad much of the time.
2 I am sad all the time.
3 1 am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it.
2. Pessimism
0 I am not discouraged about my future.
1 I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be.
2 I do not expect things to work out for me.
3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse.
3. Past Failure
0 I do not feel like a failure.
1 I have failed more than I should have.
2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures.
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person.
4. Loss of Pleasure
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy.
1 I don’t enjoy things as much as I used to.
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy.
3 I can’t get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy.
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5. Guilty Feelings
0 I don’t feel particularly guilty.
1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done.
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
3 I feel guilty all of the time.
6. Punishment Feelings
0 I don’t feel I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
7. Self-Dislike
0 I feel the same about myself as ever.
1 I have lost confidence in myself.
2 I am disappointed in myself.
3 I dislike myself.
8. Self-Criticalness
0 I don’t criticize or blame myself more than usual.
1 I am more critical of myself than I used to be.
2 1 criticize myself for all of my faults.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes
0 I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself.
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out.
2 I would like to kill myself.
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10. Crying
0  I don’t cry anymore than I used to.
1 I cry more than I used to.
2 I cry over every little thing.
3 I feel like crying, but I can’t.
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11. Agitation
0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual.
1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual.
2 I am so restless or agitated that it’s hard to stay still.
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing something.
12. Loss of Interest
0 I have not lost interest in other people or activities.
1 I am less interested in other people or things than before.
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people or things.
3 It’s hard to get interested in anything.
13. Indecisiveness
0 I make decisions about as well as ever.
1 I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual.
2 I have much greater difficulty in making decisions than I used to.
3 I have trouble making any decisions.
14. Worthlessness
0 I do not feel I am worthless.
1 I don’t consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to.
2 I feel more worthless as compared to other people.
3 I feel utterly worthless.
15. Loss of Energy
0  I have as much energy as ever.
1 I have less energy than I used to have.
2 1 don’t have enough energy to do very much.
3 1 don’t have enough energy to do anything.
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16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern
0  I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern.
la I sleep somewhat more than usual.
1b I sleep somewhat less than usual.
2a I sleep a lot more than usual.
2b I sleep a lot less than usual.
3a I sleep most of the day
3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and cannot get back to sleep.
17. Irritability
0 I am no more irritable than usual.
1 I am more irritable than usual.
2 I am much more irritable than usual.
3 I am irritable all the time.
18. Changes in Appetite
0  I have not experienced any change in my appetite.
la My appetite is somewhat less than usual.
lb My appetite is somewhat greater than usual.
2a My appetite is much less than before.
2b My appetite is much greater than usual.
3a I have no appetite at all.
3b I crave food all the time.
19. Concentration Difficulty
0  I can concentrate as well as ever.
1 I can’t concentrate as well as usual.
2 It’s hard to keep my mind on anything for very long.
3 I find I can’t concentrate on anything.
20. Tiredness or Fatigue
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual.
1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual.
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do.
3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do.
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21. Loss of Interest in Sex
0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2 I am much less interested in sex now.
3 I have lost interest in sex completely.
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Appendix E
Anger Response Inventory (ARI)
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life,
followed by several common reactions to those situations.
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate
how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to
rate fill responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the
same situation, or they may react different ways at different times.
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day—to—day life,
followed by several common reactions to those situations.
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate
how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to
rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same
situation, or they may react different ways at different times. Rate them on a scale
of 1 to 5 according to the figure below:
1---2---3---4---5
Not likely Very likely
For example:
A. You wake early one Saturday morning It is cold and rainy outside
a) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news. __1___
b) You would take the extra time to read the paper. __5___
c) You would feel disappointed that its raining. __3___
d) You would wonder why you woke up so early. __4___
In the above example, I’ve rated of the answers by writing a number “1” for
answer (a) because I wouldn’t want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday
morning —— so it’s not at all likely that I would do that. I wrote a “5” for answer
(b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very
likely). I wrote a “3” for answer (C) because for me it’s about half and half.
Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn’t ——
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it would depend on what I had planned. And I wrote a “4” for answer (d) because
I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.
1---2---3---4---5
Not very much Very much
Please do not skip any items - - rate all responses.
1. You are waiting to be served at a restaurant. Fifteen minutes have gone by,
and you still haven’t even received a menu.
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at the waitress or _____
restaurant?
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
  Not likely                 Very likely
e) I wouldn’t leave a tip. _____
f) I’d go get a menu myself. _____
g) I’d just sit there and wait. _____
h) The longer I sat there, the more I would think about how angry I was. _____
i) I’d pound a knife on the table as the waitress walked by. _____
j) I’d think the waitress must be new. _____
k) I’d snap at the person sitting with me. _____
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The next question is about the long-term consequences of how you would handle
the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think
things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful Beneficial
1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial? _____
2. You get pulled over for speeding when you were driving at the speed limit.
1---2---3---4---5
Not very much Very much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel, not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at the policeman? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 6 questions are about what you would actually do
1---2---3---4---5
Not likely Very likely
e) I’d wonder if I was going faster than I thought. _____
f) I’d go to court. _____
g) Afterwards. I’d turn on the radio to take my mind off it. _____
h) I’d take down the policeman’s badge number and report him. _____
i) I’d tell the policeman off. _____
j) I’d pay the ticket, but I would steam over it for days. _____
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The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful Beneficial
k) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you _____
personally?
1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the, _____
policeman personally?
3. You are trying to rest or read, but there are children nearby who are
making a lot of noise while playing.
1---2---3---4---5
Not very much Very much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at the children? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
1---2---3---4---5
Not likely Very likely
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do
e) I’d watch TV until I calmed down. _____
f) I’d be angry with myself for not being able to ignore it. _____
g) I’d think, “They’re only children. They don’t know better.” _____
h) I’d yell at them to shut up. _____
i) I’d take their toys away. _____
224
j) I’d snap at someone else in the house. _____
k) I’d move to a quieter room. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful Beneficial
1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for y personally? _____
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the children, _____
personally?
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
relationship with the children?
4. Your boss implies that you’re lying when you are really telling the truth.
1---2---3---4---5
Not very much Very much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do.
b) How much would you feel like getting back at the boss? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
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1---2---3---4---5
Not likely Very likely
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
e) I’d slam something on the boss’s desk. _____
f) For the next several days, I wouldn’t do any more work _____
than I had to.
g) I’d think the boss probably just misunderstood. _____
h) I’d get into a fist-fight with another co-worker. _____
i) I’d think maybe I should have been clearer. _____
j) I’d calmly explain to my boss that I was telling the truth. _____
k) I’d walk away before I lost my temper. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful Beneficial
1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for personally? _____
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your boss, _____
personally?
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
relationship with your boss?
5. During an argument, a friend calls you “stupid”.
1---2---3---4---5
Not very much Very much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? ______
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do.
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b) How much would you feel like getting back at the friend? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
1---2---3---4---5
Not likely Very likely
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
e) I’d be so angry I would just walk away. _____
f) I’d explain that I don’t like being called “stupid”. _____
g) I wouldn’t speak to the friend for at least a week. _____
h) I’d think it wasn’t worth worrying about. _____
i) I’d shove the friend against the wall. _____
j) I’d think that the friend was having a bad day. _____
k) I’d shove the next person that got in my way. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful Beneficial
1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you _____
personally?
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the friend, _____
personally?
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
relationship with the friend?
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6. Your brother borrows you car and leaves you with an empty gas tank.
1---2---3---4---5
Not very much Very much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel, not necessarily what you
would do.
b) How much would you feel like getting back at your brother? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
1---2---3---4---5
Not likely Very likely
e) I’d just forget about it. _____
f) I’d borrow his car and return it with no gas. _____
g) I wouldn’t say anything, but I’d get angrier every time I thought _____
about it
h) I’d hit him. _____
i) I’d calmly ask him to put more gas in the car. _____
j) I’d think it’s no problem. I can just get gas next time I go out. _____
k) When I saw the gas gauge, I’d slam my fist on the dashboard. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful Beneficial
1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for personally? _____
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
brother, personally?
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
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relationship with your brother?
7. You’re struggling to carry four cups of coffee to your table at a cafeteria.
Someone bumps into you, spilling the coffee.
1---2---3---4---5
Not very much Very much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do.
b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 8 questions are about what you would actually do:
1---2---3---4---5
Not likely Very likely
e) I’d get some more coffee. _____
f) I’d be angry with myself for trying to carry so many cups of coffee _____
g) I’d kick a chair. _____
h) I’d think I should have watched where I was going. _____
i) I’d spill something on that person’s coat on the way out. _____
j) I’d think it must have been an accident. I’m sure the person didn’t _____
mean it.
k) I’d bump the person back and make sure he or she spilled something. _____
l) I’d forget about it and go about my business. _____
The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
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1---2---3---4---5
Harmful Beneficial
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you _____
personally?
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the other _____
person?
8. You see a friend being bullied by another person.
1---2---3---4---5
    Not Very Much      Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel, not necessarily what you
would do
b) How much would you feel like getting back at that other person? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 6 questions are about what you would actually do.
l---2---3---4---5
  Not likely                 Very likely
e) I’d snap at a bystander to do something. _____
f) I’d walk away and keep my cool. _____
g) I’d kick myself for doing nothing. _____
h) I’d make a threatening gesture. _____
i) I’d think maybe I was overreacting. _____
j) I’d take the friend’s arm and get him to walk away. _____
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The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful                   Beneficial
k) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for personally? _____
1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the other _____
person?
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
relationship?
9. Your friend makes plans to meet you for lunch, but doesn’t show up.
1---2---3---4---5
    Not Very Much       Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do.
b) How much would you feel like getting back at the friend? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
  Not likely                  Very likely
e) I’d wonder if I’d made a mistake about the time or the place. _____
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t) I’d think that something serious must have come up to make the friend _____
miss lunch.
g) I’d stop speaking to that friend. _____
h) I’d be angry with myself for waiting around. _____
i) I’d just forget about it. _____
j) I’d snarl at the waiter. _____
k) I’d call the friend to yell at him or her for being so thoughtless. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
                Harmful                  Beneficial
1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally?_____
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the friend, _____
personally?
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
relationship?
10. You are driving to the airport to pick up a friend and get stuck in traffic.
1---2---3---4---5
 Not Very Much                   Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at someone or something? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
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The next 5 questions are about what you would actually do.
l---2---3---4---5
 Not likely                 Very likely
e) I’d turn on my favorite radio station to relax. _____
f) I’d honk my horn repeatedly. _____
g) I’d think the plane will probably be late anyway. _____
h) I’d shove people out of my way once I got to the airport. _____
i) I’d be angry with myself for not having left earlier. _____
The next question is about the long-term consequences of how you would handle
the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you think
things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
   Harmful                  Beneficial
j) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial? _____
11. You are driving along at the speed limit and the person behind you is
right on your bumper.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much       Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do.
b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
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The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do.
l---2---3---4---5
         Not likely           Very likely
e) I’d be angry at myself for letting it bother me. _____
f) I’d wonder if l was going slower than I thought. _____
g) I’d make some nasty gesture at that driver. _____
h) I’d change lanes and let the car go by. _____
i) I’d just keep going the speed limit and I’d ignore it. _____
j) I’d pound the dashboard. _____
k) I’d take down the driver’s license plate number and report it to the _____
police.
The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful                  Beneficial
1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for _____
personally?
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the _____
driver personally?
12. While arguing with your brother, he pushes you.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much       Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do.
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b) How much would you feel like getting back at your brother? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
  Not likely                  Very likely
e) I’d hit him as hard as I could. _____
f) I’d be angry with myself for getting into it. I should know better than _____
to argue with him.
g) I’d tell my brother he’d hurt me, and ask if we could talkabout what _____
was bothering him.
h) I’d walk away. _____
i) I’d hit my younger brother or sister later. _____
j) I’d think my brother was having a bad day. _____
k) I’d destroy something important to him. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
    Harmful                 Beneficial
1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for personally? _____
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your brother _____
personally?
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
relationship with your brother?
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13. A co-worker makes a mistake and blames it on you.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much  Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at the co-worker? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
 Not likely                   Very likely
e) I’d shove the next person that spoke to me. _____
1) I’d corner the co-worker and yell at him or her for being such a liar. _____
g) I’d start a rumor that would ruin that co-worker’s reputation. _____
h) I’d talk it over with the co-worker to try to clear things up. _____
i) I’d go home early. _____
j) I’d think about the co-worker over and over and really come to hate. _____
the person
k) I’d wonder if maybe I d1 have something to do with it. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
               Harmful                   Beneficial
l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____
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m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the co-worker, _____
personally?
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
relationship with the co-worker?
14. You are arguing with your spouse or partner and a friend tries to
interfere.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much      Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at the friend? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
  Not likely           Very likely
e) I’d yell at the friend to mind their own business. _____
f) The more I’d think about the friend’s interruption, the angrier I’d get. _____
g) I’d stop speaking to the friend. _____
h) I’d leave the room to calm myself down. _____
i) I’d go into the kitchen and break something. _____
j) I’d tell the friend I appreciate the concern, but I’d like to keep this between me
and my partner. _____
k) I’d decide it’s OK if the friend wants to put in a word or two. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
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1---2---3---4---5
Harmful                 Beneficial
l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the friend, _____
personally?
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
relationship with the friend?
15. You are walking along on a rainy day, and a car speeds past, splashing
you with muddy water.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much      Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do
b) How much would you feel like getting back at the driver? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
 Not likely                  Very likely
e) I’d take down the license plate number and report the driver for _____
reckless driving.
f) I’d figure it was just an accident. The driver didn’t see me. _____
g) I’d go home. wash up, and change clothes. _____
h) I’d just shrug it off. Worse things happen. _____
i) I’d make a joke about it being “just one of those days”. _____
j) I’d throw down my umbrella. _____
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k) I’d be furious with myself for walking so close to the road. _____
The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
 Harmful                   Beneficial
l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you, _____
personally?
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the driver _____
personally?
16. You find out a “friend” was talking about you behind your back.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much       Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would thy:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her? _____
c) How much would you feel. like fixing the situation? _____
 d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
1---2---3---4---5
 Not likely                   Very likely
e) I’d slam the door in the friend’s face next time he or she came by. _____
f) I’d do something I enjoy to get my mind off of it. _____
g) I’d tell all our friends this person can’t be trusted. _____
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h) I’d think maybe the friend just slipped, and the whole thing was blown _____
out of proportion.
i) I wouldn’t really care what he or she thinks. It wasn’t a good friend _____
anyway
j) I’d ask the friend why we couldn’t talk to each other about things that _____
are bothering us.
k) I’d take it out on another friend by being short-tempered. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful                     Beneficial
l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the friend, _____
personally?
n)Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you _____
relationship?
17. You find out from your boss that a fellow co-worker has complained
about your  work.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much        Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at the co-worker? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
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The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
  Not likely                  Very likely
e) I’d try to look calm, but inside I’d be furious for a long time. _____
f) I’d think that the co-worker didn’t mean to cause trouble. _____
g) I’d make a point to tell other co-workers about what he or she had done._____
h) I’d shove the co-worker up against a wall. _____
i) Once alone, I’d throw something across the room. _____
j) I’d calmly discuss the situation with the co-worker and ask him/her to speak
with me first when there are complaints. _____
k) I’d just ignore the situation and go about work as usual. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful                   Beneficial
l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you _____
personally?
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or be for the co-worker _____
personally?
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
relationship?
18. You are waiting in line for a movie and someone cuts in front of you.
1---2---3---4---5
    Not Very Much      Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her? _____
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c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
 Not likely                  Very likely
e) I’d ask the manager to speak to the person. _____
f) I’d tell the other people in the line how rude the person was. _____
g) I’d just ignore it. _____
h) I’d snap at the ticket clerk. _____
i) I’d remind myself that it’s no big deal. There will be plenty of seats. _____
j) I wouldn’t say anything, but I’d be so angry I couldn’t enjoy the movie. _____
k) I’d shove the person back out of line. _____
The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful                   Beneficial
1) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you _____
personally?
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for that person? _____
19. Someone you have just met treats you like you are not good enough.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much       Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at that person? _____
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c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
 Not likely                  Very likely
e) I’d make a nasty gesture in the person’s face. _____
f) I’d tell everyone what a snob that person is. _____
g) I’d calmly explain that I didn’t appreciate how he or she was treating me.____
h) I’d excuse myself from the conversation. _____
i) I’d think the person doesn’t realize how he or she is coming across. _____
j) I’d hit the next person I saw. _____
k) I’d wonder if I was being too sensitive. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
               Harmful                    Beneficial
l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you _____
personally?
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for that person? _____
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the _____
relationship?
20. A person who has kept you waiting before is late again for an
appointment.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much     Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
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The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
  Not likely                  Very likely
e) I’d ask the person to call next time he or she is going to be late. _____
f) I wouldn’t show up for our next appointment. _____
g) I’d be furious with myself for waiting. _____
h) I’d kick something near by. _____
i) I’d read something to calm down. _____
j) I’d wonder if I’d made a mistake about the time of our _____
appointment.
k) I’d yell at the person for being so inconsiderate. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful                  Beneficial
l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you _____
personally?
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for that person? _____
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the _____
relationship?
21. You see an older person pushed aside by someone in a hurry.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much       Very Much
244
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at that person? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
  Not likely                  Very likely
e) I’d talk loudly about how I hate people who push and shove. _____
f) I’d yell at the person and call him or her names. _____
g) I’d think it was just a little bump. _____
h) I’d make sure the older person was all right. _____
i) I’d trip the next person that ran by in a hurry. _____
j) I’d be steamed all day about the incident. _____
k) I’d just ignore it. _____
The next 2 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful                  Beneficial
l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you personally? _____
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for that person? _____
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22. A neighbor’s dog barks all night while you are trying to sleep.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much       Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at someone or something? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
  Not likely                 Very likely
e) I’d go to work the next day and be grumpy with my fellow workers. _____
f) I’d just lay there until I fell asleep. _____
g) I’d think I’m just a light sleeper. _____
h) I’d complain to the other neighbors about the problem with the dog. _____
i) The more the dog barked, the more it would get on my nerves and the _____
angrier I would get.
j) I’d ask the neighbor to try to keep the dog quiet during the night. _____
k) I’d call the neighbor and yell at him to shut his dog up. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
1---2---3---4---5
Harmful                  Beneficial
l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for you _____
personally?
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the neighbor _____
personally?
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n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the _____
relationship?
23. You tell a friend about a problem and your friend doesn’t take it
seriously.
1---2---3---4---5
     Not Very Much       Very Much
a) How angry would you be in this situation? _____
The next 3 questions are about how you would feel not necessarily what you
would do:
b) How much would you feel like getting back at him or her? _____
c) How much would you feel like fixing the situation? _____
d) How much would you feel like letting off steam? _____
The next 7 questions are about what you would actually do:
l---2---3---4---5
  Not likely                  Very likely
e) I’d be nice to the friend but my anger would build inside. _____
f) I’d pound on the wall. _____
g) I’d never speak to the friend again. _____
h) I’d grab the friend and force him or her out the door. _____
 i) I’d think maybe the friend is making light of this problem to cheer me _____
up.
j) I’d make a joke to lighten up the conversation. _____
k) I’d tell my problem to someone else who would take it seriously. _____
The next 3 questions are about the long-term consequences of how you would
handle the situation. Looking back over what you would actually do, how do you
think things would turn out in the long-run?
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1---2---3---4---5
               Harmful                   Beneficial
l) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for personally? _____
m) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for the friend, _____
personally?
n) Would the long-term effect be harmful or beneficial for your _____
relationship with the friend?
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Appendix F
Test of Self-Conscious Acts (TOSCA)
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day—to—day life,
followed by several common reactions to those situations.
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate
how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to
rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same
situation, or they may react different ways at different times. Rate them on a scale
of 1 to 5 according to the figure below:
1---2---3---4---5
         Not likely Very likely
For example:
A. You wake early one Saturday morning It is cold and rainy outside
a) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news. __1___
b) You would take the extra time to read the paper. __5___
c) You would feel disappointed that it’s raining. __3___
d) You would wonder why you woke up so early. __4___
In the above example, I’ve rated of the answers by writing a number “1” for
answer (a) because I wouldn’t want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday
morning —— so it’s not at all likely that I would do that. I wrote a “5” for answer
(b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very
likely). I wrote a “3” for answer (C) because for me it’s about half and half.
Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn’t ——
it would depend on what I had planned. And I wrote a “4” for answer (d) because
I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.
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Please do not skip any items —— rate all responses.
1---2---3---4---5
  Not likely      Very likely
1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch At 5 o’clock, you realize they’ve
stood you up:
a) You would think: “I’m inconsiderate.” _____
b) You would think: “Well, they’ll understand.” _____
C)You would try to make it up to him as soon as _____
possible.
d) You would think: “My boss distracted me just _____
before lunch.”
2. You break something at work and then hide it.
a) You would think: “This is making me anxious. I _____
need to either fix it or get someone else to.”
b) You would think about quitting. _____
c) You would think: “A lot of things aren’t made very _____
well these days.”
d) You would think: “It was only an accident.”         _____
3. You are out with friends one evening and you’re feeling especially witty and
attractive. Your best friend’s spouse seems to particularly en-joy your company
a) You would think: “I should have been aware of what
my best friend is feeling.” _____
b) You would feel happy with your appearance and personality, _____
c) You would feel pleased to have made such a good impression. _____
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1---2---3---4---5
 Not likely      Very likely
d) You would think your best friend should pay attention to his/her _____
spouse.
e) You would probably avoid eye-contact for a long time. _____
4. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project and it turns out badly
a) You would feel incompetent. _____
b) You would think: “There are never enough hours in the day.” _____
c) You would feel: “I deserve to be reprimanded.” _____
d) You would think: “What’s done is done.” _____
5. You make a mistake at work and find out a co—worker is blamed for the error
a) You would think the company did not like the co—worker. _____
b) You would think: “Life is not fair.” _____
c) You would keep quiet and avoid the co—worker. _____
d) You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation. _____
6. For several days put off making a difficult phone call. At the last minute you
make the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well.
a) You would think: “1 guess I’m more persuasive than I thought.” _____
b) You would regret that you put it off. _____
c) You would feel like a coward. _____
d) You would think: “I did a good job.” _____
e) You would think you shouldn’t have to make calls you feel
pressured into. _____
251
1---2---3---4---5
  Not likely       Very likely
7. You make a commitment to diet but when you pass the bakery a dozen donuts
a) Next meal, you would eat celery to make up for it. _____
b) You would think: “They looked too good to pass by.” _____
c) You would feel disgusted with your lack of will power and
self-control. _____
d) You would think: “Once wont matter.” _____
8. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face:
a) You would feel inadequate that you can’t even throw a ball. _____
b) You would think maybe your friend needs more practice at catching. _____
c) You would think: “It was just an accident.” _____
d) You would apologize and make sure your friend was okay. _____
9. You have recently moved away from your family and everyone has been very
helpful A few times needed to borrow money but you paid back as soon as you
could
a) You would feel immature. _____
b) You would think: “I sure ran into some bad luck.” _____
c) You would return the favor as quickly as you could. _____
d) You would think: “I am a trustworthy person.” _____
e) You would be proud that you repaid your debts. _____
10. You are driving down the road and you hit a small animal
a) You would think the animal shouldn’t have been on the road. _____
b) You would think: “I’m terrible.” _____
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c) You would feel: “Well, it was an accident.” _____
d) You would probably think it over several times wondering if you could have
avoided it. _____
1---2---3---4---5
  Not likely      Very likely
11. You walk out of an exam thinking did extremely well did poorly
a) You would think: “Well, it’s just a test.” _____
b) You would think: “The instructor doesn’t like me.” _____
c) You would think: “1 should have studied harder.” _____
d) You would feel stupid. _____
12. You and a group of co-workers worked very hard on a project out for a bonus
because the project was such a success
a) You would feel the boss is rather short-sighted. _____
b) You would feel alone and apart from your colleagues. _____
c) You would feel your hard work had paid off. _____
d) You would feel competent and proud of yourself. _____
e) You would feel you should not accept it. _____
13. While out with a group of friends make fun of a friend who’s not there
a) You would think: “It was all in fun; it’s harmless.” _____
b) You would feel small, “like a rat.” _____
c) You would think that perhaps that friend should _____
have been there to defend himself/herself. _____
d) You would apologize and talk about that person’s good points, _____
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14. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were
depending on you and your boss criticizes
a) You would think your boss should have been clearer about what
was expected of you. _____
1---2---3---4---5
  Not likely      Very likely
b) You would feel like you wanted to hide. _____
C) You would think: “I should have recognized the problem and done
a better job.” _____
d) You would think: “Well, nobody’s perfect.” _____
15. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped
children It turns out to be frustrating and time—consuming work You think
seriously about quitting but then y see how happy the kids are.
a) You would feel selfish and you’d think you are basically lazy. _____
b) You would feel you were forced into doing something you did
not want to do. _____
c) You would think: “I should be more concerned about people who
are less fortunate.” _____
d) You would feel great that you had helped others. _____
e) You would feel very satisfied with yourself. _____
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Appendix G
Demographics Form
Number ___________
Demographic Information
GENDER Male Female
AGE ________
ETHNICITY ________________________________________________
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION ___________________________________
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Appendix H
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Excluded from the Study
Mean Standard Deviation N
TOSCA
Detachment 31.56 5.39 128
Pride in Self 20.99 2.54 128
Pride in Actions 21.18 5.76 128
ARI
Anger Level 85.39 9.54 128
Physical Aggress 66.42 11.22 128
Verbal Aggress 71.51 6.32 128
Reappraisal 66.64 11.35 128
Projected Outcomes 
For Self 66.67 11.43 128
For Other 64.56 10.99 128
For Relationship 43.94 8.85 128
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